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                    <channel>
        <title>Join the conversation</title>
        <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com</link>
        <description>On the Forum you can ask questions or take part in discussions.</description>
                <item>
            <title>Google reCaptcha Enterprise keeps spinning endlessly</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/fraud-defense-recaptcha-6/google-recaptcha-enterprise-keeps-spinning-endlessly-6864</link>
            <description>Hello dear community,  We are using  “I’m not a robot” checkbox from Google reCaptcha Enterprise and currently facing some issues from time to time. I hope the community and Google team can assist here.Sometimes our users encountering endless spinning on reCaptcha checkbox after clicking it. Some users waited 30, 40 seconds, then had to refresh the page and try again to click (later it passed well).Browser - Chrome	No blocking extensions, happened also in incognito mode	Not a case of additional challenge by reCaptcha, just keeps loading Below you can see a screenshot of it’s loading, taken after 30 seconds right after the click on the checkbox.  Did anyone else experienced this? I would appreciate any suggestions or solutions. Thank you!</description>
            <category>Fraud Defense (reCAPTCHA)</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 15:33:07 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Submitting Custom SIEM Integration Components to Google SecOps Content Hub</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/submitting-custom-siem-integration-components-to-google-secops-content-hub-8563</link>
            <description>I have a few questions regarding the contribution process and how these components become available in Google SecOps SIEM.1. Parser Submission	What is the process for submitting a custom parser to the Content Hub repository?			Once a parser is submitted and merged, how will it be reflected or made available in Google SecOps SIEM?			Are there any specific validation, review, or approval steps involved?			Is the submission process different for Google SecOps partners compared to community contributors?	2. Ingestion Script Submission	Can we submit a Pull Request (PR) for a custom ingestion script to the Content Hub repository?			Is there a repository or section in Content Hub where we can browse and view the available ingestion scripts?	3. Dashboards and Detection Rules	What is the process for submitting custom dashboards and detection rules associated with a custom SIEM integration?			Can these components also be contributed to the Content Hub repository through PRs?			Once approved and merged, how are these dashboards and detection rules made available to Google SecOps users?			Are there any specific guidelines or separate submission processes for partners and community contributors?	Thanks in advance for your guidance!</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 08:00:37 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Adding new use cases and actions to existing Google-built integrations: what are the options?</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/adding-new-use-cases-and-actions-to-existing-google-built-integrations-what-are-the-options-8507</link>
            <description>Hi all,We have a requirement to add new use cases and actions to a few existing integrations:One integration is built and managed by the Google team, and it is available in the content-hub GitHub repo.	The other integration is part of a content pack, and it is not available in the GitHub repo.Is there an option to contribute these changes to the existing integrations? Or do we have to create a new community or partner integration, cloned from the existing one?Specifically:For the integration in the GitHub repo, can we submit a PR, or should we send an enhancement request?	For the content-pack-only integration, where does the source live, and how can we contribute until it is added to the repo?	Is there a documented process for this, and who is the right contact?Thanks!</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 19:40:41 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>No return contact from sales</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/no-return-contact-from-sales-443</link>
            <description>@travisn&amp;nbsp;
Hello,
Like others have written here, I too have contacted sales numerous times via the online chat function with no response. I was able to get one person to email me, but when I replied with a few questions I never heard back.
I really need to hear back from someone soon. I find the lack of follow through very concerning.
Thank you</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 14:23:47 +0100</pubDate>
        </item>
                <item>
            <title>Forwarded Calls &amp; Texts Between 2 Google Fi Accounts Were Blocked</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/forwarded-calls-texts-between-2-google-fi-accounts-were-blocked-8561</link>
            <description>Hi, I set up Call Forwarding from Google Fi account X to Google Fi account BThe number @ account B was verified.For more than 1 week, no Calls and Texts were forwarded from account X to account B.Then it was forwarded when I raised the issue with an agent @ Google Fi. But it stopped after that chat. The agent said he found nothing wrong. I believed the hacker intercepted the data and blocked it. The hacker do not want me to get out his orbit. The Cloud Community may be able to look into this. I will provide more details upon request. Sincerely,</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 14:18:41 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Secure Web Proxy: identifying Cloud Run (Direct VPC egress) workloads with secure tags instead of service accounts</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/cloud-security-foundation-7/secure-web-proxy-identifying-cloud-run-direct-vpc-egress-workloads-with-secure-tags-instead-of-service-accounts-8564</link>
            <description>Hi,We&#039;re designing a Secure Web Proxy (SWP) rule model for a multi-business-unit (BU) organization. For VMs we identify the BU with an organization-level secure tag (purpose GCE_FIREWALL, organization=auto) and source.matchTag() in gateway security policy rules. This works well in our lab: same VPC, VPC peering, Private Service Connect, and across projects.For Cloud Run with Direct VPC egress we hit a wall:1. Binding a GCE_FIREWALL tag value to a Cloud Run service fails with:   &quot;FAILED_PRECONDITION: Only compute instances can be bound to tag values with purposed tag key parents.&quot;2. A tag without purpose binds fine, but SWP doesn&#039;t match it. source.matchTag() returns no match and the request ends in default_denied, also after a new revision.3. source.matchServiceAccount() works for the same Cloud Run services, over both PSC and VPC peering (clientServiceAccount is logged correctly).Questions:- Is there any supported way to identify Cloud Run (Direct VPC egress) traffic in SWP by a secure tag or another group-level attribute, rather than by individual service accounts?- Is secure tag support for Cloud Run in SWP on the roadmap?- If service accounts are the only option, what&#039;s the recommended pattern for grouping many Cloud Run services per BU, given the 2,048-character matcher limit per rule?- The &quot;Supported identities&quot; table on the SWP policies overview page isn&#039;t clear for &quot;Direct VPC for Cloud Run&quot; (footnote 1 on service accounts, secure tags column). Could you confirm what is supported?We also looked at authorization policies, but they need TLS inspection and still require GCE_FIREWALL tags, so they don&#039;t seem to change this for Cloud Run.Thanks!</description>
            <category>Cloud Security Foundation</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 10:43:34 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>What’s New in Google SecOps: 2026–11–16</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/what-s-new-in-secops-91/what-s-new-in-google-secops-2026-11-16-8562</link>
            <description>What’s New in Google SecOps for the interval Nov 9th through Nov 15th, 2026. What’s New in Google SecOps, November 15th 2026Highlights In Google SecOps and cloud security news:	 SentinelOne and Google SecOps announced a partnership for autonomous, cloud-speed defense with improved endpoint telemetry transfer and lower alert latency, while Bindplane’s AI Agent reached general availability.			 Google Cloud debuted the Professional Agentic Architect certification, shared guidance on running CodeMender in pull requests, open-sourced A2UI 1.0, earned Leader (furthest in vision) in Gartner’s Magic Quadrant for Data Lakehouse Platforms, and published its 2027 security forecast (also featured on YouTube).			 Wiz detailed a critical Apache HTTP Server RCE (CVE-2026–119618) affecting 64% of cloud environments, Qubole cross-account abuse, Green Agent remediation workflows, ASPM at code speed, and AI agent cybersecurity benchmarks.			 In community and platform updates, the Google Cloud Security Community covered securing the Bindplane pipeline into Google SecOps and a four-part series on Connecting the Dots to GTI, alongside four active Google SecOps status updates covering scheduled dashboard report failures, us-multi latencies, and US normalization delays.	 Product Updates &amp;amp; New Features BindPlane   Bindplane’s AI Agent is now generally available, plus what else we’re bringing to KubeCon NA 2026 from Bindplane Blog	Bindplane has announced the general availability of its AI Agent and will be showcasing several new updates and giving talks at KubeCon + CloudNativeCon North America. Read More	 Google Cloud   Autonomous defense at cloud speed with SentinelOne and Google Security Operations from Google Cloud Blog	SentinelOne and Google Security Operations are partnering to provide autonomous, cloud-speed defense, addressing the pipeline dilemma in modern SOCs by improving endpoint telemetry transfer and reducing alert latency. Read More	 Google named the furthest in vision for the Gartner Magic Quadrant for Data Lakehouse Platforms from Google Cloud Blog	Google Cloud has been named a Leader, positioned furthest in vision, in Gartner’s inaugural Magic Quadrant for Data Lakehouse Platforms, validating its enterprise lakehouse strategy for the agentic era. Read More	 Don’t just prompt AI — architect it: Introducing the Professional Agentic Architect Certification from Google Cloud Blog	Google Cloud has introduced the Professional Agentic Architect certification to validate expertise in designing and building production-ready AI agents. Read More	 Don’t just flag it, fix it: How to run CodeMender in your pull requests from Google Cloud Blog	Google’s CodeMender helps developers automatically fix software flaws in complex code generated by agentic tools, and this article provides guidance on integrating it into pull requests. Read More	 Cloud CISO Perspectives: Our security forecast for 2027 from Google Cloud Blog	The article presents Google’s Cloud CISO Perspectives for November 2026, sharing their security forecast for 2027 with insights from leaders at Google, Google Cloud, and Mandiant. Read More	  A2UI 1.0: Build delightful, fast, reliable, agentic experiences from Google Developers Blog	A2UI 1.0 is an open protocol for generative UI that allows AI agents to render interactive, native screens across web, mobile, and desktop applications, supported by various open-source SDKs for seamless integration. Read More	 Community &amp;amp; Events  Tuesday’s Tip: Securing the Bindplane Pipeline into Google SecOps from Google Cloud Security Community	This tip for SecOps engineers details how the Bindplane server controls data collection and binary execution, explaining potential attacker actions and outlining controls to reduce security risks. Read More	 Connecting the Dots to GTI from Google Cloud Security Community	A multi-part series exploring Google Threat Intelligence (GTI), sharing a journey of understanding GTI from an external perspective. Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4	 Podcasts &amp;amp; YouTube  Security 2027: How We Defend What’s Next from YouTube	A discussion about future security strategies and how to protect against emerging threats by the year 2027 from Google Cloud. Read More	Google Cloud Security: Security 2027, How We Defend What’s Next Wiz  The Green Agent POV: Formulating the Fix for an Internet-Facing Container with Sensitive Data Access from Wiz Blog	The article describes how the ‘Green Agent’ developed an executable remediation plan and ready-to-merge pull requests to fix a critical security issue involving an internet-facing container with sensitive data, balancing security urgency with business continuity. Read More	 ASPM in the AI Era Part 3: Fixing Risk at the Speed of Code from Wiz Blog	This article, part of a series, focuses on improving Application Security Posture Management (ASPM) in the AI era by accelerating remediation and eliminating bottlenecks through simplified ownership, code fixes, and automated workflows. Read More	 Critical RCE Vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server: Everything You Need To Know from Wiz Blog	A critical RCE vulnerability, CVE-2026–119618, has been identified in Apache HTTP Server, affecting 64% of cloud environments according to Wiz data, necessitating immediate patching. Read More	 How to Evaluate AI Agent Cybersecurity Capabilities from Wiz Blog	The article provides a tutorial on how to evaluate the cybersecurity capabilities of AI agents by building benchmarks for offensive agents, based on Wiz’s Cyber Model Arena. Read More	 Wiz and ISMAP: Building the Foundation for Japan’s Public Sector from Wiz Blog	Wiz is actively pursuing compliance with Japan’s ISMAP standard, including a gap assessment and ISO alignment, to offer its cloud security services to the Japanese public sector. Read More	 Trusted by Default: Qubole Cross-Account Access Abused in the Wild from Wiz Blog	A threat actor exploited Qubole’s cross-account access mechanism, using IAM credentials from Qubole’s AWS account to compromise customer AWS environments. Read More	 Platform Issues  RESOLVED: Google SecOps is experiencing intermittent issues with Public Preview PDF and PNG scheduled dashboard reports across multiple regions from Google Cloud Status	Google SecOps is experiencing intermittent issues with Public Preview PDF and PNG scheduled dashboard reports across multiple regions, starting November 12, 2026. Read More	 RESOLVED: Google SecOps is experiencing an issue with Public Preview PDF and PNG scheduled dashboard reports across multiple regions from Google Cloud Status	Google SecOps is experiencing an issue across multiple regions where Public Preview PDF and PNG scheduled dashboard reports may fail. Read More	 RESOLVED: Google SecOps customers are experiencing elevated latencies for searches, detections and dashboards in the us-multi region from Google Cloud Status	Google SecOps customers are experiencing elevated latencies and retriable errors for searches, detections, and dashboards in the us-multi region. Read More	 RESOLVED: Google SecOps customers are experiencing delays in normalization from Google Cloud Status	Google SecOps customers are experiencing delays in data normalization, with an incident starting on November 7, 2026, impacting availability of new data in US regions. Read More</description>
            <category>What&#039;s New in SecOps</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 09:08:48 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Is billed volume measured before or after a data processing pipeline?</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/is-billed-volume-measured-before-or-after-a-data-processing-pipeline-8557</link>
            <description>Hi all,I have WINEVTLOG arriving via the Ingestion API (Bindplane agents and gateways) into Google SecOps. I plan to add a data processing pipeline on that stream with a Transform processor that shortens each log.The documentation says:&quot;View billed ingestion volume&quot;: billing is based on raw log bytes ingested, measured from ingestion metrics with component = &quot;Ingestion API&quot;.	&quot;Manage data processing pipelines&quot;: pipeline filters are applied after data has been received by the Chronicle Ingestion API.So:Is billed volume based on the log size before the pipeline or after it?	Does the same apply when a pipeline Filter drops a log entirely?Thanks.</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 15:24:42 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Building Autonomous Telemetry Agents in Google SecOps: Deep Dive into Our Chronicle UDM Search Agent, Defender KQL &amp; Entra Loops</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/building-autonomous-telemetry-agents-in-google-secops-deep-dive-into-our-chronicle-udm-search-agent-defender-kql-entra-loops-8560</link>
            <description>Hi everyone,As security operations scale, one of the biggest bottlenecks in triage and incident response is the mechanical grind of gathering forensic telemetry. When an alert fires, analysts and playbooks are forced to manually pivot into Chronicle SIEM, craft UDM queries, sift through hundreds of events, identify rare outliers, pivot to endpoint EDR (like Defender XDR), and cross-check cloud identity logs in Entra ID.Over the past few months, we designed and deployed an Autonomous Multi-Agent Investigation Architecture inside Google SecOps SOAR, powered natively by Gemini SecOps.In this post, I want to share how our Autonomous Chronicle UDM Search Agent works under the hood, how we expanded this pattern to Microsoft Defender XDR and Entra ID, how we leverage the different Gemini SecOps Personas, and how the combination of Authoritative Data Models and DFIR Skills keeps the system deterministic and grounded.1. The Core Engine: The Autonomous Chronicle UDM Search AgentRather than relying on static, hardcoded playbook blocks with rigid query templates, our UDM Search Agent operates as an autonomous forensic investigator:A. Dynamic Query Synthesis (Zero Python Reasoning Gates)The agent receives a high-level investigation directive from upstream triage (for example: Audit child processes spawned by powershell.exe and verify whether external outbound network connections occurred around 14:22 UTC). Instead of using brittle regexes or hardcoded string rules in Python, the agent prompts Gemini SecOps referencing our authoritative UDM schema to synthesize syntactically valid, strongly scoped Chronicle UDM queries dynamically.B. Adaptive Aggregation &amp;amp; The Saturation Cap (Pivot / Table View)In enterprise environments, a broad query can return thousands of noisy events. Our agent enforces an automatic 25-event saturation cap:Direct Pluck: If the query returns fewer than 25 events, the agent plucks high-signal forensic evidence directly (target processes, file hashes, remote network endpoints, user identity).	Adaptive Pivot on Saturation: If total events reach or exceed 25, the agent automatically pivots to an Aggregated Table Search (grouping by target entity over time, ordered by frequency). Gemini SecOps evaluates the resulting table view to isolate 1-off outliers and rare long-tail telemetry (prioritizing external routable traffic over known internal subnets), synthesizes a surgical micro-query targeting the outlier, and extracts the exact evidence needed.C. The &quot;Pure Evidence Gatekeeper&quot; Invariant (The Lab vs. The Judge)A key lesson from production: telemetry gatherers must never act as the judge.Our UDM Search Agent acts strictly as an expert forensic witness. It extracts and summarizes factual telemetry (events found, process lineage, connection endpoints). It is explicitly forbidden from issuing overall case verdicts or threat classifications (such as marking an unexecuted phishing payload as &quot;Benign&quot; simply because network sockets were empty). Threat adjudication happens downstream once all evidence is gathered.2. Expanding to Endpoint &amp;amp; Identity: Defender XDR &amp;amp; Entra ID LoopsAdversary activity rarely stays in a single log source. Using the same architectural framework, we built companion agents to provide 360-degree visibility across endpoints and identity:1. Autonomous Defender KQL Hunting Loop (Microsoft Defender XDR)Scope: Advanced hunting across 25 verified, compiler-grounded hunting tables (DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents, UrlClickEvents, CloudAppEvents, EmailEvents, etc.).	Dynamic KQL Generation: Generates multi-table KQL joins while preserving strict endpoint scoping (DeviceName).	Lineage &amp;amp; In-Memory Forensics: Reconstructs dual-process trees (InitiatingProcess vs. TargetProcess) and recursively decodes Base64 encoded PowerShell commands in memory.2. Autonomous Entra Forensic Loop (Microsoft Entra ID)Scope: Cloud authentication and sign-in forensics bridging Entra ID and Active Directory Domain Controllers (AADSignInEventsBeta, IdentityLogonEvents, IdentityDirectoryEvents).	Cloud Boundary Awareness: Dynamically routes queries based on network boundaries—omitting private RFC1918 subnets from cloud sign-in logs and querying domain controller logon events for internal authentications.	Identity Anomaly Detection: Identifies anomalous sign-ins, conditional access policy evaluations, and impossible travel patterns.3. How We Leverage the 5 Gemini SecOps PersonasGoogle SecOps Gemini includes distinct operational personas. Rather than treating Gemini as a generic one-size-fits-all model, our agents explicitly engage the right persona for each phase:Hunter (Threat Hunter &amp;amp; Detection Engineer): Used in UDM and KQL query formulation. Decomposes triggering YARA-L detection logic, identifies key forensic pivot fields, analyzes attack tradecraft, and plans targeted hunt paths.	SOAR (Security Automation Engineer): Used in action architecture and orchestration. Generates resilient Python actions, manages API connection pooling, enforces exponential backoff (handling transient HTTP 429/503 errors), and guarantees session cleanup.	Analyst (Security Analyst / Triage &amp;amp; IR): Used in telemetry plucking and forensic fact-finding. Evaluates process lineages, timeline sequences, and factual evidence without confirmation bias.	CTI (Threat Intelligence Analyst): Used in threat intelligence grounding. Evaluates extracted hashes, domains, and IPs against Mandiant Frontline Threat Intelligence and VirusTotal multi-engine telemetry to attribute threat actors, campaigns, and malware families.	Advisor (Unified Security Advisor): Used in containment gating and peer review. Evaluates systemic blast radius (e.g., Domain Controller vs. clinical workstation) and conducts independent peer review to prevent false auto-containment actions.4. The Foundation: Data Models and Modular SkillsTo ensure our agents remain completely deterministic and never hallucinate syntax or fields, we built our architecture on two pillars:A. Authoritative Data Models (Principles in Prompts, Entities in Dictionaries)A core rule we enforce: Prompts contain principles; data models contain entities. We never inject long, brittle lists into prompts (e.g., no hardcoded lists of executables or flags). Instead, we supply strongly typed data models:UDM Schema Vocabulary: Strongly typed Chronicle UDM field paths across 15 domains (Execution, Disk/Registry, Identity/Auth, Network, SaaS, and Governance).	Ingestion Source Mappings: Verified enterprise log source mappings (CrowdStrike EDR, Windows Event Logs, Sysmon, Abnormal Security, Defender ATP).	KQL &amp;amp; Entra Schema Vocabularies: 25 verified hunting tables, field contracts, and relational syntax rules.	Enterprise Environment Models: Codified internal CIDRs, corporate domains, and vulnerability scanner subnets so the model knows what is internal vs. external.B. Modular DFIR SkillsSkills act as domain-specific playbooks and forensic procedures that guide agent behaviors:Encoded PowerShell Decoding: Multi-layer recursive unwrapping of Base64 wrappers, Shannon entropy analysis, and script sandboxing.	CMDB &amp;amp; Change Control Grounding: Validating whether an observed administrative command is tied to an active ServiceNow Change Request.	Lateral Movement Context: Correlating source-to-target host identity, administrative sessions, and network boundaries.	Chronicle Rule Health Auditing: Monitoring rule runtime execution errors, scan gaps, and outcome variable limits.5. Key Takeaways &amp;amp; Community DiscussionKeep Python Mechanical, Keep AI Cognitive: We use Python strictly for parameter extraction, API transport with exponential backoff, defanging, and data plucking. All semantic reasoning and query formulation belongs to Gemini SecOps.	Never Mock Production Telemetry: Testing against live Chronicle Alpha endpoints and real tenant telemetry exposed API syntax nuances and schema drift that synthetic tests completely hide.	Evidence Over Conclusion: Separating evidence collection (UDM/KQL loops) from final case adjudication eliminated false benign dismissals and gave our SOC complete auditability.We’d love to hear from the community:How are you approaching autonomous or AI-assisted UDM search in your environments?	Are you integrating Chronicle UDM queries with endpoint EDR queries (like Defender or CrowdStrike) inside your SOAR playbooks?	What guardrails have you found most effective when allowing LLMs to synthesize hunting queries?Looking forward to your thoughts and discussion!</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 15:18:08 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>X.509 Workload Identity Federation: STS rejects valid certificate with attribute_condition_rejected</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/cloud-security-foundation-7/x-509-workload-identity-federation-sts-rejects-valid-certificate-with-attribute-condition-rejected-8558</link>
            <description>Google Cloud X.509 WIF — attribute_condition_rejected with an authority-less URN URI SANWe are investigating a production authentication issue involving Google Cloud X.509 Workload Identity Federation.A client presents an existing CA-issued X.509 certificate to https://sts.mtls.googleapis.com/v1/token.The STS exchange returns:HTTP 400unauthorized_clientThe given credential is rejected by the attribute condition.Our provider uses the following mapping:google.subject = assertion.san.uriAnd a condition equivalent to:assertion.san.uri == &quot;urn:example:backup:node-1&quot; &amp;amp;&amp;amp;assertion.sha256Fingerprint == &quot;&amp;lt;standard-padded-Base64-SHA256-of-leaf-DER&amp;gt;&quot;The identifiers above are representative, not our actual production values.Already established:	The certificate contains the expected single URI SAN.			Its locally computed DER SHA-256 fingerprint matches the configured value.			The configured trust anchor matches the intended public CA.			The request construction follows Google&#039;s published X.509 WIF format.			Local OpenSSL verification succeeds.			LibreSSL 3.3.6 reports error 53 (unsupported or invalid name syntax) for the authority-less URI SAN. Its published source explains that local parser behavior.			The provider&#039;s stored mapping and condition were read back and matched the intended configuration.			No successful STS exchange has been observed.	We have not established Google&#039;s actual evaluated assertion values.We need an authoritative answer to four specific questions:	Does Google Cloud X.509 Workload Identity Federation support authority-less, non-hierarchical URI SAN values such as urn:example:backup:node-1 in assertion.san.uri? Is the exact IA5String preserved, or does the extractor require a //host authority component?			Is assertion.sha256Fingerprint guaranteed to use standard RFC 4648 Base64 with padding, as produced by the OpenSSL example in Google&#039;s X.509 documentation? Can this attribute ever use Base64URL or an unpadded representation?			Does unauthorized_client with the attribute-condition rejection message guarantee successful full certificate-chain verification and mTLS-to-subject-token binding, or is that processing order undocumented?			Is there an officially supported read-only diagnostic or evaluation mechanism that can identify which attribute-condition clause failed without changing the provider or making another live STS exchange?	Please cite official documentation, maintained implementation source, or a confirmed Google engineering statement.We are not looking for a generic troubleshooting checklist, replacement credentials, a new CA, or a suggestion to remove the attribute condition.Our objective is to identify the smallest correction that preserves the existing X.509 identity and fingerprint restrictions.Thank you.</description>
            <category>Cloud Security Foundation</category>
            <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 02:07:01 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>SOAR API endpoint - api/external/v1/logging/python</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/soar-api-endpoint-api-external-v1-logging-python-1379</link>
            <description>Hey everyone!Has anyone had success with using this API endpoint on Chronicle SOAR to get Connector logs?/api/external/v1/logging/pythonIt&#039;s visible under Cloud Logging in Swagger. Swagger references the following sample config:&amp;nbsp;  &quot;filter&quot;: &quot;labels.integration_name=\\&quot;Siemplify\\&quot;&quot;,  &quot;pageToken&quot;: &quot;string&quot;,  &quot;pageSize&quot;: 0,  &quot;sortOrder&quot;: &quot;desc&quot;  &amp;nbsp;I&#039;ve been trying to adapt this to get my config working.&amp;nbsp;{ &quot;filter&quot;: &quot;labels.connector_name=\\&quot;My Exchange Mail Connector v2 with Oauth Authentication\\&quot;&quot;, &quot;pageToken&quot;: &quot;string&quot;, &quot;pageSize&quot;: 0,&quot;sortOrder&quot;: &quot;desc&quot; } &#039;&amp;nbsp;In all instances, including just using the sample config, I get a 400 Bad Request error. Is there any documentation surrounding the data structures that we can use in that filter anywhere, or any instances where anyone has got a working configuration?Thought I&#039;d check in on this before going to Support.&amp;nbsp;</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 22:04:32 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Regional Secret Manager IAM condition fails on resource.name — Policy Troubleshooter</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/regional-secret-manager-iam-condition-fails-on-resource-name-policy-troubleshooter-8556</link>
            <description>Hello Google Cloud Community,We are implementing a least-privilege disaster recovery workflow in Google Cloud, using regional Secret Manager in europe-west1, IAM Conditions, Cloud SQL and Cloud Storage.We have two issues that we cannot resolve using the official documentation.Issue 1 — Regional Secret Manager IAM ConditionWe have a regional secret version with the following structure:projects/PROJECT_NUMBER/locations/europe-west1/secrets/SECRET_ID/versions/1A dedicated service account has a custom role containing only secretmanager.versions.access, restricted by this IAM Condition:request.time &amp;lt; timestamp(&quot;2026-11-14T13:44:46Z&quot;) &amp;amp;&amp;amp;resource.type == &quot;secretmanager.googleapis.com/SecretVersion&quot; &amp;amp;&amp;amp;resource.name == &quot;projects/PROJECT_NUMBER/locations/europe-west1/secrets/SECRET_ID/versions/1&quot;Policy Troubleshooter returns:	Principal membership: MATCHED			Required permission: INCLUDED			Time condition: TRUE			Resource type: TRUE			Resource name equality: FALSE			Overall access: CANNOT_ACCESS			Deny policy: NOT_DENIED	We have tested six different resource-name representations using the v3 and v3beta Troubleshooter APIs, without success.Our questions:	What exact resource.name does IAM Conditions evaluate for secretmanager.versions.access on a regional secret version?			How can we grant access exclusively to version 1 of a specific regional secret, without granting access to other versions or regions?			Is there a documented limitation in Policy Troubleshooter when evaluating regional Secret Manager versions?	Issue 2 — Cloud Storage object permissionsPolicy Troubleshooter returns HTTP 400 INVALID_RESOURCE_NAME when evaluating storage.objects.get for an existing GCS object using://storage.googleapis.com/projects/_/buckets/BUCKET/objects/PREFIX/OBJECTWe also tested URL-encoded object paths.Is direct object-level evaluation supported by Policy Troubleshooter?If not, is a metadata-only objects.get request executed under a Workflows service account, with a positive object inside the authorized prefix and a negative object outside it, a supported way to verify the effective IAM restriction?We want to preserve strict least-privilege access. We do not want to grant broad Secret Manager permissions, access all secret versions, or use Owner/Editor roles as a workaround.Thank you for your help. Official documentation or examples of the correct IAM Condition would be greatly appreciated.</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 13:34:58 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Seeking Guidance on Starting My Cloud Security Learning Journey</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/cloud-security-foundation-7/seeking-guidance-on-starting-my-cloud-security-learning-journey-8488</link>
            <description>Hello everyone,I am a beginner interested in learning cloud security and building my knowledge step by step.I would really appreciate your guidance. If you have any recommended learning materials, documentation, practical labs, or resources for beginners, please share them with me.</description>
            <category>Cloud Security Foundation</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 08:46:59 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Google Secops - ServiceNow Integration -Snow Incident creation at case scope.</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/google-secops-servicenow-integration-snow-incident-creation-at-case-scope-8555</link>
            <description>We have a scenario where in we have alert scoped playbook which has a ServiceNow Integration (https://docs.cloud.google.com/chronicle/docs/soar/marketplace-integrations/servicenow) up and running fine.Now we are migrating to a case scoped playbook and want to have one on one parity of GSO case and a Snow Incident. When we try to invoke the same action as part of the case scoped playbook , I’m getting the following error. &quot;Error executing action ServiceNow - Create Incident. Reason: Cannot set alert context property in Case Playbook without specifying a valid alert_group Identifier&quot;Now we have checked with both “create Incident” and “create alert Incident” Actions and the same issue exists.Has someone faced the same issue and know of any resolutions or work around.We have checked the Python Integration script and a custom connector by simply commenting the “setAlertContext” method call , gets the issue fixed.Can someone from the Google Secops Connectors/Integrations Team take a look at this and provide a OOTB fix as part of the connector version updates ? Regards,Venkatesh M S</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 08:29:17 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Syncing Cases Across Greymatter, Servicenow, and Secops</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/syncing-cases-across-greymatter-servicenow-and-secops-8554</link>
            <description>Hello everyone,Has anyone implemented a reliable way to synchronize incidents and cases across ReliaQuest GreyMatter, ServiceNow, and Google SecOps SOAR?We want to maintain linked records across all three platforms and synchronize relevant information, including state/status changes, analyst comments, work notes, and resolution details. Ideally, analysts could work from their respective platforms while keeping the other systems updated.Our current setup	We already have bidirectional synchronization between GreyMatter and ServiceNow.			We use Google SecOps SOAR playbooks that create ServiceNow incidents through the ServiceNow integration actions.			We are evaluating the ServiceNow connector and available synchronization jobs to bring SecOps SOAR into this workflow.	Proposed approachI am considering using ServiceNow as the central source of truth for shared incident information, with GreyMatter and SecOps SOAR synchronizing against the corresponding ServiceNow record. We would also define which platform controls specific fields and how conflicting updates should be handled.The intended behavior would be:	When a SOAR playbook creates a ServiceNow incident, subsequent updates synchronize with the original SOAR case.			When an incident originates in ServiceNow or GreyMatter, a SOAR case is created if a corresponding case does not already exist.			Once linked, the records remain synchronized without duplicate tickets, repeated comments, or updates continuously cycling between platforms.	Main concern: duplicate ingestionMy concern is that a ServiceNow incident created by a SOAR playbook could subsequently be picked up by the ServiceNow connector and ingested as a second SOAR case.From the ServiceNow integration documentation, I see that the ServiceNow – Sync Incidents job uses the ServiceNow Incident Sync tag and a TICKET_ID context value containing the ServiceNow incident number.Could we have the originating playbook set those values immediately after creating the ServiceNow incident to establish the relationship with the existing SOAR case? Would we also need connector filtering or additional correlation logic to prevent that incident from being ingested again?I would appreciate insight into the following:	Architecture: Has anyone successfully used ServiceNow as the central coordination point for these three platforms, or found another approach that works better?			Linking and deduplication: How are you distinguishing ServiceNow incidents created by SOAR from incidents that should create a new SOAR case? Are you using correlation fields, custom fields, connector filters, or another supported mechanism?			Synchronization jobs: Which jobs and configurations are you using to synchronize comments/work notes, status changes, closure, and reopening on existing linked records? Are you maintaining the relationship at the case or alert level?			Update loops and conflicts: How are you preventing copied comments and automated state changes from being treated as new updates and sent back through the integrations?	If anyone has implemented a similar setup, I would appreciate any lessons learned, configuration examples, or limitations to account for before we build this out.Thank you,Blake</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 00:03:19 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Choosing Native WIZ_IO Over Generic OCSF for Wiz Cloud Detections in Google SecOps</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/choosing-native-wiz-io-over-generic-ocsf-for-wiz-cloud-detections-in-google-secops-8553</link>
            <description> Hi Folks,When connecting Wiz Automation Rules or Wiz Workflows to Google SecOps SIEM, I have seen several teams select the OCSF output format assuming an open schema will give them broader compatibility, only to find later that the Wiz Alerts curated rule set in Google SecOps generates zero detections. When you configure a Wiz Automation Rule or Workflow to forward Issues or Detections, choosing the Native data format sends events to the WIZ_IO log type, whereas choosing OCSF sends events to the OCSF log type (https://docs.cloud.google.com/chronicle/docs/ingestion/default-parsers/wiz-io). Switching to the Native data format (while keeping any existing OCSF rule active in parallel during cutover until you confirm WIZ_IO events are normalizing in UDM Search) opens up built in detection coverage for Wiz Detections and cleaner UDM field mappings.Comparing how both formats normalize highlights why this happens. In my experience, when Wiz sends a new detection finding in OCSF format, the event lands under metadata.log_type = &quot;OCSF&quot; with metadata.product_event_type formatted from the OCSF activity ID and name (&quot;1 - Create&quot; for a new finding). While Wiz audit logs map action to metadata.product_event_type, when Wiz forwards a threat detection or cloud issue in the Native data format, WIZ_IO sets metadata.log_type = &quot;WIZ_IO&quot;, populates metadata.vendor_name = &quot;WIZ_IO&quot;, and maps trigger.source into metadata.product_event_type as &quot;DETECTIONS&quot; for detections and either &quot;ISSUE&quot; (from Wiz Automation Rules) or &quot;RISK_ISSUES&quot; (from Wiz Workflows, where creating a separate workflow per stream keeps each trigger template aligned with its source). You can verify how Curated Detections evaluate these fields by opening Content Hub in your console and checking the Rule Definition tab on the Wiz Alerts rule set (https://docs.cloud.google.com/chronicle/docs/secops/content_hub). Because the Wiz Alerts passthrough rules filter specifically for WIZ_IO Detections (with Critical and High rules in Precise and Medium through Informational rules in Broad), OCSF events never match those rules, and Wiz Issues forwarded in the Native data format land in SIEM for search and custom YARA L rules without firing Wiz Alerts.Two testing and filtering quirks are also worth watching for in Wiz. Clicking the manual test button inside Wiz omits trigger.source from the sample webhook payload and WIZ_IO anchors metadata.event_timestamp to issue.created or detection.timeframe.start, so metadata.product_event_type stays empty on manual test sends and older sample findings appear under their original creation timestamp in UDM Search until a live Detection or Issue fires. Additionally, if your Wiz rule forwards resolved issue notifications alongside newly created ones, WIZ_IO still populates metadata.product_event_type and security_result.severity while setting security_result.action_details to &quot;RESOLVED&quot; rather than &quot;OPEN&quot;. If you enable the Wiz Alerts curated rule set for threat detections and also want alerts on open Critical Wiz posture issues (and if your rule forwards issue updates as well, you can add a match window on metadata.product_log_id to deduplicate repeats), you can pair it with a custom YARA L rule targeting open &quot;ISSUE&quot; and &quot;RISK_ISSUES&quot; events: rule wiz_native_critical_cloud_issue {  meta:    author = &quot;SecOps Team&quot;    description = &quot;Surfaces open critical Wiz posture issues that are not covered by the Wiz Alerts passthrough rule set&quot;    severity = &quot;High&quot;  events:    $w.metadata.log_type = &quot;WIZ_IO&quot;    ($w.metadata.product_event_type = &quot;ISSUE&quot; or $w.metadata.product_event_type = &quot;RISK_ISSUES&quot;)    $w.security_result.severity = &quot;CRITICAL&quot;    $w.security_result.action_details = &quot;OPEN&quot;  condition:    $w} One security consideration during setup is that although the Google SecOps parser guide still shows uploading a static service account JSON key with Chronicle API Editor (roles/chronicle.editor), the Google SecOps integration in Wiz also offers a keyless Wiz managed service account option that authenticates to the Chronicle API through Google Cloud IAM, so selecting that keyless Wiz managed identity on your Google SecOps project and granting a custom IAM role with the required ingestion permissions such as chronicle.logs.import (https://docs.cloud.google.com/chronicle/docs/reference/ingestion-methods) alongside any forwarder permissions Wiz requests rather than broad roles/chronicle.editor (or isolating and rotating keys on a dedicated service account if your organization requires customer managed credentials) avoids static JSON keys and limits exposure. Please keep in mind that this is a sample rule provided as an example that we will not be supporting or maintaining, so your team will want to test and maintain it for your environment.</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 23:53:51 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Google SecOps Triage &amp; Investigation Agent experience</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/google-secops-triage-investigation-agent-experience-8275</link>
            <description>Hi everyone,We are currently evaluating the Triage and Investigation Agent (TIN) in Google SecOps, but we haven&#039;t had the opportunity to test it in our environment yet.We would mainly like to understand how well it works overall in a real SOC environment, and also how it performs with third-party security products such as Cortex XDR, CrowdStrike, Fortinet, etc.For those already using it:	Overall, how has your experience with TIN been so far?			Does it genuinely help with triage and investigation, or is it still fairly limited?			How well does it investigate alerts coming from third-party products?			Does it understand and correlate the context properly once those logs are ingested into SecOps?			Have you tested it with Cortex XDR or similar EDR solutions?			Is the TP/FP verdict generally reliable, or do analysts still need to redo most of the investigation manually?			Does it work well with custom detections/YARA-L rules built on top of third-party data?			Are there any important limitations when the alert is not coming from Google&#039;s own security stack?			Has it actually reduced investigation time for your analysts?	We are considering a trial/PoC or potentially purchasing the capability, so any feedback on overall performance, investigation quality, third-party integrations, limitations and real SOC usage would be really useful.Thanks!</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 16:54:52 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Looking for usecases by leveraging WIZ telemetry and Google Secops telemetry</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/looking-for-usecases-by-leveraging-wiz-telemetry-and-google-secops-telemetry-8266</link>
            <description>Hi, I am looking for 4 to 5 usecases by leveraging WIZ telemetry + Google Secops telemetry. Further I want to understand,  the basic differences between Google Security Operations investigations and Blue Agent analysis. it seems both are doing almost similar type of work. Can you help me to understand the difference and similarity. </description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 16:53:43 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Office 365 Parser extension to extract array of mail_ids from InternetmessageID</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/office-365-parser-extension-to-extract-array-of-mail-ids-from-internetmessageid-8249</link>
            <description>Hi Team,We have a sample log where the internetmessageID field is being mapped to network.email.mail_id in UDM. We need to create an array for this field using a parser extension.As I am new to parser development, could someone please guide me on how to implement this or share an example if available?Thanks in advance for your help.</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 16:52:28 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>usage and location of ticked_ids_free_search</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/usage-and-location-of-ticked-ids-free-search-8496</link>
            <description>Hello,Quick question, I’m trying to use “siemplify.get_cases_by_filter()” and I don’t understand the usage of the “ticket_ids_free_search” field.Where are ticket_ids linked to my case? How do I write/read it?Thank you !(Context: I’m trying to use comment syncing with Jira integration, but to do Jira → gsecops, it searches tickets id with ticket_ids_free_search in my cases, but that field seems to not exist.)</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 14:39:15 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Connecting the Dots to GTI (Part 4/4)</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-threat-intelligence-3/connecting-the-dots-to-gti-part-4-4-8552</link>
            <description> This is Part 4 (the finale) of the Connecting the Dots to GTI series. After tracing the history of TAG, VirusTotal, and Mandiant (Part 1), the GTIG/GTI intelligence loop and Diamond Model (Part 2), and how DTM and Google SecOps SOAR cut credential-leak noise in the SOC (Part 3), let&#039;s tackle one final architectural question: how does GTI fit alongside open-source TIPs like OpenCTI and MISP?Disclaimer: This series is built entirely on publicly available material. All views, war stories, and opinions here are strictly my own—not Google speaking officially. OpenCTI and MISPWhen an organization has a dedicated CTI team, they frequently maintain two open-source Threat Intelligence Platforms (TIPs)—the CTI equivalent of a SIEM, built to aggregate, normalize, correlate, and distribute threat feeds: OpenCTI as their central STIX 2.1 knowledge graph and source of truth, and MISP to ingest, curate, and share tactical indicators with external partners.It&#039;s cool, and it&#039;s the power of open source—with all the pros and cons that come with self-hosting. Maintaining containers, Elasticsearch, workers, and connectors, plus curating objects across multiple consoles, eats up engineering time that is almost always scarce on CTI teams.Where does Google Threat Intelligence (GTI) fit into this architecture?Retiring self-hosted TIP infra: If a team&#039;s primary use case for OpenCTI and MISP is curating campaign indicators, mapping relationships visually, sharing collections with peers, and pushing high-confidence IOCs to the SIEM, GTI handles that natively via Collections, Threat Graphs, and IOC Stream. Especially if your partners also use GTI, you can share curated Collections and Threat Graphs directly inside the platform and retire the self-hosted stack.	Running GTI, OpenCTI, and MISP in conjunction: Many financial institutions and enterprises still want or need to keep MISP (for regulated peer-to-peer sector sharing like FS-ISAC or FEBRABAN) and OpenCTI (to aggregate internal incident data and niche feeds). One scenario off the top of my head shows how the three tools can work together using Google&#039;s native OpenCTI connector and MISP modules to relieve the operational burden. Instead of manually ingesting, curating, and enriching thousands of global observables inside OpenCTI and MISP, everything that already exists in GTI stays managed in GTI—streaming directly to your SIEM via IOC Stream and automatically enriching OpenCTI investigations on demand with sandbox verdicts and UNC/Actor attribution. That leaves OpenCTI and MISP to handle only the delta: proprietary internal IR findings and closed MISP community events that don&#039;t exist in GTI. With far fewer STIX objects and attributes to manage locally, CTI analysts are freed up to actually analyze threats, not babysit database objects. Wrapping UpInstead of letting past acquisitions sit in silos or rot, Google fused TAG, VirusTotal, and Mandiant into something much stronger than the sum of its parts: an intelligence organization and platform built to track everything from regional eCrime crews to well-resourced, state-sponsored adversaries.Despite the common criticism that global platforms overlook smaller regional actors, GTIG, GTI, and Mandiant Services don&#039;t just sit on the world&#039;s largest threat corpus—they actively cluster, attribute, and operationalize that telemetry into UNC intrusion sets and tracked threat actors long before a public report ever drops.More importantly, in an over-connected world, geography is not a firewall. Nothing stops an operator in North Korea from hitting a company in the Caribbean or a fintech in Brazil on a Tuesday morning. Defenders have to look at the global threat landscape to actually protect their business. It&#039;s a huge, asymmetric fight—just like all blue-team work is—but having global telemetry and frontline tradecraft in one loop gives our side a much better shot.Studying GTI, GTIG, and Mandiant was a great exercise for me. It helped me connect the dots across 15 years of security history, and Google&#039;s approach genuinely impressed me. Seeing an intelligence-driven architecture I first read about in Intelligence-Driven Incident Response years ago become an operational reality is exciting—and it&#039;s clear there are still plenty of chapters left to be written in this story.</description>
            <category>Google Threat Intelligence</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 12:05:51 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Inquiry About IP-Based Bot Detection and Increasing Block Duration in reCAPTCHA v3</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/fraud-defense-recaptcha-6/inquiry-about-ip-based-bot-detection-and-increasing-block-duration-in-recaptcha-v3-8541</link>
            <description>Subject: Inquiry About IP-Based Bot Detection and Increasing Block Duration in reCAPTCHA v3Hello,We operate a website built on Cafe24 that uses Google reCAPTCHA v3 for spam protection.During normal website administration, we sometimes need to publish a large number of posts within a short period.However, after multiple posts are submitted in succession, further submissions become blocked.We have observed the following behavior:	When multiple posts are submitted from the same Wi-Fi network, posting eventually becomes blocked.			Switching to a different network, such as a mobile hotspot, temporarily allows posting again.			After continued posting on the new network, submissions become blocked again.			The duration of these restrictions appears to increase with repeated occurrences.	Cafe24 customer support has informed us that these restrictions are not caused by their own IP-blocking functionality.We would like to clarify the following:	Does Google reCAPTCHA v3 evaluate repeated posting activity from the same IP address as potentially automated behavior?			Can such activity cause an IP address to receive a lower risk score or become temporarily restricted?			Does reCAPTCHA implement progressively longer restrictions for repeated suspicious activity?			Are there any documented thresholds or criteria related to posting frequency, IP reputation, or repeated requests?			Is there a recommended solution for legitimate website administrators who need to publish multiple posts in a short period?	We would appreciate any clarification regarding how reCAPTCHA handles this type of activity.Thank you.</description>
            <category>Fraud Defense (reCAPTCHA)</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 09:16:27 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Connecting the Dots to GTI (Part 3/4)</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-threat-intelligence-3/connecting-the-dots-to-gti-part-3-4-8549</link>
            <description> This is Part 3 of the Connecting the Dots to GTI series. In Part 1 and Part 2, we covered how TAG, VirusTotal, and Mandiant converged into GTIG and GTI, and how analysts use the Diamond Model to cluster UNC activity into named actors. Today, we&#039;ll look at what this means for day-to-day SOC operations: cutting credential-leak alert fatigue and debunking myths about regional threat coverage.Disclaimer: This series is built entirely on publicly available material. All views, war stories, and opinions here are strictly my own—not Google speaking officially. Cutting Intel NoiseI&#039;ll save deep dives into hunting tools like YARA Livehunt and Retrohunt for a future post. For a day-to-day SOC, one of the clearest examples of how Google Threat Intelligence (GTI) turns noisy raw collection into high-fidelity intelligence is Digital Threat Monitoring (DTM)—specifically around compromised credentials.While GTI does not execute legal brand takedowns (yet ), DTM solves a headache every detection engineer knows too well: credential-leak alert fatigue.Side Note — Why Not Native GCP Takedowns? Honestly, I think takedowns—at least for malicious pages and infrastructure hosted on GCP—would be a natural step for Google. I&#039;ve been running my own honeypot fleet, Lantana, for about six months now, and GCP consistently ranks #1 among attack source providers. That&#039;s a side effect of GCP&#039;s popularity, and an obvious place where native takedowns tied to GTI would make the cloud safer and send a clear message to malicious actors.Underground channels constantly recycle years-old third-party breaches into &quot;new&quot; combolists. If a monitoring tool simply matches your @company.com string against those dumps without evaluating source reliability or context, your SOC gets buried in alerts for dead accounts and weak personal passwords that wouldn&#039;t even pass your corporate Active Directory policy.DTM cuts this noise upstream in two ways:Password Policy Filters (PPF): Analysts can configure their corporate password complexity rules (minimum length, character sets, complexity) directly inside a DTM Compromised Credentials Monitor. DTM uses that filter to prioritize leaked passwords that actually match your organization&#039;s standards over 123456 combolist junk.	Infostealer Context: Instead of just handing you an unverified user:password observable, DTM parses full infostealer logs (Lumma, RedLine, Stealc) to extract the exact login URL where the credential was captured (e.g., sso.yourcompany.com vs. a personal gaming site), the stealer family, the infected host&#039;s IP/hostname/OS user, and whether active session cookies were stolen. Debunking Local MythsIn my experience working with internal CTI teams in Brazil, I often heard the same criticism of global platforms like GTI: that they miss local threat actors. Some practitioners attributed this to the fact that Mandiant Incident Response is priced in USD—meaning fewer Latin American companies hire them compared to the US.Now that I understand how GTIG actually operates, it&#039;s clear why that assumption is flawed. Because countries like Brazil are among the largest contributors of samples and URLs to VirusTotal globally, GTIG proactively clusters local campaigns into UNC intrusion sets using VT, Gmail, and Safe Browsing telemetry without waiting for anyone to buy an IR retainer. When local companies do hire Mandiant IR, it adds the post-exploitation &quot;last mile&quot; inside the private network—which is how UNC5669 graduated into Breeze Comet (English technical report here) with full visibility into their vishing tradecraft, RMM abuse, and Pix API manipulation. And because cybercrime is globalized—nothing stops a North Korean actor from targeting a Brazilian fintech, or a local crew from copying global RMM playbooks—relying solely on a vendor that watches local chatrooms leaves a massive blindspot for global tradecraft.Looking back at my own experience in the SOC, two practical scenarios highlight how this plays out in daily operations.War Story: Leaked Credential DetectionsIn a previous role, our threat intelligence team hired a regional vendor to monitor leaked credentials, and it fell to me on the Detection Engineering side to operationalize those findings for Incident Response.I didn&#039;t interact much with the vendor directly, but looking at their JSON payloads, the collection mechanism was obvious: they had scrapers pulling dumps from dark web forums, Telegram, and Discord channels. Whenever a dump contained one of our corporate domains, they packaged a JSON event with bare-bones observables—user, password, timestamps, and the leak source—and pushed it to our queue.My mistake was assuming that JSON feed was curated intelligence. It wasn&#039;t.I built the ingestion architecture, wrote the custom Chronicle SIEM parser, and deployed the detection rule to fire whenever a new credential leak arrived. Because the rule didn&#039;t trigger in massive hourly bursts, it flew under the radar at first. Then, a few months later, I got complaints from the Triage team that I was flooding their queue with false positives: the rule was firing roughly 30 alerts per month with a precision of around 2%. Almost everything was recycled leaks we had already handled, former employees, or passwords that didn&#039;t even match our corporate password policy.To fix the mess I had automated, I laid out three engineering strategies:Rule-level suppression: Tune the detection logic so the same credential pair wouldn&#039;t re-trigger alerts within the same time window.	Pre-ingestion IdP enrichment: Build a post-processing step before SIEM ingestion that queried our Identity Provider (IdP) to verify if the identity was actually active, appending that status field to the raw log.	Password structure validation: Evaluate the leaked plaintext password against our corporate complexity standard and append a pattern=compliant|non-compliant attribute to the log.I managed to ship the first two before moving on, which improved precision dramatically. Looking back today, two things stand out:First, the IdP active-status check obviously can&#039;t be done by an external intel vendor (they don&#039;t have access to your internal directory). If I were building that pipeline today with Google SecOps SOAR, I wouldn&#039;t even maintain a custom pre-ingestion script—I&#039;d handle it in SOAR auto-triage: one step extracts the identity, the next checks its status in the IdP, and if the account is inactive, the playbook closes the alert automatically. Neat and zero custom infra.	Second, that 3rd strategy (password structure validation) I never got around to coding? It comes out of the box in GTI&#039;s DTM via Password Policy Filters, alongside the actual login URL from the infostealer log. Frankly, this is table stakes—any intel vendor selling credential monitoring should implement it.Direct Contact with Intel AnalystsWhat about teams that love local boutique vendors because they can send a quick Request for Information (RFI) to a human analyst on an instant messenger like WhatsApp or Slack?With Gemini built into GTI and full API/MCP support, you can replicate 80% of that workflow across any IM tool. It takes very little code to stand up an internal agent connected to WhatsApp, Slack, or Google Chat that intercepts a question in Portuguese, Spanish, or English, queries GTI via API for actor profiles, UNC intrusion sets, or DTM exposures, and replies in plain language.The only boundary is collection scope: an automated agent can only query intelligence already indexed in GTI—it can&#039;t jump into an invite-only Telegram group on command to check out a rumor. When a team needs a human analyst to run custom collection in closed underground sources, they can pair GTI with Mandiant EIA or AIA retainer hours. Up Next in Part 4 (Series Finale): Where do open-source TIPs like OpenCTI and MISP fit when you have GTI? We&#039;ll walk through a practical &quot;Delta-Only&quot; architecture that lets CTI analysts analyze threats instead of babysitting database objects.</description>
            <category>Google Threat Intelligence</category>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 13:20:10 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Request for OAuth Verification Status Update — Project ID: 575990071634 — Ogneliss Mail</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/cloud-security-foundation-7/request-for-oauth-verification-status-update-project-id-575990071634-ogneliss-mail-8545</link>
            <description>Dear Google Trust &amp;amp; Safety Team / Community Moderator,I am writing to respectfully request an update on the OAuth verification status for my application, Ogneliss Mail, which has been under review for several weeks now.Below are the details of the project for your reference:Application Name: Ogneliss Mail	Google Play Store Link: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.ogneliss.mail	Project ID / Project Number: ogneliss-mail / 575990071634	User Support Email: oedante@gmail.com	Developer Contact: oedante@gmail.com	Authorized Domain: ogneliss.ru	Application Homepage: https://ogneliss.ru/mail/	Privacy Policy: https://ogneliss.ru/mail/privacy	Terms of Service: https://ogneliss.ru/mail/termsContext &amp;amp; Compliance:Ogneliss Mail is a secure, open-source email client for Android. The requested scopes are strictly necessary to allow users to sync and manage their Gmail, Google Calendar, and Google Contacts directly from the app on their device.All user data is processed entirely on-device and stored in an encrypted database. We strictly adhere to the Google API Services User Data Policy, including the Limited Use requirements. Our comprehensive Privacy Policy is publicly available and completely up to date.Could you please check if there are any outstanding requirements, blocked steps, or additional details needed from my side to move this verification forward? No additional email requests or notifications have been received so far.Thank you very much for your time and assistance.Best regards,Oleg ErmishinIndividual Developer</description>
            <category>Cloud Security Foundation</category>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 05:45:36 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Operation Cymbal: Cold Room – Questions About Challenges, Scoring, and Certification</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/operation-cymbal-cold-room-questions-about-challenges-scoring-and-certification-8498</link>
            <description>Hello Google Cloud Security team,I&#039;m participating in Operation Cymbal: Cold Room, organized through Hack The Box, and I have a few questions regarding the event.The challenge started around 16:00 today, and it&#039;s now approximately 21:00. I&#039;ve already completed several challenges, but I&#039;ve noticed that my score continues to decrease. Additionally, the scoreboard is currently inaccessible, and I understand that the event is expected to run for approximately 72 hours.Could you please clarify a few points?	Daily challenges: Will three new challenges be released each day throughout the 72-hour event, or are the challenges announced at the beginning the complete set for the entire event?			Scoring and scoreboard: Is the decreasing score expected behavior, and when will the scoreboard become accessible again?			Event completion: If participants complete all available challenges early, will there be additional activities or challenges to work on during the remaining time?			Certification and rewards: Will participants receive a certificate of participation, a completion certificate, or any other recognition for taking part in the event?	I&#039;d appreciate some clarification so participants can better understand the event structure and what to expect over the next three days.Thank you for organizing this event and for your time!</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 03:50:25 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Tuesday&#039;s Tip: Securing the Bindplane Pipeline into Google SecOps</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/tuesday-s-tip-of-the-week-93/tuesday-s-tip-securing-the-bindplane-pipeline-into-google-secops-8546</link>
            <description>Tuesday 11/10/2026 Audience: SecOps engineers and platform owners who use Bindplane to collect logs for Google SecOps.Summary: The Bindplane server decides what every managed collector reads, where it sends data, and which binary it runs. Whoever controls the server controls every host with a managed collector. This tip covers how that trust works, what an attacker could do with it, and the controls that reduce the risk.The legacy SecOps forwarder reaches end of life on January 1, 2027, and Google blocks ingestion from it on April 1, 2027. Most teams will depend on Bindplane by then, so harden it first.1. How Bindplane manages collectorsBindplane server: the web app and API that store pipeline configurations and manage collectors. You can host it yourself or use Bindplane Cloud. The UI, API and collector connections all use port 3001 by default.	Collector (BDOT): the Bindplane Distro for OpenTelemetry Collector. It runs on each host, reads logs, and sends them on. On Linux it runs as root by default.	OpAMP: the protocol the collector uses to connect out to the server over a websocket. The server never opens connections to collectors. It sends configurations and upgrade instructions back over the collector’s connection.	Secret key: a shared value that every collector presents when it connects.	Rollout: pushing a new configuration version to a group of collectors.	Gateway: a collector that receives data from other collectors and forwards it to SecOps.The collector applies whatever configuration or upgrade the server sends. Bindplane has no built-in approval step for rollouts.2. What someone with control of the server can doAccess gained			What they can do			Effect		Push a configuration			Add a file receiver for /etc/shadow, SSH keys or cloud credential files, plus an exporter to their own endpoint			Secrets leave the host, read with root access		Push a configuration			Add a filter that drops chosen events, for example 4624 and 4688 from one host			SecOps stops seeing that activity, and the change looks like normal tuning		Push a configuration			Insert or modify events			False leads, alert noise, misleading investigations		Push an upgrade			Point collectors at their own package (section 3)			Code runs as root or administrator on every managed host		Read stored credentials			Copy the SecOps credentials held in destination settings			Forged logs from anywhere. If the service account has Chronicle Editor, also data access and rule changes		Steal the secret key			Enroll rogue collectors			Rogue collectors pull configurations, including any secrets in them		Impersonate the server			Works when collectors use OPAMP_TLS_SKIP_VERIFY=true or unencrypted ws://			Same result as owning the server, done from the network		3. How upgrades are checkedBased on the collector source code as of November 10, 2026 (v1.112.0):When someone starts an upgrade, the server sends the collector a download URL and a SHA-256 hash.	The collector downloads the file from that URL and compares it to the hash.	The updater installs the package, restarts the collector, and rolls back if the collector does not report healthy. It runs as root on Linux and macOS and as administrator on Windows.The URL and the hash both come from the server. The hash proves the download was not corrupted. It does not prove the package came from Bindplane.Signatures exist, but the remote upgrade path does not use them:Every release file has a cosign signature (.sig) that you can check by hand.	The install script checks the package’s GPG signature by default. If the gpg tools are missing, it warns and installs anyway unless you pass --require-gpg-check.Offline mode adds another path. It is available in Bindplane Enterprise and Bindplane for Google:The server hosts upgrade packages in /var/lib/bindplane/agent-upgrades.	Packages are uploaded with bindplane upload agent-upgrade using normal UI credentials.	The documentation does not describe any verification of uploaded packages.Dynatrace completed its acquisition of Bindplane in April 2026, and the collector’s management code now lives in a Dynatrace repository. Watch the release notes for changes to this behavior.4. Hardening controlsControl			How			What it limits		Isolate the server			Management subnet, admin access through a jump host, SSO with MFA, few admins, EDR			Server takeover		Lock down OpAMP			Collectors: wss:// endpoint with OPAMP_TLS_CA and a client certificate (OPAMP_TLS_CERT, OPAMP_TLS_KEY), never skip-verify. Server: network.tlsCA turns on mutual TLS			Server impersonation, and rogue collectors using a stolen secret key		Run collectors unprivileged			BDOT_UNPRIVILEGED=true on Linux, v1.82 and later			Root-level file reads. UI upgrades are not supported in this mode		Own the upgrade channel			Install script with --require-gpg-check, or check the .deb/.rpm with cosign verify-blob and deploy it with your patching tool			Poisoned upgrade packages		Restrict collector egress			Collectors reach only the Bindplane server and gateways. Only gateways reach SecOps			Data theft through a pushed configuration		Limit SecOps credentials			Keep them on gateways only. For HTTPS, use a custom role with only chronicle.logs.import, not Chronicle Editor			Credential theft, and what a stolen key can do		Audit and change control			Send the Audit Trail to SecOps. Keep configurations in Git and apply them with bindplane apply after review			Unnoticed configuration changes		Unmanaged collectors on Tier 0 hosts			Static configuration from your config management, no OpAMP connection			All remote changes on domain controllers		 5. Use casesA. Keep upgrades in your own verified channel (Linux)Before the first install, create the pre-install file: /etc/default/observiq-otel-collector on Debian and Ubuntu, or /etc/sysconfig/observiq-otel-collector on RHEL. It must be owned by root with mode 0644.	Put BDOT_UNPRIVILEGED=true in that file (v1.82 or later). The collector then runs as the bdot user.	Give bdot read access only to the logs you collect. On Debian and Ubuntu, for example, add it to the adm group for /var/log.	In a lab, confirm that an upgrade started from the Bindplane UI does not go through for that collector.	For each new release, upgrade with the install script and --require-gpg-check. As an alternative, verify the package with cosign verify-blob and deploy it through your patching tool.	For hosts that still run as root, add file integrity monitoring on /opt/observiq-otel-collector. Alert when the binary changes outside a patch window.B. Catch a pipeline change that hides activityConfirm the Audit Trail is on (gear icon, then Audit Logs). It is not available in the Free edition and keeps 30 days of events by default.	Create a Bindplane API key for reading audit events.	Create a dedicated configuration with the Bindplane Audit Logs source and your SecOps destination. Attach a collector to it, because the server does not send these logs itself. Each source covers one project.	In SecOps, alert on collector upgrade requests, new or changed destinations, API key creation, and rollouts outside your change window.	Someone who controls the server could turn this pipeline off. Add a Cloud Monitoring absence alert on ingested log count for the audit log type.	Add silent host alerts for your critical sources. A filter that drops one host’s events then still raises an alert.C. Block data theft through a pushed configurationList what each collector must reach: the Bindplane server (port 3001 by default) and your gateway collectors.	Gateways also need the SecOps ingestion endpoint and nothing else. For HTTPS ingestion, Google says to allow *.chronicle.googleapis.com on port 443.	On Linux collectors running as bdot, add an owner-match firewall rule (iptables -m owner --uid-owner bdot) that allows only those destinations for that user.	On Windows, use Windows Firewall outbound rules scoped to the collector program.	In a lab, add a destination that points to an outside endpoint and confirm the connection is blocked.	Alert on blocked outbound attempts from the collector. They point to a configuration sending data somewhere unexpected.6. Example detectionA collector reads files and sends network traffic. It has no reason to start a shell, a script interpreter or a download tool. If it does, someone may have pushed a malicious configuration or package.The rule needs EDR process telemetry parsed to UDM PROCESS_LAUNCH events, for example from CrowdStrike, Defender for Endpoint or Sysmon. The updater is a separate binary, so normal upgrades do not match.rule bindplane_collector_spawns_shell_or_downloader {  meta:    author = &quot;Tuesday Tip of the Week&quot;    description = &quot;Bindplane collector process starts a shell, script interpreter, or download tool&quot;    severity = &quot;High&quot;    priority = &quot;High&quot;    technique = &quot;T1059&quot;  events:    $e.metadata.event_type = &quot;PROCESS_LAUNCH&quot;    re.regex($e.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(observiq-otel-collector|bindplane-otel-collector)(\.exe)?$`)    re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(/(ba|da|z)?sh|/pythons0-9.]*|/pwsh|/curl|/wget|\\(cmd|powershell|pwsh|curl)\.exe)$`)  outcome:    $risk_score = 80    $hostname = $e.principal.hostname    $parent_path = $e.principal.process.file.full_path    $child_path = $e.target.process.file.full_path    $child_command_line = $e.target.process.command_line  condition:    $e}7. Action checklistList every collector. Note which run as root and which use skip-verify or ws://.	Move the Bindplane server into a management subnet with SSO, MFA and a short admin list.	Turn on TLS verification and client certificates for OpAMP.	Switch Linux collectors to unprivileged mode, and move upgrades to your own verified channel.	Restrict collector egress, and keep SecOps credentials on gateways only.	Replace Chronicle Editor on the ingestion service account with a custom ingest-only role.	Send the Bindplane Audit Trail to SecOps. Alert on upgrade requests, changes outside the change window, and a quiet feed.	Deploy the collector process rule and file integrity monitoring on collector install directories.	Decide which Tier 0 hosts should run unmanaged collectors.</description>
            <category>Tuesday&#039;s Tip of the Week</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 19:16:58 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Firebase Hosting site suspended for phishing (false positive) - appeal has had no response for 15+ days</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/firebase-hosting-site-suspended-for-phishing-false-positive-appeal-has-had-no-response-for-15-days-8542</link>
            <description>Our Firebase project was suspended after Trust &amp;amp; Safety flagged our Firebase Hosting dev site http://reach5g-website-dev.web.app/ for suspected phishing on 16 Jul 2026.This is a false positive. The site is our own legitimate internal operations portal: It is not intended for the public. It is used only by our staff.	It is publicly reachable (it is on a *.web.app URL), but every login goes through our company SSO. There is no credential form that collects usernames or passwords itself.	We have had similar phishing flags on our own legitimate sites before, so we suspect automated detection is picking up the login page. We submitted an appeal on 26 Oct 2026 (Google appeal ID: KVHH4HJDMNAA6DNYXXSY67B3WU) and were told to expect a response within two business days. It has now been more than 15 days with no decision.</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 17:50:52 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>reCAPTCHA Enterprise React Native SDK: different tokens share the same createTime, causing expiry errors</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/fraud-defense-recaptcha-6/recaptcha-enterprise-react-native-sdk-different-tokens-share-the-same-createtime-causing-expiry-errors-8533</link>
            <description>Environment@google-cloud/recaptcha-enterprise-react-native 18.9.2	Native SDK: iOS RecaptchaEnterprise 18.9.1	React Native 0.81.1, iOS and AndroidUsageOn each login attempt the app calls Recaptcha.fetchClient(siteKey) and then client.execute(RecaptchaAction.LOGIN()) to request a token from the SDK.	The app forwards the returned token to our backend. The backend creates an assessment and rejects tokens older than 5 minutes (RECAPTCHA_CHALLENGE_LOAD_EXPIRED). We also see INVALID_RECAPTCHA_RESPONSE.ProblemIn Google&#039;s assessment logs, several different tokens received by the app have the same createTime, even though they were requested at different times. Our backend then treats them as expired.What we verifiedThe app doesn&#039;t create, cache, or reuse tokens. It requests a new token from the SDK on every attempt and forwards it as received. It sets and sends no timestamp on the login call.	The time at which the SDK returned each token to the app (UTC) differs per attempt, but Google&#039;s createTime repeats. 	The behavior is intermittent on the same device with identical code: it works at times and fails at others, and doesn&#039;t follow app install time.Questions:Why do different tokens returned by execute carry the same createTime in the assessment, and is there a supported way to force a fresh challenge on each execute?</description>
            <category>Fraud Defense (reCAPTCHA)</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 15:24:51 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Connecting the Dots to GTI (Part 2/4)</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-threat-intelligence-3/connecting-the-dots-to-gti-part-2-4-8543</link>
            <description> This is Part 2 of the Connecting the Dots to GTI series. In Part 1, we traced the 15-year timeline from Operation Aurora and TAG (2010), VirusTotal (2012), and Mandiant (2022) to today&#039;s three unified pillars: GTIG, GTI, and Mandiant Services. In this post, we&#039;ll look at how the intelligence loop between GTIG and GTI works under the hood.Disclaimer: This series is built entirely on publicly available material. All views, war stories, and opinions here are strictly my own—not Google speaking officially. GTIG and GTI MagicWith its unified structure, Google created a tight intelligence cycle between its human analysts (GTIG) and its platform (GTI).Community users (who know the free public surface as VirusTotal) and enterprise customers (who use the paid GTI platform) continuously submit raw observables—files, URLs, domains, and IPs—and pivot across infrastructure. At the same time, GTIG analysts use GTI as their own analytical workbench: correlating that crowdsourced corpus with Google&#039;s internal telemetry and Mandiant&#039;s frontline engagements, then publishing finished intelligence straight back into GTI. Customers can operationalize that output immediately—enabling GTIG&#039;s Curated YARA Rules directly inside Livehunt and Retrohunt, subscribing to Threat Profiles, and streaming indicators into their SIEM via IOC Stream. And when enterprise customers need to detonate sensitive internal artifacts without exposing them to that shared loop, they use Private Scanning, which runs in isolated buckets and auto-deletes without ever entering the public corpus. Free VirusTotal vs. Google Threat Intelligence (GTI): What&#039;s Inside the Platform?While free users interact with the public VirusTotal scanner, enterprise customers on GTI get a consolidated suite spanning tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence:Crowdsourced Observables &amp;amp; Pivoting: Full search and infrastructure pivoting across the global VirusTotal dataset of files, URLs, domains, IPs, and passive DNS.	Finished Threat Intelligence &amp;amp; Threat Profiles: GTIG&#039;s strategic and operational reporting, Threat Actor profiles, UNC intrusion sets, Malware profiles, and vulnerability intelligence.	Curated YARA Rules, Livehunt &amp;amp; Retrohunt: Running custom or GTIG-curated YARA rules against the live stream of incoming global uploads (Livehunt) or scanning backwards across petabyte-scale historical samples (Retrohunt).	Threat Graph &amp;amp; Collections: Visual link-analysis graphs and shareable, curated indicator collections for specific campaigns.	IOC Stream: A real-time tactical feed of evaluated indicators matching your subscribed Collections, Livehunt rules, and Threat Profiles, ready to ingest into a SIEM.	Digital Threat Monitoring (DTM): Continuous collection across the deep and dark web, Telegram channels, paste sites, and infostealer logs for compromised credentials and brand exposure.	Attack Surface Management (ASM): Outside-in discovery of an organization&#039;s external assets, shadow IT, and exploitable vulnerabilities.	Private Scanning: Isolated, ephemeral file and URL sandboxing that never shares artifacts with the public community.	Gemini in GTI: Conversational AI for summarizing finished intelligence, translating underground chatter, and building hunting queries.A natural question here is: if a competitor or customer also has access to the VirusTotal dataset, does a GTIG analyst have any real collection advantage? Yes—three big ones that external users cannot query directly:Mandiant Frontline IR &amp;amp; MDR Telemetry: Raw forensic artifacts, hands-on-keyboard attacker commands, and internal lateral-movement tradecraft gathered directly from active breach investigations worldwide—much of which never touches public VirusTotal.	Google Product Telemetry: Aggregated security signals from billions of Gmail accounts, Chrome Safe Browsing blocks, Android Play Protect, and Google Cloud.	FLARE Reverse Engineering &amp;amp; Unpublished UNC Tracking: Automated malware configuration extractors and internal intrusion-set tracking before a campaign ever goes public. The Diamond Model and UNC ClustersTo turn millions of raw observables into tracked threat actors, GTIG analysts structure their clustering and attribution methodology around the Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis. That word—intrusion—is the core of Mandiant&#039;s modus operandi: unlike vendors that build intelligence primarily by scraping dark web forums or underground chatrooms, Mandiant starts from real intrusion data, which is why the Diamond Model fits so naturally: CTI 101: The Diamond ModelFormulated by Caltagirone, Pendergast, and Betz, the Diamond Model maps every cyber intrusion across four connected vertices:Adversary: The threat actor or operator behind the intrusion.	Capability: The malware families, custom tools, exploits, or living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) used.	Infrastructure: The domains, IPs, C2 servers, SSL certificates, or RMM relays supporting the operation.	Victim: The target organization, sector, tech stack, or geography (victimology).When an investigation begins, the Adversary vertex is unknown. Analysts start pivoting—taking a single indicator (say, a phishing domain) and pivoting across shared infrastructure—for example, uncovering dozens of related domains that reuse the same SSL certificate serial pattern, JARM fingerprint, or C2 configuration.When two or more vertices of the Diamond align across separate intrusions, GTIG groups that activity into an intrusion set (or activity cluster) and assigns an UNC (Uncategorized) designation, like UNC5669.GTIG doesn&#039;t rush to assign formal attribution on Day 1, because early in an investigation you can&#039;t tell if UNC5669 is a net-new group, an Initial Access Broker (IAB) handing off access to multiple ransomware affiliates, or a known actor testing new tradecraft. Instead, analysts gather longitudinal data—information collected about the same group repeatedly over an extended period of time—tracking how that intrusion set behaves across months and multiple campaigns. Crucially, GTI customers don&#039;t wait for a public report to operationalize this: as soon as an UNC cluster is cataloged, its indicators, TTPs, and hunting rules are live inside GTI.Once longitudinal tracking confirms that an UNC cluster is a distinct, persistent group with consistent motivation and victimology, it graduates to a named Threat Actor under GTIG&#039;s two-word naming convention. For example, UNC5669 graduated into Breeze Comet: the first word (Breeze) is the unique identifier assigned to that specific group, while the second word (COMET) is the category suffix designating financially motivated eCrime. Up Next in Part 3: We&#039;ll move from attribution to daily SOC operations—how Digital Threat Monitoring (DTM) cuts credential-leak alert fatigue, why global platforms don&#039;t miss regional actors, and a personal detection engineering war story on leaked credentials.</description>
            <category>Google Threat Intelligence</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 11:59:59 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Connecting the Dots to GTI (Part 1/4)</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-threat-intelligence-3/connecting-the-dots-to-gti-part-1-4-8540</link>
            <description> I spent my career on the SOC side—detection engineering, incident response, and SIEM architecture. I worked with threat intelligence teams, wired up their feeds (including integrating MISP with Chronicle SIEM), and built detection rules from their reports, even reviewing books like Intelligence-Driven Incident Response along the way. Still, I never actually sat in the CTI chair.Recently, I started studying Google Threat Intelligence (GTI) and the services around it. Coming from the outside, the acronyms hit you fast: TAG, GTI, GTIG, DTM, ASM, UNC. You also run into the natural skepticism most security practitioners share whenever a Big Tech company with deep pockets goes on an acquisition spree: great, another tech giant buying respected security companies to dress up its portfolio, squeeze revenue, and let a good product rot—even if Google&#039;s track record with acquisitions like YouTube and Waze points in a different direction.As I dug into how the pieces actually fit together, the 15-year strategy behind them impressed me—and the way GTI, GTIG, and Google SecOps operate today looks remarkably close to the operational blueprint described in Intelligence-Driven Incident Response. I decided to turn my study notes into a four-part series to take fellow SOC practitioners from zero to hero on how Google&#039;s intelligence ecosystem works under the hood.Disclaimer: This series is built entirely on publicly available material. All views, war stories, and opinions here are strictly my own—not Google speaking officially. Building the PortfolioWhat looks like a massive portfolio today started as three separate pieces built years apart. 2010 — Operation Aurora and TAGIn late 2009, Google detected a coordinated intrusion targeting its corporate infrastructure—an attack publicly disclosed in January 2010 as Operation Aurora (Google&#039;s Hacking Google documentary series on YouTube covers the entire story in Episode 000). State-sponsored operators went after Google&#039;s source code and the Gmail accounts of Chinese human-rights activists.Aurora forced Google to rethink security from the ground up. On the architecture side, while Forrester analyst John Kindervag coined the term Zero Trust in 2010, Google responded to Aurora by actually engineering and deploying the first large-scale enterprise Zero Trust network—BeyondCorp—killing the privileged corporate VPN so access depended on device and identity state rather than network location. On the intelligence side, Aurora led directly to the creation of Google&#039;s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) in 2010.TAG wasn&#039;t created to sell threat feeds; its mission was to defend Google and its users from state-sponsored espionage, zero-day brokers, and commercial spyware vendors. TAG analysts consume planet-scale telemetry across Gmail, Chrome Safe Browsing, Android, YouTube, and Google Cloud to protect both Google&#039;s own infrastructure and billions of everyday, non-paying users. Over the last decade, their outputs directly made Google safer—powering the government-backed attack warnings in Gmail, taking down state-sponsored phishing and influence operations, and burning dozens of in-the-wild zero-day exploits alongside Project Zero (Google&#039;s offensive vulnerability research team tasked with finding zero-day bugs before attackers do). 2012 — Acquiring VirusTotalIn September 2012, Google made its first major move outside its own walls by acquiring VirusTotal. Founded in June 2004 by Spanish security company Hispasec Sistemas (led by Bernardo Quintero in Málaga), VirusTotal was an eight-year-old service that had already become the daily workbench for malware researchers and SOC analysts worldwide.At the time of the acquisition, VirusTotal was not a traditional CTI research organization publishing threat actor attributions—it was a lean engineering team running a community platform and building hunting tools for researchers. Whenever a practitioner anywhere in the world ran into a suspicious binary, document, IP, or URL, they uploaded it to VirusTotal to scan it against 70+ antivirus engines and sandboxes. Crucially, VirusTotal&#039;s team had also created YARA (originally released by Víctor Manuel Álvarez in 2008) and launched VirusTotal Intelligence, giving the security community the ability to run YARA rules against the global malware stream.By acquiring VirusTotal while keeping it independent and vendor-neutral, Google backed the world&#039;s largest crowdsourced malware repository with Google-scale infrastructure. Every sample uploaded in São Paulo, Ciudad de México, New York, or Frankfurt added another node to a single global threat graph. 2022 — Acquiring MandiantIn 2022, Google made another move that shook the cybersecurity industry: it acquired Mandiant.Founded in 2004, Mandiant had built a legendary reputation on the front lines of the world&#039;s worst breaches. They put modern adversary attribution on the map in 2013 with the landmark APT1 report, exposing a Chinese military cyber-espionage unit down to the physical building in Shanghai. Acquired by FireEye at the end of 2013, the company eventually sold off the legacy FireEye appliance business in 2021 to focus purely on what made Mandiant famous.By the time Google acquired it in September 2022, Mandiant wasn&#039;t just a consulting shop anymore. It brought three distinct pillars into Google Cloud:External Frontline Services: The gold-standard Incident Response (IR) retainers, compromise assessments, red teaming, and Managed Defense (MDR).	Internal Adversary &amp;amp; Malware Research: Hundreds of global threat intelligence analysts tracking nation-state and financial crime groups, backed by the elite FLARE malware reverse-engineering team.	*An External SaaS Platform (Mandiant Advantage): A commercial intelligence portal that delivered Mandiant&#039;s actor and vulnerability research alongside two integrated modules: Digital Threat Monitoring (DTM) (monitoring the dark web, Telegram, and credential leaks) and Attack Surface Management (ASM)* (built from Mandiant&#039;s 2021 acquisition of Intrigue). 2024 — Connecting the PiecesFor a couple of years, TAG, VirusTotal, and Mandiant operated side by side while teams planned the integration behind the scenes. Starting at RSA Conference 2024, Google brought those pieces together into three clear pillars: GTIG (Google Threat Intelligence Group): All the human researchers—from TAG, Mandiant Intelligence, FLARE, and VirusTotal—merged into a single research organization.	GTI (Google Threat Intelligence): The unified SaaS platform combining VirusTotal Enterprise, Mandiant Advantage (Threat Intelligence, DTM, and ASM), and Gemini.	Mandiant Services: Human-in-the-loop expertise sold alongside the platform—including Incident Response retainers, subscription access to intel analysts via Essential Intelligence Access (EIA) or an embedded analyst via Advanced Intelligence Access (AIA), and Mandiant Managed Defense and Mandiant Threat Defense (MTD) (managed detection, threat hunting, and curated detection pipelines on top of Google SecOps). Up Next in Part 2: We&#039;ll look under the hood at how GTIG and GTI feed each other in a continuous intelligence loop, what separates the enterprise GTI platform from free VirusTotal, and how analysts use the Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis to cluster raw intrusions into UNC groups and named threat actors like Breeze Comet.</description>
            <category>Google Threat Intelligence</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 19:30:06 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>How Can I Remove My Own IAM Access from a Google Cloud Project Without Contacting Its Owner?</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/cloud-security-foundation-7/how-can-i-remove-my-own-iam-access-from-a-google-cloud-project-without-contacting-its-owner-8538</link>
            <description>Hello Google Cloud Community,I have Editor access to a Google Cloud project that was previously used for a university course.I am no longer involved in the project and am no longer in contact with its owner.I would like to completely remove my own account from the project&#039;s IAM policy so that it no longer appears in my Google Cloud Console.However, my Editor role does not allow me to modify the IAM policy, and I cannot delete the project.I do not want to delete the project or affect other users.Is there a way to revoke my own access without contacting the project owner? Can Google Cloud Support assist with this request for users on the Basic Support plan?Thank you.</description>
            <category>Cloud Security Foundation</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 17:00:03 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Display Source and Destination Entities in Case List View</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/display-source-and-destination-entities-in-case-list-view-8457</link>
            <description>What is the best way to display Source and Destination entities (IP addresses and hostnames) in the Case List view, similar to QRadar and ArcSight, so SOC analysts can quickly understand alert context at a glance without opening each case?</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 16:59:03 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Project Owner (Legacy) receives PERMISSION_DENIED for Resource Manager and Firestore</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/cloud-security-foundation-7/project-owner-legacy-receives-permission-denied-for-resource-manager-and-firestore-8537</link>
            <description>Hello Google Cloud Community,I need assistance troubleshooting an IAM permission issue on a Google Cloud project.Project details:	Project name: Djanji Soetji Payment			Project ID: djanji-soetji-payment			Organization: No organization			IAM role: Owner (Legacy)	Problem:My account is listed as the project Owner in IAM and Manage Resources, but I receive the following errors:	resourcemanager.projects.get — Permission denied			datastore.databases.list — Missing permission			Policy Troubleshooter — Insufficient permissions	Running gcloud projects describe also returns PERMISSION_DENIED.Troubleshooting already performed:	Verified the correct Google account and Project ID.			Confirmed the Owner (Legacy) role in IAM.			Confirmed the project appears in Manage Resources.			Restarted Cloud Shell.			Attempted to refresh authentication.			Checked Policy Troubleshooter.	The issue persists.Could someone help identify why API access is denied even though the account has the Owner role?Thank you.</description>
            <category>Cloud Security Foundation</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 16:55:54 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>SecOps Rule Observability Improvements - Fall Edition</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/secops-rule-observability-improvements-fall-edition-8536</link>
            <description>Hello Google SecOps Community,  I wanted to send out a feature announcement that has been enabled for all customers in all regions. If you recall from earlier this year, we announced some improvements to “rule observability” (o11y) that labeled detections more clearly regarding event time, normalization time and detection times, as well as rule replay metadata. While we received very positive feedback, and have watched the “Rule Observability” curated dashboard rapidly grow in adoption, we are excited to let the community know we’re adding additional observability to rule state changes. Historically, when community members have asked, our guidance has been to use the existing APIs to poll this information, and folks like @Bruzz have provided toolkits to help simplify integrating with those APIs. There are a number of reasons why a rule will be placed into a LIMITED and subsequently a PAUSED state, but most commonly it’s when a rule has consumed a large amount of cluster-wide resources and needs to be moved first to a lower tier (LIMITED) and if it persistently consumes a high amount of resources, then to PAUSED, which is functionally equivalent to the rule being “disabled”.  As of this week, we are now emitting rule state change messages directly to Google Cloud Monitoring, which can also be forwarded to your SecOps Instance. Here is an example of a rule that has transitioned to a LIMITED state: {  &quot;protoPayload&quot;: {    &quot;@type&quot;: &quot;type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.AuditLog&quot;,    &quot;status&quot;: {      &quot;message&quot;: &quot;Rule status automatically transitioned to LIMITED due to exceeding resource consumption or error limits.&quot;    },    &quot;authenticationInfo&quot;: {},    &quot;requestMetadata&quot;: {      &quot;requestAttributes&quot;: {},      &quot;destinationAttributes&quot;: {}    },    &quot;serviceName&quot;: &quot;chronicle.googleapis.com&quot;,    &quot;methodName&quot;: &quot;google.cloud.chronicle.v1.RuleService.UpdateRuleExecutionState&quot;,    &quot;resourceName&quot;: &quot;projects/secops-pm-federation-demo/locations/us-central1/instances/7fd5be84-ff27-4eeb-9ae8-c9535a7757f9/rules/ru_8307ce31-7134-4ab6-b7a5-4f06bddfb2ce/deployment&quot;,    &quot;metadata&quot;: {      &quot;transitionReason&quot;: &quot;Rule status automatically transitioned to LIMITED due to exceeding resource consumption or error limits.&quot;,      &quot;previousExecutionState&quot;: &quot;DEFAULT&quot;,      &quot;executionState&quot;: &quot;LIMITED&quot;,      &quot;@type&quot;: &quot;type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.chronicle.audit.RuleGuardrailAuditMetadata&quot;,      &quot;displayName&quot;: &quot;vt_relationships_file_downloaded_from_url&quot;,      &quot;name&quot;: &quot;projects/secops-pm-federation-demo/locations/us-central1/instances/7fd5be84-ff27-4eeb-9ae8-c9535a7757f9/rules/ru_8307ce31-7134-4ab6-b7a5-4f06bddfb2ce/deployment&quot;    },   … To quickly orient yourself around the shape of these logs, use the following LQL query in Google Cloud Monitoring: SEARCH(&quot;PAUSED&quot;) OR SEARCH(&quot;LIMITED&quot;)protoPayload.methodName=&quot;google.cloud.chronicle.v1.RuleService.UpdateRuleExecutionState&quot; If you have any rules that have reached a LIMITED or PAUSED state you’ll see results similar to the following:  If you want to alert on these conditions, you can set up a “log alert”, and in this example, send an email.  We’re looking to add additional message types to this feature in the coming months, but would love to know what you think about this and how we can improve it.-Kyle &amp;amp; the SecOps Team </description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 14:57:18 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>What’s New in Google SecOps: 2026–11–09</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/what-s-new-in-secops-91/what-s-new-in-google-secops-2026-11-09-8539</link>
            <description>What’s New in Google SecOps for the interval Nov 2nd through Nov 8th, 2026.   Highlights In Google SecOps news:	Case activity tagging is now available, allowing analysts to categorize and filter activities, comments, and tasks on the Case Wall.			Consolidated Settings and Navigation has entered public preview, unifying SIEM and SOAR settings into a single menu alongside an updated left navigation.			Several new Pre-GA and Private Preview Gemini capabilities were documented this week, including AI Parsing (for generating custom JavaScript parsers and extensions), the 3P Context Agent (for read-only third-party alert enrichment with TIN), and creating custom SOAR IDE response actions with Gemini.	In community and cloud security news, the Google Cloud Security Community shared updates on Fall rule observability improvements, 23 new curated detections for PHP2SHELL, RBAC best practices, and John Stoner’s guide to the |&amp;gt; EXTEND SQL pipe operator, while Mandiant detailed the rise of LLMJacking. Product Updates &amp;amp; New Features Google SecOps  Release Notes from Google Cloud Docs	Google SecOps has released a new ‘Case activity tagging’ feature, allowing users to categorize and filter activities, comments, and tasks on the Case Wall for improved investigation management. Read More			Google SecOps has released a new Consolidated Settings and Navigation feature in public preview, unifying SIEM and SOAR settings into a single menu and updating the left navigation. Read More	Note: I checked my tenants and I don’t see this setting under Public Preview settings or in the SecOps UI yet, so I suspect it is still rolling out.	 Google SecOps deprecated the ListCaseEvents API endpoint on November 2, 2026, instructing users to migrate to the ListCaseEvidenceData API endpoint. Read More	 New Docs: Event Processing &amp;gt; Parsers Using AI from Google Cloud Docs	This document introduces AI Parsing in Google SecOps, a new feature supported by Gemini, currently in Pre-GA and Private Preview.			Create Parser with AI: Generates complete custom parsers from scratch for new or unsupported log sources. Users provide log type, ingested raw logs, and optional vendor documentation links. The AI samples logs, researches schema, plans UDM mapping, and writes JavaScript parser code, which can then be refined via natural language prompts.			Write Extension with AI: Allows users to augment existing parsers by extracting additional fields, applying conditional logic, and transforming values. Users provide log type, a sample raw log, and prompts to describe desired mappings.			The document details prerequisites, step-by-step workflows for both custom parser generation and extension creation, guidelines for crafting effective prompts, troubleshooting common issues, and usage quotas (10 extension sessions/24h, 5 messages/session).			Read More	 New Docs: Investigation &amp;gt; Context Agent Investigation from Google Cloud Docs	This document introduces the 3P Context Agent within Google SecOps, currently in Pre-GA and Private Preview.			Purpose: An AI-powered agent designed to automatically enrich security alerts and entities with crucial external contextual data from third-party tools, thereby augmenting the verdicts of the Triage and Investigation Agent (TIN).			Benefits: Reduces manual data gathering, accelerates the triage process, leads to faster Mean Time To Respond (MTTR), and improves decision-making during investigations.			Functionality: Primarily triggers as a sub-agent to TIN, dynamically selects appropriate third-party tools (excluding some Google SecOps first-party tools), and enriches alert entities with findings, which are viewable in the alert details page, Gemini Investigations timeline, and Case Wall.			Guardrails: Operates strictly with read-only enrichment actions; cannot modify data or states in third-party systems.			Configuration: Managed under SIEM Settings &amp;gt; Gemini Investigations &amp;gt; 3P Context Agent, allowing users to enable/disable, manage included or excluded third-party tools, and configure specific integration instances per environment.			Quota during Private Preview: The 3P Context Agent itself doesn’t consume AI quota, but TIN might consume an average of 5% additional AI quota when triggering it. Standard integration fees may apply.			Read More	 New Docs: SOAR &amp;gt; Respond &amp;gt; IDE &amp;gt; Create IDE Actions Gemini from Google Cloud Docs	This document introduces a new feature allowing users to create custom Python code for response actions using Gemini within the Google SecOps SOAR Integrated Development Environment (IDE).			Functionality: Users provide natural language descriptions to generate action code for existing integrations.			Availability: The feature is currently in Pre-GA and Private Preview.			Process: Detailed steps cover generating code from a prompt, reviewing the output, modifying if needed, and saving the action.			Best Practices: Guidelines are provided for effective prompting, such as suggesting specific names and parameters, focusing on single API endpoints, defining JSON output structures, keeping code in a single module, and including documentation references.			Read More	 Google Cloud  New capabilities to power agents at scale with Google’s Agentic Data Cloud from Google Cloud Blog	Google is announcing new capabilities for its Agentic Data Cloud, empowering organizations to deploy and scale AI agents in production to generate revenue, enhance efficiency, and mitigate risks. Read More	 The Rise of LLMJacking: How Threat Actors Monetize Compromised Cloud and Model Resources from Google Cloud Blog	The article introduces LLMJacking, a new method where threat actors hijack enterprise cloud and AI model resources for monetization, based on incidents Mandiant responded to. Read More	 Adoption Guides &amp;amp; Deep Dives  New to Google SecOps: Same as It Ever Was? Not When You Use |&amp;gt; EXTEND from Google Cloud Security Community	This article from John Stoner introduces the EXTEND pipe operator in Google Security Operations (SecOps) SQL syntax, explaining how it adds computed columns to query results and builds on foundational query skills. Read More	 Community &amp;amp; Events  SecOps Rule Observability Improvements — Fall Edition from Google Cloud Security Community	Google SecOps has announced new improvements to rule observability, building on earlier successful enhancements that have been widely adopted by customers. Read More	 Curated Content — Quick Update For PHP2SHELL Content from Google Cloud Security Community	Google Security Operations has released new curated content and detections related to the PHP2SHELL disclosures, including a detailed writeup and 23 new detections for the SecOps community. Read More	 Tuesday’s Tip of the Week — RBAC in Google SecOps: IAM Roles, Data Scopes, and Least Privilege from Google Cloud Security Community	This article provides a guide on implementing Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) in Google SecOps using Google Cloud IAM, covering IAM roles, data scopes, and the principle of least privilege for SecOps administrators. Read More	 Wiz  The ROI of Agentic Remediation: Real-World Results with Wiz Green Agent from Wiz Blog	The article explores the return on investment of Wiz Green Agent, detailing how client companies like Fireblocks utilized its ‘agentic remediation’ to eliminate cross-team blockers and accelerate critical risk resolution. Read More	 From Reactive to Proactive: Empowering SOC Teams with the Wiz Red and Blue Agents from Wiz Blog	The article introduces Wiz’s Red and Blue Agents, designed to empower SOC teams with proactive pre-breach alerts and automated threat investigation to stay ahead of AI-era threats. Read More	 Platform Issues  RESOLVED: Google SecOps is experiencing elevated error rates and high Search query latency in the US region from Google Cloud Status	Google SecOps experienced elevated error rates and high query latency in the US region; the issue has been resolved. Read More	 RESOLVED: Google SecOps is experiencing elevated search error rates in the asia-southeast1 (Singapore) region from Google Cloud Status	Google SecOps experienced elevated search error rates affecting log search and query capabilities in the asia-southeast1 (Singapore) region; the issue has been resolved. Read More</description>
            <category>What&#039;s New in SecOps</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 13:04:32 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Never Miss a Silenced Detection: Monitoring PAUSED and LIMITED Rules with the Google SecOps Toolkit</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/community-blog-42/never-miss-a-silenced-detection-monitoring-paused-and-limited-rules-with-the-google-secops-toolkit-8425</link>
            <description>Author: Simone Bruzzechesse,  Strategic Cloud Engineer   Detection engineering teams put a lot of effort into writing, tuning and deploying YARA-L rules in Google SecOps. Once a rule is live, it is easy to assume it keeps running. That isn&#039;t always true. To keep the platform stable for every tenant, Google SecOps watches how much each live rule costs to run. When a rule uses unusually high resources, the platform can move it to a LIMITED execution state, where its executions are no longer guaranteed. If its performance doesn&#039;t improve within three days, the rule is moved again, this time to PAUSED, and it stops running.This protects the platform. For the SOC, though, it creates a quiet failure: a rule that stopped running raises no errors in the case queue, sends no page and produces no alert. It just stops producing detections. The first sign may be a missed incident or a coverage review days later. The state change is visible in the console, but only if someone opens the Rules Dashboard and checks the rule deployment state.In this article, we&#039;ll look at how to close that gap. First, we&#039;ll cover rule execution states and the Rule Deployments API that exposes them. Then we&#039;ll introduce the RulesMonitoring job, part of the official SecOpsToolkit SOAR Integration available in the open-source secops-toolkit repository. It turns those state changes into de-duplicated email notifications, using a SecOps Data Table as its memory. Finally, we&#039;ll walk through deploying and testing it in your environment. Rule execution states in Google SecOps Every rule in Google SecOps has two related resources. The Rule holds the YARA-L definition: its text, display name, severity and revisions. The RuleDeployment describes how that rule runs: whether it is enabled as a live rule, whether it generates alerts, its run frequency, whether it is archived, and its current execution state.  The four execution states 			State									Meaning								DEFAULT									The rule is enabled and working normally.								LIMITED									The rule showed unusually high resource usage and is isolated from other live rules. Its executions are not guaranteed. Detections from runs that do succeed are kept, and the rule reports errors with suggestions for improving performance.								PAUSED									The rule stayed LIMITED for 3 days without improving and is no longer executed. Error messages suggest how to optimize it.								EXECUTION_STATE_UNSPECIFIED									Unknown or unspecified state (for example, a rule that has never been deployed).					 The recovery path is also worth knowing. To bring a rule back to DEFAULT, you have to optimize the rule and save it. Saving a modified rule resets its status to enabled. Changing only the run frequency (for example, from 10 minutes to hourly) does not reset the state. So a notification is only useful if it reaches the people who own the rule logic, which is why RulesMonitoring sends email to a configurable list of detection engineers.Reading Execution States Through the APIWhen auditing rule execution health across a large enterprise environment, querying each rule endpoint individually is inefficient and inefficiently uses your API quota. To solve this, Google SecOps supports bulk deployment retrieval. By placing the wildcard character - in the rule segment of the resource path, you can request and enumerate the deployment settings and execution statuses of every rule across the instance through a single paginated API request:HTTP Request Endpoint:GEThttps://{region}-chronicle.googleapis.com/v1alpha/projects/{project}/locations/{location}/instances/{instance}/rules/-/deploymentsRequired IAM Permission:chronicle.ruleDeployments.listBelow is an example JSON response structure showing rule deployments in various execution states: {  &quot;ruleDeployments&quot;: e    {      &quot;name&quot;: &quot;projects/PROJECT_NUMBER/locations/LOCATION/instances/INSTANCE_ID/rules/ru_3b4c5d6e-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx/deployment&quot;,      &quot;enabled&quot;: true,      &quot;alerting&quot;: true,      &quot;runFrequency&quot;: &quot;LIVE&quot;,      &quot;executionState&quot;: &quot;LIMITED&quot;    },    {      &quot;name&quot;: &quot;projects/PROJECT_NUMBER/locations/LOCATION/instances/INSTANCE_ID/rules/ru_9f8e7d6c-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx/deployment&quot;,      &quot;enabled&quot;: false,      &quot;archived&quot;: true,      &quot;executionState&quot;: &quot;DEFAULT&quot;    }  ],  &quot;nextPageToken&quot;: &quot;...&quot;} A deployment&#039;s name is its rule&#039;s resource name with the suffix /deployment added. Remove that suffix and you get the key you need to join each deployment to the matching entry from the companion call:HTTP Request Endpoint:GEThttps://{region}-chronicle.googleapis.com/v1alpha/projects/{project}/locations/{location}/instances/{instance}/rules?view=FULLRequired IAM Permission:chronicle.rules.listThe rules call returns the human-readable displayName for each rule, which is what you want in a notification instead of an opaque ru_... identifier. Put the two calls together and you have a complete view of the tenant&#039;s detection health in two paginated requests. Why polling is not enough on its own A scheduled job that reads execution states and emails whatever it finds would work, but it would quickly get noisy. A rule can stay PAUSED for days while its owner works on a fix. If the job runs every 15 minutes, a naive implementation sends close to 100 identical emails per rule per day, and people start ignoring them. The job has to remember what it already reported, and it has to forget it again after a while, so that a rule nobody fixes gets flagged again.Google SecOps already provides that kind of memory: Data Tables with key columns and a per-table row time-to-live (TTL). A row keyed by the rule&#039;s resource name with a 7-day TTL answers the question &quot;have we told someone about this rule in the last week?&quot; without any external database.  The platform provides the state and the storage. What it doesn&#039;t provide is the scheduler and the notification logic, and that&#039;s the gap the SecOps Toolkit fills. SecOps Toolkit Official SOAR integrationThe secops-toolkit is an open-source repository from the Google Cloud Professional Services team with blueprints and automation for Google SecOps environments. Its integrations/ directory ships SecOpsToolkit, a custom SecOps SOAR integration with utilities for Google SecOps platform administrators.The integration has a single Ping action for connectivity and authentication testing, plus three jobs: RulesMonitoring, which is our subject here, ScheduledQueryJob (which runs saved UDM searches on a schedule and writes the results into Data Tables through the Asynchronous Search API, covered in our previous article).The integration needs only a few settings:   Workload Identity Federation is the recommended authentication method. It issues short-lived tokens through impersonation, so you don&#039;t store a long-lived private key in the integration configuration. A service account JSON key is still available as a fallback. If you set neither parameter, the SecOps instance default service account is used.For IAM, a custom least-privilege role is better than a broad grant. The permissions this job uses are:	chronicle.instances.get			chronicle.rules.list			chronicle.ruleDeployments.list			chronicle.dataTables.get			chronicle.dataTables.create			chronicle.dataTables.update			chronicle.dataTableRows.list			chronicle.dataTableRows.bulkCreate	If you run into permission issues while setting up the integration, you can fall back to roles/chronicle.admin and then later evaluate the custom role with least privileges required for making this Integration/Job works.Once the integration is configured, all the monitoring logic lives in the job. Inside the RulesMonitoring job The RulesMonitoring job checks every detection rule in the tenant and notifies a distribution list when rules enter a degraded state. Its job definition describes it as &quot;Monitors SecOps rules and emails about PAUSED or LIMITED rules&quot;. The actual cadence is whatever you configure when you schedule the job in SOAR (e.g. every 15 minutes).  The execution flow works like this:	Bootstrap. Parse the integration configuration (API Root, credentials or WIF, Verify SSL) and the two job parameters. Recipient Emails are split on commas into a clean list, and Tenant URL is trimmed. 			Collect state. Enumerate rules and their corresponding rule deployment to get current rules status. Both follow pagination with 1,000 items per page, so large rule sets are fully covered.			Evaluate affected rules. The job will later iterate through the rules and rule deployments lists:			Archived rules are skipped. They are retired on purpose and aren&#039;t expected to run.						Rules without a deployment default to UNSPECIFIED.						Rules in LIMITED or PAUSED are collected as affected.					Short-circuit. If nothing is affected, the job logs &quot;No affected rules found&quot; and exits successfully without touching the Data Table.			Load memory. Look up the rules_monitoring Data Table.			If it exists, read all rows and collect the first column, rule_name, into a set of already-notified rules.						If it doesn&#039;t exist, create it with one STRING column rule_name marked as the key column, then PATCH it to set rowTimeToLive = 604800s (7 days).					Notify and remember. If there&#039;s anything new, send a single HTML email that lists each rule&#039;s displayName and state in red, with a link to the tenant. Then bulk-create one Data Table row per newly notified rule. If everything was already reported, log &quot;All affected rules were already notified recently. No email sent.&quot;	  This is what recipients see:  A few design notes to understand before you run this in production:	The Data Table is the dedup state, and the TTL is the reminder interval. Because each row expires after 7 days, a rule that is still LIMITED or PAUSED a week later gets reported again. This gives you a built-in weekly reminder for unresolved rules without flooding anyone in between. If you want a different reminder interval, change the rowTimeToLive of the rules_monitoring table (in the console or through the API). Keep in mind that the job only sets the TTL when it creates the table.			Dedup is per rule, not per state. The key is the rule&#039;s resource name. If a rule is reported as LIMITED and moves to PAUSED during the same 7-day window, no second email is sent. If you want the LIMITED → PAUSED escalation to trigger a new notification, you&#039;d need to extend the key to include the state.			Fixing a rule doesn&#039;t clear its row. Once a rule is saved and back in DEFAULT, it drops out of the affected list, and its row simply expires. If the rule degrades again before the TTL runs out, it won&#039;t be reported until the row has expired. You can delete the row manually to re-arm notifications right away.			One email per run, not one per rule. All newly affected rules are grouped into a single message. A tenant-wide event, such as a bad bulk rule deployment, produces one digest instead of an inbox storm.			Monitor the job too. Run every 15 minutes, the job is cheap (two list calls and, only when needed, one Data Table read). Also use SOAR job failure visibility, so that an authentication or permission regression doesn&#039;t silence the monitor itself.	With the mechanics covered, let&#039;s deploy it. Getting Started with the SecOps Toolkit integration The Google SecOps Toolkit Integration in the SecOps Toolkit repository is an open-source framework that helps security teams automate operational workflows and simplify environment administration.PrerequisitesGit, Python 3, a Google Cloud service account within the Google SecOps project to use with Workload Identity Federation, SecOps SOAR admin access, outbound email working in your SecOps SOAR environment, and a distribution list for your detection engineering team. You don&#039;t need to create a Data Table in advance: the job creates rules_monitoring on its first run that finds an affected rule.If you already deployed SecOpsToolkit for the ScheduledQueryJob, skip to Step 4. Step 0: Clone the RepositoryTo begin, you need the SecOps Toolkit integration code locally or in your Cloud Shell or terminal. So please run: git clone https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/secops-toolkit.gitcd secops-toolkit/integrationspip install -r requirements.txt Step 1: Deploy the integration — Method 1 (recommended) The upload_integration.py script packages the integration and pushes it via the Integrations Import API. First update the .env file used to load target instance details such as Customer ID, Region and Project for Google SecOps. cp .env.example .env Set SECOPS_PROJECT_ID, SECOPS_LOCATION and SECOPS_INSTANCE_ID in .env, plus GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS if you are not using Application Default Credentials (which is the case if you are using the Cloud Shell). Then: python upload_integration.py --integration SecOpsToolkit Use python upload_integration.py --list to see everything available in the repo. You can also bypass .env entirely with explicit flags: python upload_integration.py \  --integration SecOpsToolkit \  --project my-secops-project \  --location europe \  --instance xxxxx-xxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxx \  --service-account /path/to/sa-key.json # optional  Step 2: Deploy the integration — Method 2 (manual) Zip the contents of the integration directory — the archive root must contain Integration-SecOpsToolkit.def — then upload it through SOAR Settings → Integrations → Upload Integration. cd SecOpsToolkitzip -r ../SecOpsToolkit.zip . -x &quot;*.DS_Store&quot; &quot;*__pycache__*&quot; &quot;*.pyc&quot;  Step 3: Configure the integration instance Set API Root (https://eu-chronicle.googleapis.com/v1alpha/projects/xxxx-prod-secops-0/locations/eu/instances/xxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxx), either Workload Identity Email (recommended) or User&#039;s Service Account, and Verify SSL. Save, then run the Ping action to confirm authentication works before going further.  Step 4: Schedule the jobIn SOAR Settings → Jobs, add RulesMonitoring, select your SecOpsToolkit integration instance and fill in the two parameters: 			Parameter									Mandatory									Example									Description								Recipient Emails									Yes									soc-team@acme.com, detection-eng@acme.com									Comma-separated list of recipients. Spaces around commas are trimmed.								Tenant URL									Yes									https://&amp;lt;tenant_id&amp;gt;.backstory.chronicle.security/ide									Console URL included as a link in the email. Pointing it at the rules editor (/ide) takes engineers straight to where they can fix the rule.					 Set the run interval (15 minutes, the shipped default, is a good starting point) and enable the job.   Step 5: Test and verifyRun the job on demand and read the logs. A healthy run on a tenant with degraded rules looks like this:   Then open SIEM Settings → Data Tables → rules_monitoring and confirm there&#039;s one row per notified rule. Run the job a second time: it should log &quot;All affected rules were already notified recently. No email sent.&quot;, which shows that de-duplication works.If the tenant currently has no degraded rules, the job logs &quot;No affected rules found. Job finished.&quot; and doesn&#039;t create the table yet. That&#039;s expected. You can check the state of your rules at any time in Detections → Rules Dashboard.  TroubleshootingBelow are common issues you may run into when deploying and running the RulesMonitoring job, with their likely causes and fixes: 			Symptom									Likely cause									Fix								403 on Failed to list rules / rule deployments									Missing chronicle.rules.list or chronicle.ruleDeployments.list									Add the permissions to the custom role, or fall back to roles/chronicle.admin								Failed to create data table in logs, and the same rules are emailed on every run									Missing chronicle.dataTables.create / update, so there&#039;s nowhere to record notifications									Grant the Data Table permissions, or create rules_monitoring manually with a key column rule_name (STRING) and a 7-day TTL								Job succeeds and rows are written, but no email arrives									Email delivery failed (the error is logged and doesn&#039;t fail the job)									Check the log for Failed to send email notification, validate the SOAR email configuration and the recipient addresses, then delete the affected rows to re-trigger								A rule that is still PAUSED is not re-notified									Its row is still within the 7-day TTL									Expected behavior; lower the table TTL or delete the row to re-arm								A known degraded rule is never reported									The rule is archived, or its deployment state is DEFAULT/UNSPECIFIED									Archived rules are skipped by design; check the rule&#039;s execution state in the Rules Dashboard					 Conclusions Automatic throttling of expensive rules keeps Google SecOps stable, but without visibility it turns into silent detection gaps: rules that look deployed and aren&#039;t running. RulesMonitoring makes those state changes visible. It reads the execution state of every rule in two paginated API calls, uses a Data Table with a 7-day TTL as de-duplication memory, and sends a single, actionable digest to the people who can fix the rules. There&#039;s no extra infrastructure to run, no external database, and no one has to remember to check the Rules Dashboard.Rule health monitoring is one example of reducing platform toil. The open-source secops-toolkit repository also includes ScheduledQueryJob (to keep Data Tables up to date from saved UDM searches through the Asynchronous Search API). These modular jobs automate routine SecOps maintenance. Explore the repository, try the deployment, and share your feedback with the community!</description>
            <category>Community Blog</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 22:38:25 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>How to detect and get alerted when detection rules are automatically moved to PAUSED state?</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/how-to-detect-and-get-alerted-when-detection-rules-are-automatically-moved-to-paused-state-8443</link>
            <description>Hi everyone,We have noticed that when certain detection rules exceed resource consumption limits, Google SecOps automatically transitions them to a PAUSED state (following the LIMITED throttling period). Because paused rules stop evaluating events and generating alerts, we need to monitor these operational status changes closely.I have two questions regarding identifying and tracking these transitions:	Native Notifications: Does Google SecOps support any built-in alerting or notification mechanism (such as in-console alerts, bell notifications, or automated emails) when the platform suspends a rule due to high resource usage?			Identification &amp;amp; Auditing: What is the recommended way to capture the exact timestamp when a rule moves to PAUSED? Should we be just polling the SecOps REST API (rules.list / rules.get with executionState)?	 	How are other teams tracking degraded or paused rules to ensure detection coverage isn&#039;t silently lost? Any API query examples, or best practices would be greatly appreciated.Thanks!</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 22:37:51 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Production Threat: Requesting Human Review for Project amromeet-gemini (Case ID: 439511549012)</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/cloud-security-foundation-7/production-threat-requesting-human-review-for-project-amromeet-gemini-case-id-439511549012-8534</link>
            <description>Hello Google Cloud Community Managers,I am writing to request a manual human engineering escalation for a finalized automated appeal rejection under Case ID 439511549012. My production application ecosystem is experiencing a high-stakes threat because an automated policy flag has frozen my testing environments, and I need a security engineer to verify our completed remediation logs.Project Details:• Google Cloud Project ID: amromeet-gemini• Project Number: 439511549012• Active Billing Account ID: 01B276-FF8357-494048 (Agentic AI Ltd)• Primary Owner: hemant@agentic-ai.ltdContext &amp;amp; Root Cause:The sudden API usage anomaly that triggered the automated &quot;Abusive Activity / Hijacked Resource&quot; system flag was caused entirely by an autonomous local AI agent misconfiguring credential deployment scopes during an orchestration testing routine. There was zero malicious human intent, data scraping, or active endpoint abuse.Completed Remediation:1. The misconfigured and compromised Gemini API keys have been fully revoked and permanently deleted from our infrastructure.2. The project space is clean, and no automated local testing agent scripts are pointing to Google Cloud endpoints.3. Our primary live application runtime environment (agentic-ai-amro), which is hosting live traffic, has been completely decoupled from the Gemini API and safely switched to an external OpenAI credential layout.Request:As there is no ongoing policy violation or underlying vulnerability remaining on our ledger, I request a manual human review to clear the project-level flag so our active workspaces and historical assets are secure. Thank you for your assistance. </description>
            <category>Cloud Security Foundation</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 17:57:35 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>AWS Shield integration with Google SecOps</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/aws-shield-integration-with-google-secops-6933</link>
            <description>Hi,Could anyone help me if you have integrated AWS Shield with Google SecOps?I want to know which methods you have used to ingest AWS Shield events into Google SecOps. Thank you,</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 09:24:27 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Repeated field</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/repeated-field-8530</link>
            <description>Hi ,Does anyone help me to write a regular expression based on repeated field ?for example i am having the following fileds .My goal is to trigger an alert when target.resource.attribute.labels.value != &quot;Internal&quot;How i can write this regular expression  in google chronicle ?I have written like this.But it is not triggering correctly any target.resource.attribute.labels.value != &quot;Internal&quot;Could you please guide me ? </description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 02:44:24 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Integrating Bindplane  OP console  Audit logs with Secops</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/integrating-bindplane-op-console-audit-logs-with-secops-6628</link>
            <description>Hi All,In our environment, we are using the Bindplane OP Console. As part of our logging and monitoring requirements, we need to forward the Bindplane OP Console Audit logs to the SecOps console for centralized visibility and analysis. Could someone please guide us on the recommended approach to send or integrate Bindplane OP Console logs into SecOps? Currently I am referring the link https://docs.bindplane.com/integrations/sources/bindplane-audit-logs  and performed the below changes. I created an API key at the Bindplane project level and configured a source using Bindplane Audit Logs, with the destination set to our SecOps console. However, I’m not seeing any logs in SecOps. In other configurations, we usually need to attach agents to a configuration for logs to flow. In this case, since it’s SaaS-based, how are these changes supposed to be applied or pushed from the Bindplane OP console? Any documentation, configuration steps, or best practices would be greatly appreciatedThanks in advance for your support. Regards,Karthik</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 01:31:43 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>set up business account for reCAPTCHA</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/fraud-defense-recaptcha-6/set-up-business-account-for-recaptcha-8532</link>
            <description>we have a free account currently set up for reCAPTCHA but nearing 10,000 limit.  We would like to have a billing account set up however we need an account set up for invoice and billing with our procurement and finance teams, can you advise on the best contact to start this process?  </description>
            <category>Fraud Defense (reCAPTCHA)</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 17:38:57 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Exclusion Management for Custom Rules across many SecOps tenants</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/exclusion-management-for-custom-rules-across-many-secops-tenants-8529</link>
            <description>How do you manage rule exclusions across multiple Google SecOps tenants? I´m part of an MSSP running Google SecOps SIEM tenants and a centralized Unified tenant for SOAR. We maintain a shared library of roughly 900 custom YARA-L rules and deploy it across about 50 separate Google SecOps SIEM customer instances. Most customers have different benign activity, so the same rule can need different exclusions in each instance.We’d like to compare notes with teams managing exclusions at similar scale. Here’s our current approach, what works, and where we run into friction. How we manage exclusions today The rule text (event section) is the same across customer instances. Tenant-specific exceptions live in data tables: the tables have the same names in each instance, but their rows differ by customer.We keep one table per domain and platform, such as exclusion_network or exclusion_endpoint_windows. A rule builds a key from its identifier and selected event fields, then checks that key against a REGEX column:$exclusion = strings.to_lower(    strings.concat(        &quot;network_fortinet_admin_login_from_public_source_b##&quot;,        $e.principal.ip, &quot;##&quot;,        $e.principal.user.userid, &quot;##&quot;,        $e.target.hostname    ))not($exclusion in regex %exclusion_network.exclusion nocase)A row starts with the rule identifier, so a shared table can serve multiple rules without one rule’s row matching another rule. For example:^network_fortinet_admin_login_from_public_source_b##203\.0\.113\.7##.^#]*##fw-hq-01$We initially used one table per rule, coming from the Reference Sets times. But that would scale poorly against Google SecOps’ documented limit of 1,000 data tables per account. Google also documents a maximum of five in statements using regex operators in a query. Google SecOps data-table documentation. We are also facing long deployment times because of a large number of data tables. That´s why we reduced them to these domain exclusion tables.At the time of writing, 597 of our 901 rules use an exclusion lookup. About one-third of those use the anchored format above; the rest use older key formats. We migrate those gradually because the rule logic and its rows need to change together.We treat every exclusion as a reduction in detection coverage. Each row needs supporting evidence and a named human approver. When benign behavior can be described generally, we prefer to improve the rule logic rather than add a one-off exception. Where the approach hurts The pattern works, but its operational cost grows with every customer instance we add.	No shared inheritance layer in our workflow. We manage tables per customer instance and have not found a documented MSSP-wide layer where global rows are inherited and customer-specific rows override them. A generally applicable exclusion therefore has to be distributed to each instance.			Two sources of truth. Exclusions are usually added in the instance where the noise occurs. As a result, many table files in our repository are empty seeds, and a cross-customer view means collecting the tables instance by instance.			Broad or malformed rows are risky. A blank or overly broad regex can behave like a catch-all, so our linter rejects blank patterns and checks table rows before deployment. If a table is temporarily empty, its exclusions won’t match and detections may resume. We therefore update tables by adding or deleting rows rather than replacing them wholesale.			Our key format is coupled to rule identifiers. Because the identifier is embedded in the key, a rename or a beta-to-release promotion in our naming scheme can require corresponding row updates in every customer instance.			The packed key is a design trade-off. In this format, we concatenate string fields from one event variable. That makes the segment order part of the contract and means a multi-event rule must choose which event to key on. We also have to handle missing fields carefully: if they normalize to empty segments, a row can match more broadly than intended.			No real-time run frequency with data tables. Google’s documentation states that real-time run frequency isn’t supported for rules that use data tables. That’s a trade-off for rules where latency matters. Google SecOps data-table documentation			No built-in impact preview in our table workflow. We test proposed rows offline against sample events. The native exclusion feature offers a Test Exclusion preview over detections from the last 30 days; we don’t have an equivalent preview for a proposed data-table row in our workflow. Configure alert suppression	 Why Curated Detections exclusions look attractive Google SecOps has a native rule-exclusion feature: exclusions can filter matches without changing the rule text, and the Exclusions tab supports managing them. The feature also offers a Test Exclusion preview over the last 30 days. The API uses the findingsRefinements resource. Configure alert suppression · Manage rule exclusions through the APIThere is an important limitation for us: the current operational documentation says rule exclusions apply to curated rules and curated rule sets, not custom rules. The API guide says that custom-rule names supplied in the rules field are ignored, even though the request can return 200 OK. The REST schema does expose a rulesR] field, so the documentation is easy to misread. A Google SecOps staff reply in the Security Forum also says custom rules aren’t supported. Until Google confirms otherwise or we verify a working path, we’re treating curated exclusions as unavailable for our custom library. Alert-suppression documentation · API guide · REST schema · Google Security Forum discussionFor curated rules, the main differences from our current approach look like this:			 									Data tables in our rules									Curated rule exclusions								Rule-text change									Each rule must reference the lookup.									No rule-text change for supported curated rules.								Filter on									The key defined by our rule.									UDM event fields; outcome-variable filters are available through the API.								Impact test									Offline tests against sample events in our workflow.									Test Exclusion previews the effect on detections from the last 30 days.								Management									Table rows, repository tooling and our review process.									Exclusions tab: enable, disable, edit, archive and restore.								Expiry									Data-table rows support TTLs; Google documents a maximum of 365 days.									No exclusion TTL; the API guide describes a timestamp condition as a workaround.								Scope									Managed separately in each customer instance in our setup.									The API resource is scoped to a Google SecOps instance; we found no documented MSSP-wide inheritance layer.								Rule targets									Our row embeds the rule identifier.									Curated rule or rule-set resources; custom-rule targets are documented as unsupported.					Sources: data-table documentation, alert-suppression documentation, rule-exclusion API guide. What we’d like to know We’d especially like to hear from teams managing more than a handful of customer instances:	Where is your source of truth for exclusions: a repository that deploys to instances, or the instances themselves?			How do you separate exclusions that apply broadly from customer-specific ones?			Has anyone confirmed a working API path for native exclusions on custom rules? The REST schema exposes a rulesc] target, but the API guide says custom-rule targets are ignored.			Do you keep latency-sensitive rules free of data tables, given the documented real-time-frequency limitation?			How do you review and expire exclusions, and how do you catch a row that is broader than intended?			What other patterns have worked for you, such as SOAR-based suppression or entity context?			For the Google team: is an MSSP-level exclusion, defined once and applied across customer instances, on the roadmap?	We’re happy to share more about our key format, table linting and approval flow in the comments.</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 10:44:04 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Goolge SecOps/ServiceNow Job Sync Level</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/goolge-secops-servicenow-job-sync-level-8506</link>
            <description>Hi all,I am attempting to get the ServiceNow job “Sync Closed Incidents” between SecOps going.However I am running into an issue where the secops job picks up a case is open, but doesn’t read the Ticket_ID value assigned during the playbook stage. In short, a ticket is being created in serviceNow off the back of a secops playbook, but SNOW isn’t picking up the serviceNow case has been closed. I have attached a log export below:  2026-11-02,03:58:34,000 INFO] --------------- JOB STARTED ----------------2026-11-02,03:58:34,000 INFO] --- Start synchronize closure from Google SecOps to ServiceNow ---c2026-11-02,03:58:34,000 INFO] Found 0 closed cases since 2026-11-02 03:58:01 2026-11-02,03:58:34,000 INFO] --- Start synchronize closure from ServiceNow to Google SecOps ---e2026-11-02,03:58:34,000 INFO] Found 1 open casesp2026-11-02,03:58:34,000 INFO] No data found for property key: TICKET_IDT2026-11-02,03:58:34,000 INFO] --- Finish synchronize closure from ServiceNow to Google SecOps ---e2026-11-02,03:58:34,000 INFO] --------------- JOB FINISHED --------------- I have a feeling it relates to “No data found for property key: TICKET_ID” but I am unsure how to resolve.  Any ideas or advice would be greatly appreciated. Thanks,  </description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 23:27:56 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Curated Content - Quick Update For PHP2SHELL Content</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/curated-content-quick-update-for-php2shell-content-8528</link>
            <description> Hello SecOps Community! We wanted to send out a quick post to y’all highlighting some SecOps curated content relevant to PHP2SHELL disclosures on 2026.10.21. In addition to an excellent writeup by our colleagues at Wiz (which you should check out here: https://www.wiz.io/blog/php2shell-php-rce), we did a long form writeup on the Google Cloud blog, which alluded to a set of new curated detections, but didn’t provide direct guidance on how to find them:&amp;gt;Google Security Operations now has 23 new curated detections added to the Mandiant Frontline Threats rule pack. We recommend verifying that this rule pack is enabled and reviewing your detections to assess any potential impact to your environment. If you are so inclined, we bundled these rules up into the Pack “Mandiant Frontline Threats”, and you can also use the new Unified Rules search feature as well as the search feature in Content Hub to review and deploy them as you see fit. If you are an E+ customer, you can also use the Emerging Threats Center to look up the the GTI campaign GLOBAL.26.015 and the associated rules. Rule Pack: Unified Rules:Content Hub:Emerging Threats Center (E+ only customers):(Bonus - you can turn this into an active threat hunt as well using the “New Threat Hunt” button in the top right) Lastly, we also published a new rule related to a tampered copy of the Claude Code extension for Cursor - you can search for the rule name “Trojanized Anthropic Claude Code Extension Supply-Chain Compromise Artifacts” / “ttp_claude_code_extension_supply_chain_compromise”. Good luck and happy hunting! -Kyle &amp;amp; the SecOps Team</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 22:06:39 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Mandiant Actors deployment</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/security-validation-5/mandiant-actors-deployment-8527</link>
            <description>Hi comunity! I would like to know if there´s a way to permit that an actor that don’t have access directly to the Director, can send the information gathered in the jobs done using another actor that have this direct communication. Thank you all!</description>
            <category>Security Validation</category>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 20:44:36 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Tuesday&#039;s Tip of the Week - RBAC in Google SecOps: IAM Roles, Data Scopes, and Least Privilege</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/tuesday-s-tip-of-the-week-93/tuesday-s-tip-of-the-week-rbac-in-google-secops-iam-roles-data-scopes-and-least-privilege-8526</link>
            <description>Tuesday 11/3/2026 Audience: SOC leads, analysts, and SecOps admins who control access to Google SecOps but haven’t used Google Cloud IAM before.Summary: Google SecOps manages most access in Google Cloud IAM rather than in its own user screens. IAM is the same access system that controls every Google Cloud service. This brief covers the IAM basics you need, the SecOps roles that exist, and how to set up common access patterns, such as limiting CrowdStrike and Defender logs to one team.1. IAM basicsIAM answers one question: who can do what, and where.Term			What it means			SecOps example		Project			A container in Google Cloud. Your SecOps instance is linked to one project, and all SecOps access is granted on that project			acme-secops-prod		Principal			Who gets access: a user, a group, or a service account (an identity used by a script or integration)			The group secops-tier1		Permission			One specific action, written as service.resource.action			chronicle.rules.update lets someone edit detection rules		Role			A named bundle of permissions. Google provides predefined roles, and you can build your own custom roles			Chronicle API Viewer		Grant			Gives a principal a role on the project. The formal name is a role binding			secops-tier1 holds Chronicle API Viewer		Condition			An optional rule on a grant that narrows it, for example to one data scope or until a set date			Applies only to the edr-team scope		 Two rules explain most access problems:Access adds up. A user gets every permission from every role they hold. Granting someone a smaller role doesn’t take anything away. You have to remove the bigger role.	A grant without a condition always wins over the same role granted with a condition.Where to grant access: in the Google Cloud console, select the SecOps project, then go to IAM &amp;amp; Admin &amp;gt; IAM &amp;gt; Grant access. Enter the principal, choose the role, add a condition if you need one, and save.How your people appear in IAM:How users sign in to SecOps			What you enter as the principal		Google Workspace or Cloud Identity accounts			The group email, for example secops-tier1@example.com		Okta, Entra ID, Ping, or another identity provider			principalSet://iam.googleapis.com/locations/global/workforcePools/POOL_ID/group/GROUP_NAME. The pool ID is listed under IAM &amp;amp; Admin &amp;gt; Workforce Identity Federation		Always grant roles to groups. Adding or removing a person then happens in your identity provider, and IAM doesn’t need to change.2. How SecOps uses IAMLayer			Question it answers			Where it’s set		Feature access			What can this person do? (search, edit rules, close cases, manage feeds)			IAM roles on the SecOps project		Data access (data RBAC)			Which logs can this person see?			Scopes in Settings &amp;gt; SIEM Settings &amp;gt; Data Access &amp;gt; Scopes, assigned through IAM conditions		SOAR environments and SOC roles			Which SOAR cases can this person see, and which queue do they work?			SOAR settings, mapped to identity provider groups		A scope is a saved filter on your data. It’s built from labels such as log type (CS_EDR), namespace, or an ingestion label you add to a feed (region=emea). Users with a scope see only the data that matches it. Users with no scope are called global users, and they see everything.3. The SecOps rolesRole			In plain terms			Can’t		Chronicle API Admin			Full control, including feeds, parsers, and scopes			 		Chronicle API Editor			Builds detections: rules, retrohunts, reference lists, data tables, dashboards. Once SOAR uses IAM, it can also close cases, run actions, and edit playbooks			Feeds, parsers, scopes, SOAR settings		Chronicle API Viewer			Read-only: search, read rules, read cases			Change anything, including updating or closing cases		Chronicle API Limited Viewer			Read-only, without rules			See rules or retrohunts		Chronicle SOAR Admin			Runs SOAR: settings, environments, playbooks, cases			Use SIEM rules or search		Chronicle API Restricted Data Access			Turns on scoped data access. Grants no features by itself			Work alone. Pair it with the role below or a custom role		Chronicle API Restricted Data Access Viewer			Viewer for scoped users			See data outside their scopes		Watch for:Viewer, Editor, and Admin include permission to see all data. A scoped user who also holds one of them without a condition sees everything.	The project-wide roles Owner and Editor also include SecOps permissions. Check who holds them on the SecOps project.	SOAR moves to IAM when an admin selects Enable IAM on the SOAR IAM Migration tab. After that, Chronicle API Editor includes SOAR permissions, so review who holds it before you switch. The legacy SOAR API stops working after March 31, 2027.4. Matching roles to jobsJob			Grant		Tier 1 analyst			Custom role: Viewer plus case update and close		Tier 2 and 3 analyst			The Tier 1 role plus manual actions, which include containment actions such as host isolation		Detection engineer			Chronicle API Editor, or Editor with SOAR permissions removed		Playbook developer			Custom role: Viewer plus playbook permissions		Platform admin			Chronicle API Admin, limited to two or three people		Scoped analyst			Restricted Data Access with a scope condition, plus Restricted Data Access Viewer		To build a custom role:Go to IAM &amp;amp; Admin &amp;gt; Roles.	Select the role to start from, for example Chronicle API Viewer, and choose Create role from selection.	Give the new role an ID that starts with secops.	Add the permissions you need. For Tier 1, add chronicle.cases.update and chronicle.cases.close.	Save. The new role now appears in the role list on the Grant access screen.5. Use cases 5.1 Only the EDR team can see CrowdStrike and Defender logsCreate two scopes in Settings &amp;gt; SIEM Settings &amp;gt; Data Access &amp;gt; Scopes:	edr-team: allow the log types CS_EDR, CS_ALERTS, CS_DETECTS, MICROSOFT_DEFENDER_ENDPOINT, and any other CrowdStrike or Defender log types you ingest.		soc-general: allow all, then deny the same log types. Use Test scope to confirm that EDR events don’t appear.		Bind your rules to the scopes with Bind to scope in the Rules Editor. CrowdStrike and Defender rules go to edr-team, and all other rules go to soc-general. Do this before you turn on data RBAC. Otherwise every existing rule becomes global, and only global users can see its detections.	Grant the EDR group access. On IAM &amp;gt; Grant access, give the EDR group Chronicle API Restricted Data Access and Chronicle API Restricted Data Access Viewer. On Restricted Data Access, click Add IAM condition, open the condition editor, and paste:resource.name.endsWith(&#039;/edr-team&#039;) || resource.name.endsWith(&#039;/soc-general&#039;)	Grant everyone else access. Give them the same two roles with the condition resource.name.endsWith(&#039;/soc-general&#039;). Then remove any Viewer, Editor, Owner, or Editor (project) grants they hold without a condition. Because access adds up, those grants would still show them everything.	Route the cases. In SOAR settings &amp;gt; Access Management &amp;gt; Environments, map edr-team to an EDR environment so that CrowdStrike and Defender cases appear only to the EDR team. This is a Pre-GA feature.What to expect:Admins and other global users still see EDR data, so keep that group small.	A rule that combines EDR data with other sources has to stay global, and only global users see its detections.	Scoped users can’t see curated detections.	Case search isn’t filtered by scope.5.2 Regional SOCs (EMEA and Americas)Add an ingestion label such as region=emea or region=amer to every feed and collector.	Create one scope per region that allows its label.	Grant each regional group Restricted Data Access with a condition for its scope, and map each scope to that region’s SOAR environment.	Logs that arrive without a label are visible only to global users, so add the label to every new feed.5.3 Executive and HR-sensitive dataCreate a custom label from a UDM query that matches the sensitive data, such as executive hostnames or user accounts.	Allow that label in an insider-risk scope, and deny it in soc-general.	Grant insider-risk only to the investigations team.	Users whose scope includes a custom label lose ingestion metrics, so their ingestion dashboards will be empty.5.4 A contractor with an end dateGrant Chronicle API Limited Viewer to a contractor group. Limited Viewer can search but can’t see your rules.	Add a condition so the access ends automatically: request.time &amp;lt; timestamp(&quot;2026-12-31T00:00:00Z&quot;).	If they should see only part of the data, use Restricted Data Access with a scope instead. Limited Viewer can see all data.6. Monitor Access Changes Every IAM change in Google Cloud writes an audit log entry called SetIamPolicy. If you send the SecOps project’s audit logs into SecOps (log type GCP_CLOUDAUDIT), this rule alerts on any grant or removal of a SecOps role:rule secops_project_access_change {  meta:    description = &quot;IAM binding change on a Chronicle or secops custom role&quot;    severity = &quot;Medium&quot;  events:    $e.metadata.log_type = &quot;GCP_CLOUDAUDIT&quot;    $e.metadata.product_event_type = &quot;SetIamPolicy&quot;    $e.target.resource.attribute.labelsg&quot;ser_binding_deltas_role&quot;] = /chronicle|secops/ nocase  outcome:    $actor = $e.principal.user.userid    $action = $e.target.resource.attribute.labelsg&quot;ser_binding_deltas_action&quot;]    $member = $e.target.resource.attribute.labelsg&quot;ser_binding_deltas_member&quot;]  condition:    $e}7. Action itemsOpen IAM &amp;amp; Admin &amp;gt; IAM on the SecOps project and list everyone with a Chronicle role, plus anyone with Owner or Editor.	Create an identity provider group for each job in section 4.	Build the Tier 1 and playbook developer custom roles.	Replace grants to individual users with grants to groups.	Design your scopes and bind every rule to one before turning on data RBAC.	Deploy the access change rule and test it with a test grant. </description>
            <category>Tuesday&#039;s Tip of the Week</category>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 17:15:27 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Suspended GCP Projects: slv-super-market / supermarket-app-bad93 (Ref: Firebase Case 10454773)</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/suspended-gcp-projects-slv-super-market-supermarket-app-bad93-ref-firebase-case-10454773-8525</link>
            <description>Hello Google Cloud Community Managers and Support Team,Our Google Cloud Platform account was placed under a full account service restriction on October 2, 2026, due to automated abuse/DoS heuristics triggered by an internal stress test.Context &amp;amp; Root Cause:	We were conducting internal performance benchmarking and load testing using k6 against our own backend Cloud Functions and Firestore database for our mobile application (GK Mart).			An unoptimized database transaction loop combined with high synthetic request concurrency caused rapid invocations, which automated traffic monitors flagged as abusive activity.			There was zero malicious intent, external targeting, proxy relaying, or crypto-mining; this was purely localized backend testing on our own resources.	Corrective Actions Taken:	All automated stress testing and k6 scripts were immediately terminated.			Cloud Functions transaction logic was refactored to eliminate execution contention.			All sensitive credentials, API keys, and environment variables have been rotated and secured.	Current Blocker:	An appeal was submitted via the Google Account service restriction form, but no status update or confirmation email has arrived.			Firebase Support was contacted under Case 10454773. Support agent Hugo confirmed our projects remain suspended and recommended reaching out to GCP Support / Billing.			Because the account-level restriction redirects all console.cloud.google.com URLs directly to [myaccount.google.com/restrictions](https://myaccount.google.com/restrictions), we cannot access standard Cloud Console support channels to file a ticket.	Affected Project IDs:	slv-super-market			slv-super-market-staging			supermarket-app-bad93	Could a Community Manager or Google Cloud specialist please help escalate this ticket internally to the Trust &amp;amp; Safety / Cloud Compliance team to clear this false positive and restore project access?Thank you for your assistance.</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 16:36:35 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Contradictory OAuth client deletion warning despite recent activity</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/cloud-security-foundation-7/contradictory-oauth-client-deletion-warning-despite-recent-activity-8524</link>
            <description>Hello everyone,I received an email notification today stating that an OAuth client in one of my projects will be deleted in 30 days because it has allegedly been inactive for at least 5 months.However, this completely contradicts the data in the Google Cloud Console. The &quot;Date of last use&quot; for this specific client is explicitly listed as October 20, 2026.To be absolutely safe, I manually triggered a successful OAuth login flow via the browser today to register new activity. I am aware the console UI might take 24 to 48 hours to reflect this new timestamp.Has anyone else received these automated deletion warnings despite having recent client activity? Is this a known bug in the activity tracker, and do I need to take any further action to prevent the automated deletion?Thanks in advance for your insights. </description>
            <category>Cloud Security Foundation</category>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 09:45:55 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>SWP identity authorization BLOCKED</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/cloud-security-foundation-7/swp-identity-authorization-blocked-8522</link>
            <description>We have completed a reproducible, fail-closed diagnostic in us-central1.Verified configuration	Next-hop Secure Web Proxy with a correctly attached gateway security policy.			Source Compute Engine VM: 10.250.244.3, private IP only.			Attached, enabled service account: helixis-ci-swp-probe@studio-1130431360-48a05.iam.gserviceaccount.com.			Priority 60: destination.port == 443 &amp;amp;&amp;amp; source.matchServiceAccount(&#039;...&#039;) — DENY.			Priority 70: source.matchServiceAccount(&#039;...&#039;) — DENY.			Priority 80: host() == &#039;fhir.epic.com&#039; — DENY.			No active ALLOW rules or authorization-policy override.	Observed transactions — 2026-11-04 at approximately 04:02:17 UTC	Correct SNI (fhir.epic.com) → hostname-only DENY, priority 80.			Incorrect SNI (example.com) → default DENY.			No SNI → default DENY.	All three connections reached the SWP gateway from the expected VM address. Priority 60 and 70 did not match any transaction.The complete JSON payloads contain enforcedGatewaySecurityPolicy.matchedRules but no clientServiceAccount field or other source-identity information.The test completed safely. Two independent recovery workflows successfully stopped the VM, removed its diagnostic firewall authorization tag, disabled the temporary firewall exception, and verified final isolation. Temporary IAM privileges were revoked.Request for Google Cloud engineering clarification	Should source.matchServiceAccount() recognize a Compute Engine VM&#039;s attached service account in NEXT_HOP_ROUTING_MODE when using a tagged static next-hop-ilb route?			Are there undocumented source-identity attribution prerequisites or mode-specific limitations?			How can we verify whether source identity is unavailable, omitted from logging, or evaluated as nonmatching?			Do the VM&#039;s OAuth access scopes affect SWP source identity attribution?	We can provide sanitized transaction records and exact timestamps for investigation. We require service-account-based authorization and will not enable a hostname-only ALLOW rule.</description>
            <category>Cloud Security Foundation</category>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 05:18:42 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Secops chronicle agentic ai features</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/secops-chronicle-agentic-ai-features-8517</link>
            <description>Hi Team,Can anyone please help me understand what agentic AI features are available in enterprise edition as i do not see any thing like gemini investigation and others under siem settings </description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 00:14:26 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>New to Google SecOps: Same as It Ever Was? Not When You Use |&gt; EXTEND</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/community-blog-42/new-to-google-secops-same-as-it-ever-was-not-when-you-use-extend-8519</link>
            <description>I hope you are enjoying this mini-series on SQL Pipe syntax and that you’ve tried a few SQL queries out in Google Security Operations (SecOps)! The pipe operators of WHERE, SELECT and AGGREGATE are a great springboard to get you started and after we cover EXTEND today, you will have a great foundation to build queries with! Quite simply, the EXTEND pipe operator adds computed columns to a result set. That statement is a nice summary, but it only scrapes the surface of what EXTEND can do. Do you want to create a concatenated output of multiple values within various columns?	How about creating a sum (or any other mathematical calculation) based on values within a row of data?	Calculating the length of a command line?	Classifying results from a column? EXTEND can do all of those things…and more. For those familiar with YARA-L, the EXTEND pipe doesn’t have an exact counterpart, but it can fill the role that placeholder variables perform in the filtering statement or in the outcome section in the form of conditional logic, for instance. Because EXTEND fills many different roles, it is a bit harder to provide a single example that summarizes how it compares to YARA-L, so here is a basic example to kick this off. Here we are generating an output of the time, IP pair, sent and received bytes and creating a new column with the total bytes for each event. metadata.event_type = &quot;NETWORK_CONNECTION&quot;network.sent_bytes &amp;gt; 0network.received_bytes &amp;gt; 0match:  metadata.id  // Group by the unique event ID to guarantee row-by-row resultsoutcome:  // Using a match section, fields must be aggregated  $time = timestamp.get_timestamp(max(metadata.event_timestamp.seconds))  $principal_ip = array_distinct(principal.ip)  $target_ip = array_distinct(target.ip)  $sent_bytes = max(network.sent_bytes)  $received_bytes = max(network.received_bytes)  $total_bytes = max(network.sent_bytes + network.received_bytes)order:  $time descunselect:  metadata.id Here is the equivalent query in SQL pipe syntax:FROM events|&amp;gt; WHERE metadata.event_type = &quot;NETWORK_CONNECTION&quot; and     network.sent_bytes &amp;gt; 0 and     network.received_bytes &amp;gt; 0|&amp;gt; SELECT TIMESTAMP_SECONDS(metadata.event_timestamp.seconds) as time,     principal.ip as principal_ip,     target.ip as target_ip,    network.sent_bytes,     network.received_bytes|&amp;gt; EXTEND sent_bytes + received_bytes as total_bytes If you want to use traditional SQL rather than pipe SQL, it’s worth noting that like the AGGREGATE pipe, EXTEND is not a term you will find in traditional SQL. However, this query can be handled by performing the addition of the bytes in the SELECT statement like this.SELECT   TIMESTAMP_SECONDS(metadata.event_timestamp.seconds) as time,   principal.ip as principal_ip,   target.ip as target_ip,   network.sent_bytes,   network.received_bytes,   network.sent_bytes + network.received_bytes as total_bytesFROM eventsWHERE metadata.event_type = &quot;NETWORK_CONNECTION&quot; and   network.sent_bytes &amp;gt; 0 and   network.received_bytes &amp;gt; 0 Either way, the results looks like this: I’ve mentioned a number of capabilities that EXTEND can handle, so let’s dig into some additional capabilities. Extracting Values into New ColumnsIn the previous example, we created a new column by taking the sum of two other columns. Let’s apply EXTEND to string values. SecOps stores the file name and full path in a single field, and perhaps we want to extract that file name to perform some additional analysis. We would apply the regular expression REGEXP_EXTRACT to the target.process.file.full_path, extract it and name the new column file_name using the EXTEND pipe. The result is two columns, the source column and the newly created one that just contains the file name.FROM events|&amp;gt; WHERE metadata.event_type = &quot;PROCESS_LAUNCH&quot; and target.process.file.full_path &amp;lt;&amp;gt; &quot;&quot;|&amp;gt; SELECT target.process.file.full_path|&amp;gt; EXTEND REGEXP_EXTRACT(full_path, r&#039;\\(&amp;^\\]+)$&#039;) as file_name  Calculating Numeric Values from StringsNow let’s take a string and use a SQL function to output a numeric. In this example, we are using the LENGTH function, one of nearly 200 SQL functions supported in Google SecOps, and outputting this numeric to a new column using EXTEND.FROM events|&amp;gt; WHERE metadata.event_type = &quot;PROCESS_LAUNCH&quot; and target.process.command_line &amp;lt;&amp;gt; &quot;&quot;|&amp;gt; SELECT target.process.command_line as cmd_line|&amp;gt; EXTEND length(cmd_line) as cmd_length  With all three of these examples, the total bytes, file name and command string length, we are probably not at the final step of the query, but it unlocks values that can then be further manipulated in the query. These next steps could be as simple as sorting or they could be used in additional statistical calculations or filtered to arrive at a final actionable result. Classifying EventsIn fact, let’s take this last example and take it a step further. Again a lot of this mini-series is around highlighting the building blocks that exist within SQL pipes that you can take to build your own queries for your use cases as well as ensuring you understand what is occurring in each of these steps. I’m not expecting everyone to be SQL experts but it is important to be able to understand the flow of these queries as we add more pipe operators to them! With the command line length calculated in the previous query, perhaps we want to add a classification column to the results. The EXTEND pipe does this as well.FROM events|&amp;gt; WHERE metadata.event_type = &quot;PROCESS_LAUNCH&quot; and target.process.command_line &amp;lt;&amp;gt; &quot;&quot;|&amp;gt; SELECT target.process.command_line as cmd_line|&amp;gt; EXTEND length(cmd_line) as cmd_length|&amp;gt; EXTEND cmd_length &amp;gt; 200 or cmd_length &amp;lt; 10 as interesting_rows|&amp;gt; WHERE interesting_rows = TRUE The first thing I want to call out is that we have two EXTEND pipes back to back in this query. In SQL pipes, we need two separate pipes in this case because the latter one is dependent on the results of the former. So, the first EXTEND calculates the length of the command line. With that calculated, the second EXTEND can use that calculated value and based on the logic provided compares the command length to the values provided and if it meets the criteria, it outputs true in the newly named column and if not, it returns false.   If we had wanted to perform additional classifications or create additional columns, we could append additional logic to the second EXTEND pipe and separate the new logic from what we already have with a a comma. The last step of this query is the addition of another WHERE pipe to further filter the result set to just the “interesting” columns. In my estimation, the additional bonus that EXTEND brings is that because SQL pipes operate in a linear manner, we can create new columns during a query and then perform operations on those columns within the same query. In traditional SQL, this is often handled with a common table expression (CTE) or using the last example, adding more calculations to the SELECT statement as well as filtering in the WHERE statement as the query gets refined. In YARA-L, these additional calculations are often handled by building a multi-stage search which I’ve covered previously. We’ve scratched the surface of EXTEND and will follow this blog with another one with more examples of EXTEND which go deeper into its capabilities. In the meantime, here are a few things to keep in mind as you get started:EXTEND creates additional columns in the result set	Using SQL functions, it can be used to concatenate values, extract strings, perform mathematical functions and more	These newly created columns can then be used by subsequent pipe operators	Just remember that the EXTEND pipe can’t be used to calculate a new column and then immediately use that newly created column in that same EXTEND pipe; you need to add a second EXTEND pipe Try some of these concepts out in your next search and let us know how it goes. I’ll be back with more tips, more pipes and the concepts we covered today will be leveraged as we go deeper into SQL pipes!</description>
            <category>Community Blog</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 21:51:22 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Production project suspended for “hijacked resources” – customer data locked in Cloud SQL, appeal pending, requesting escalation</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/cloud-security-foundation-7/production-project-suspended-for-hijacked-resources-customer-data-locked-in-cloud-sql-appeal-pending-requesting-escalation-8516</link>
            <description>Hello Community Managers and Google team,Our production Google Cloud project was suspended on 2 November 2026 for “abusive activity consistent with hijacked resources”. We received no prior warning.Project ID: imposing-gadget-465000-n9	Appeal ticket: IBTPVFDWXUZDKLVH3KXNP4OEQUThe project runs NexHRM, a multi-tenant HR and payroll platform that businesses rely on daily. The whole service is down, and our customers’ data is in Cloud SQL inside the suspended project, so we can’t restore the service anywhere else.We believe a third party compromised our credentials. Since receiving the notice, we have:Disabled all service account keys on the project	Begun auditing our codebase and deployment configuration for exposed credentialsWe can’t finish remediating (reviewing logs, removing unauthorised resources) because every console page redirects to the appeal form.We kindly request either:Escalation of our appeal to Trust &amp;amp; Safety for an expedited review, or	Temporary, restricted access so we can export our Cloud SQL database and complete remediation.We will cooperate fully and can verify ownership through official channels.Thank you. </description>
            <category>Cloud Security Foundation</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 21:23:48 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Secure Web Proxy next-hop routing: source.matchServiceAccount() does not match Compute Engine VM</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/cloud-security-foundation-7/secure-web-proxy-next-hop-routing-source-matchserviceaccount-does-not-match-compute-engine-vm-8518</link>
            <description>I&#039;m investigating a source-identity policy matching issue with Google Cloud Secure Web Proxy in NEXT_HOP_ROUTING_MODE.Configuration	Compute Engine VM with a dedicated, enabled service account			Private VPC, no external VM IP			Next-hop Secure Web Proxy with gateway security policy			TLS destination: fhir.epic.com:443			Source VM service account verified through Compute Engine configuration			No TLS inspection or application data involved	Diagnostic policy rulesPriority 70: DENYsource.matchServiceAccount(&#039;PROBE_SA&#039;)Priority 80: DENYhost() == &#039;fhir.epic.com&#039;Priority 90: DENYsource.matchServiceAccount(&#039;PROBE_SA&#039;)&amp;amp;&amp;amp; host() == &#039;fhir.epic.com&#039;Observed results	The VM&#039;s TCP connections reach Secure Web Proxy.			VPC firewall logs confirm the diagnostic connections were permitted.			SWP logs correctly identify fhir.epic.com from TLS SNI.			The hostname-only DENY rule matches.			The service-account-only DENY rule does not match.			The combined service-account and hostname rule does not match.			The service account exists, is enabled, and is correctly attached to the VM.			SWP transaction logs do not expose a clientServiceAccount value.	Questions	Are there additional prerequisites for source.matchServiceAccount() in next-hop Secure Web Proxy mode?			What can prevent SWP from attributing traffic to a correctly attached Compute Engine service account?			Is there a supported way to diagnose source-identity attribution without weakening the security policy?			Can empty VM OAuth access scopes affect this attribution?	This is an isolated staging environment. We have preserved correlated firewall and SWP evidence and can provide sanitized diagnostic details if needed.We need to retain service-account-based authorization rather than using a hostname-only ALLOW rule.</description>
            <category>Cloud Security Foundation</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 21:20:57 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>reCAPTCHA Android SDK 18.7.1 — HTTPS/TLS and Data Safety clarification</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/fraud-defense-recaptcha-6/recaptcha-android-sdk-18-7-1-https-tls-and-data-safety-clarification-8453</link>
            <description>Hello Google Cloud reCAPTCHA Team,We are reviewing the Google Play Data Safety declarations for our published Android application SEYCHAS.Application environment:	Framework: Flutter			Android minSdk: 24			Android targetSdk: 36			reCAPTCHA Android SDK: 18.7.1			Integration: Firebase Authentication (conditional reCAPTCHA verification)	Our technical investigation confirmed that the primary reCAPTCHA endpoint uses HTTPS. However, we could not establish complete transport guarantees for auxiliary requests using dynamically supplied URLs and for embedded WebView navigation, redirects, and subresources.We have not identified any confirmed unencrypted transmission of user data or demonstrated security vulnerability.We would appreciate clarification of the following questions:1. Encryption in transitDoes reCAPTCHA Android SDK 18.7.1 ensure that all SDK-controlled network requests carrying user or device data use HTTPS/TLS, including auxiliary GET requests, dynamically supplied URLs, WebView navigation, redirects, and subresources?Does this also apply on Android API levels 24–27, where the platform&#039;s default cleartext policy differs from newer Android versions?2. Data collectionWhich data categories are actually collected by SDK version 18.7.1 when invoked through Firebase Authentication?In particular, we would like to clarify the collection of app interactions, device identifiers, installed-app information, and diagnostic data, including which collection is automatic or conditional.3. Google Play Data SafetyWhat processing purposes, sharing classifications, and retention practices apply to these SDK operations?4. Official technical guidanceIs there version-specific documentation or guidance from the reCAPTCHA engineering team confirming the applicable transport security guarantees and recommended configuration?Our goal is to ensure that our Google Play Data Safety declarations accurately reflect the actual SDK behavior.Thank you for your assistance.</description>
            <category>Fraud Defense (reCAPTCHA)</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 19:49:32 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>reCAPTCHA Monthly Usage Reset Clarification</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/fraud-defense-recaptcha-6/recaptcha-monthly-usage-reset-clarification-6527</link>
            <description>This query is regarding the recent Google reCAPTCHA migration. As per Google’s policy, the monthly free quota is 10,000 assessments, and charges apply only if this limit is exceeded. Our understanding is that if the quota is not exceeded, usage should reset at the start of each new calendar month and begin again from 1, 2, 3, etc.However, we are seeing inconsistent usage information in the Google Cloud Console:One screen shows usage based on “Last 30 days” (rolling data). Another screen (Billing → Current Month) shows no usage data and $0 cost.Due to this, it is unclear which view should be used to track monthly free-tier usage and billing.Please confirm:Whether the 10,000 free assessments are calculated per calendar month Whether usage resets every month Which console view reflects actual billable usage Thank you for your support.</description>
            <category>Fraud Defense (reCAPTCHA)</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 15:59:11 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Google Cloud Security Summit 11/4: Defend at Machine Speed with Security Agents and Unified SOC Detection &amp; Response</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/google-cloud-security-summit-11-4-defend-at-machine-speed-with-security-agents-and-unified-soc-detection-response-8511</link>
            <description>Hi All,Everyone&#039;s racing to roll out AI agents, and bad actors are moving faster than ever, too.Is your security strategy keeping up, or still built for last year&#039;s threats?To help you meet the challenge, we&#039;re hosting the Google Cloud Security Summit, a 90-minute virtual event hosted by Google Cloud, Mandiant, and Wiz. Our threat researchers and product leaders will share practical frameworks across two dedicated tracks:Build SecurelySecure AI agents from day one: How to safely build, deploy and govern agents on Gemini across your organization.	Protect apps from the ground up: Ways to build security in from the very first line of code, autonomously fix vulnerabilities directly in CI/CD pipelines, and protect applications from code to runtime.Defend at Machine SpeedDefend against new attacks: What Google Threat Intelligence researchers are seeing in the threat landscape, and how to counter threats with security agents and operationalize threat intelligence to shrink exploit windows to hours.	Respond at machine speed: How agent-powered security operations help your team unify SOC detection and response, so you can find, investigate and respond to incidents faster.Register today to save your spot for this complimentary summit! Learn how you can use AI security capabilities with Google Cloud and Wiz, and what our threat intelligence experts are learning about AI-driven threats.Session details:When: Wednesday, November 4, 2026, 9:00 AM–10:30 AM PST	Where: Virtual (global)	Register or view replays post-event: Save your spot!	Regional summits: Europe, the Middle East, and Africa | Asia Pacific | JapanCan&#039;t make the live broadcast? Register anyway, and you&#039;ll get the on-demand recordings and session takeaways right after the event.Your turn: What&#039;s your biggest headache with securing or governing AI agents right now? Is it visibility, access control, or something else? Tell us below, and we&#039;ll try to bring your questions into the session.See you Wednesday!Cheers,Katey </description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 15:21:16 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Google Cloud Security Summit 11/4: How AI Is Changing the Threat Landscape, from Google Cloud, Mandiant, &amp; Wiz</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/fraud-defense-recaptcha-6/google-cloud-security-summit-11-4-how-ai-is-changing-the-threat-landscape-from-google-cloud-mandiant-wiz-8515</link>
            <description>Hi All,Bad actors are using AI to scale attacks, and every security team is feeling it.Is your security strategy keeping up, or still built for last year&#039;s threats?To help you meet the challenge, we&#039;re hosting the Google Cloud Security Summit, a 90-minute virtual event hosted by Google Cloud, Mandiant, and Wiz. Our threat researchers and product leaders will share practical frameworks across two dedicated tracks:Build SecurelySecure AI agents from day one: How to safely build, deploy and govern agents on Gemini across your organization.	Protect apps from the ground up: Ways to build security in from the very first line of code, autonomously fix vulnerabilities directly in CI/CD pipelines, and protect applications from code to runtime.Defend at Machine SpeedDefend against new attacks: What Google Threat Intelligence researchers are seeing in the threat landscape, and how to counter threats with security agents and operationalize threat intelligence to shrink exploit windows to hours.	Respond at machine speed: How agent-powered security operations help your team unify SOC detection and response, so you can find, investigate and respond to incidents faster.Register today to save your spot for this complimentary summit! Learn how you can use AI security capabilities with Google Cloud and Wiz, and what our threat intelligence experts are learning about AI-driven threats.Session details:When: Wednesday, November 4, 2026, 9:00 AM–10:30 AM PST	Where: Virtual (global)	Register or view replays post-event: Save your spot!	Regional summits: Europe, the Middle East, and Africa | Asia Pacific | JapanCan&#039;t make the live broadcast? Register anyway, and you&#039;ll get the on-demand recordings and session takeaways right after the event.Your turn: What&#039;s your biggest headache with securing or governing AI agents right now? Is it visibility, access control, or something else? Tell us below, and we&#039;ll try to bring your questions into the session.See you Wednesday!Cheers,Katey</description>
            <category>Fraud Defense (reCAPTCHA)</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 22:39:44 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Google Cloud Security Summit 11/4: Is Your Security Strategy Ready for AI-Driven Threats?</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/security-validation-5/google-cloud-security-summit-11-4-is-your-security-strategy-ready-for-ai-driven-threats-8514</link>
            <description>Hi All,How confident are you that your defenses would hold up against an AI-driven attack?Is your security strategy keeping up, or still built for last year&#039;s threats?To help you meet the challenge, we&#039;re hosting the Google Cloud Security Summit, a 90-minute virtual event hosted by Google Cloud, Mandiant, and Wiz. Our threat researchers and product leaders will share practical frameworks across two dedicated tracks:Build SecurelySecure AI agents from day one: How to safely build, deploy and govern agents on Gemini across your organization.	Protect apps from the ground up: Ways to build security in from the very first line of code, autonomously fix vulnerabilities directly in CI/CD pipelines, and protect applications from code to runtime.Defend at Machine SpeedDefend against new attacks: What Google Threat Intelligence researchers are seeing in the threat landscape, and how to counter threats with security agents and operationalize threat intelligence to shrink exploit windows to hours.	Respond at machine speed: How agent-powered security operations help your team unify SOC detection and response, so you can find, investigate and respond to incidents faster.Register today to save your spot for this complimentary summit! Learn how you can use AI security capabilities with Google Cloud and Wiz, and what our threat intelligence experts are learning about AI-driven threats.Session details:When: Wednesday, November 4, 2026, 9:00 AM–10:30 AM PST	Where: Virtual (global)	Register or view replays post-event: Save your spot!	Regional summits: Europe, the Middle East, and Africa | Asia Pacific | JapanCan&#039;t make the live broadcast? Register anyway, and you&#039;ll get the on-demand recordings and session takeaways right after the event.Your turn: What&#039;s your biggest headache with securing or governing AI agents right now? Is it visibility, access control, or something else? Tell us below, and we&#039;ll try to bring your questions into the session.See you Wednesday!Cheers,Katey</description>
            <category>Security Validation</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 22:35:10 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Google Cloud Security Summit 11/4: Turn Threat Intelligence into Action and Shrink Exploit Windows</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-threat-intelligence-3/google-cloud-security-summit-11-4-turn-threat-intelligence-into-action-and-shrink-exploit-windows-8513</link>
            <description>Hi All,Threat actors are using AI too, and the window between disclosure and exploit keeps getting shorter.Is your security strategy keeping up, or still built for last year&#039;s threats?To help you meet the challenge, we&#039;re hosting the Google Cloud Security Summit, a 90-minute virtual event hosted by Google Cloud, Mandiant, and Wiz. Our threat researchers and product leaders will share practical frameworks across two dedicated tracks:Build SecurelySecure AI agents from day one: How to safely build, deploy and govern agents on Gemini across your organization.	Protect apps from the ground up: Ways to build security in from the very first line of code, autonomously fix vulnerabilities directly in CI/CD pipelines, and protect applications from code to runtime.Defend at Machine SpeedDefend against new attacks: What Google Threat Intelligence researchers are seeing in the threat landscape, and how to counter threats with security agents and operationalize threat intelligence to shrink exploit windows to hours.	Respond at machine speed: How agent-powered security operations help your team unify SOC detection and response, so you can find, investigate and respond to incidents faster.Register today to save your spot for this complimentary summit! Learn how you can use AI security capabilities with Google Cloud and Wiz, and what our threat intelligence experts are learning about AI-driven threats.Session details:When: Wednesday, November 4, 2026, 9:00 AM–10:30 AM PST	Where: Virtual (global)	Register or view replays post-event: Save your spot!	Regional summits: Europe, the Middle East, and Africa | Asia Pacific | JapanCan&#039;t make the live broadcast? Register anyway, and you&#039;ll get the on-demand recordings and session takeaways right after the event.Your turn: What&#039;s your biggest headache with securing or governing AI agents right now? Is it visibility, access control, or something else? Tell us below, and we&#039;ll try to bring your questions into the session.See you Wednesday!Cheers,Katey</description>
            <category>Google Threat Intelligence</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 22:25:35 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Google Cloud Security Summit 11/4: Turn Threat Intelligence into Action and Shrink Exploit Windows</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/security-command-center-4/google-cloud-security-summit-11-4-turn-threat-intelligence-into-action-and-shrink-exploit-windows-8512</link>
            <description>Hi All,Everyone&#039;s racing to roll out AI agents, and bad actors are moving faster than ever, too.Is your security strategy keeping up, or still built for last year&#039;s threats?To help you meet the challenge, we&#039;re hosting the Google Cloud Security Summit, a 90-minute virtual event hosted by Google Cloud, Mandiant, and Wiz. Our threat researchers and product leaders will share practical frameworks across two dedicated tracks:Build SecurelySecure AI agents from day one: How to safely build, deploy and govern agents on Gemini across your organization.	Protect apps from the ground up: Ways to build security in from the very first line of code, autonomously fix vulnerabilities directly in CI/CD pipelines, and protect applications from code to runtime.Defend at Machine SpeedDefend against new attacks: What Google Threat Intelligence researchers are seeing in the threat landscape, and how to counter threats with security agents and operationalize threat intelligence to shrink exploit windows to hours.	Respond at machine speed: How agent-powered security operations help your team unify SOC detection and response, so you can find, investigate and respond to incidents faster.Register today to save your spot for this complimentary summit! Learn how you can use AI security capabilities with Google Cloud and Wiz, and what our threat intelligence experts are learning about AI-driven threats.Session details:When: Wednesday, November 4, 2026, 9:00 AM–10:30 AM PST	Where: Virtual (global)	Register or view replays post-event: Save your spot!	Regional summits: Europe, the Middle East, and Africa | Asia Pacific | JapanCan&#039;t make the live broadcast? Register anyway, and you&#039;ll get the on-demand recordings and session takeaways right after the event.Your turn: What&#039;s your biggest headache with securing or governing AI agents right now? Is it visibility, access control, or something else? Tell us below, and we&#039;ll try to bring your questions into the session.See you Wednesday!Cheers,Katey</description>
            <category>Security Command Center</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 22:18:29 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Wednesday 11/4! Register for the Google Cloud Security Summit: Build with Confidence. Secure and Defend at Scale.</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/cloud-security-foundation-7/wednesday-11-4-register-for-the-google-cloud-security-summit-build-with-confidence-secure-and-defend-at-scale-8510</link>
            <description> Hi All,Everyone&#039;s racing to roll out AI agents, and bad actors are moving faster than ever, too.Is your security strategy keeping up, or still built for last year&#039;s threats?To help you meet the challenge, we&#039;re hosting the Google Cloud Security Summit, a 90-minute virtual event hosted by Google Cloud, Mandiant, and Wiz. Our threat researchers and product leaders will share practical frameworks across two dedicated tracks:Build SecurelySecure AI agents from day one: How to safely build, deploy and govern agents on Gemini across your organization.	Protect apps from the ground up: Ways to build security in from the very first line of code, autonomously fix vulnerabilities directly in CI/CD pipelines, and protect applications from code to runtime.Defend at Machine SpeedDefend against new attacks: What Google Threat Intelligence researchers are seeing in the threat landscape, and how to counter threats with security agents and operationalize threat intelligence to shrink exploit windows to hours.	Respond at machine speed: How agent-powered security operations help your team unify SOC detection and response, so you can find, investigate and respond to incidents faster.Register today to save your spot for this complimentary summit! Learn how you can use AI security capabilities with Google Cloud and Wiz, and what our threat intelligence experts are learning about AI-driven threats.Session details:When: Wednesday, November 4, 2026, 9:00 AM–10:30 AM PST	Where: Virtual (global)	Register or view replays post-event: Save your spot!	Regional summits: Europe, the Middle East, and Africa | Asia Pacific | JapanCan&#039;t make the live broadcast? Register anyway, and you&#039;ll get the on-demand recordings and session takeaways right after the event.Your turn: What&#039;s your biggest headache with securing or governing AI agents right now? Is it visibility, access control, or something else? Tell us below, and we&#039;ll try to bring your questions into the session.See you Wednesday!Cheers,Katey </description>
            <category>Cloud Security Foundation</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 22:00:51 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Any impacts to be aware when increasing the alert grouping limit?</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/any-impacts-to-be-aware-when-increasing-the-alert-grouping-limit-8509</link>
            <description>My team is considering increasing the max number of alerts that can be grouped together in a case- I think Google has increased it at some point to now be a max of 90. I will do testing of this before making any changes, but has anyone seen any impacts that arent immediately obvious when making this kind of change?</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 20:49:12 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Request for Late Registration – Operation Cymbal: Cold Room</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/request-for-late-registration-operation-cymbal-cold-room-8505</link>
            <description>Hello Google Cloud Security Community Team,I recently discovered the Operation Cymbal: Cold Room event organized by Google Cloud Sec Community and Hack The Box.Unfortunately, I found out about the event after registration had closed.I am a cybersecurity student from Pakistan and an active Hack The Box learner. I am very interested in participating in this event to improve my skills in threat hunting, incident response, and cloud security.I would like to kindly ask:	Is late registration still possible?			Is there any waitlist for participants?			Is there an alternative way to obtain an event access key?	I would be extremely grateful if you could consider my request.Thank you for your time and support!</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 18:37:01 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Operation Cymbal: Cold Room – Google SecOps access instructions?</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/operation-cymbal-cold-room-google-secops-access-instructions-8497</link>
            <description>Hi! I’m registered for the Cold Room CTF (HTB team “gerd”) but couldn’t get into the StreamYard session (“Restricted access”), so I missed the SecOps access instructions. HTB support said to ask the organizers. Could someone share how to access the Google SecOps instance? Thanks!</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 16:56:53 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>HTB CTF - Operation Cymbal: Cold Room - unable to re-retrieve login credentials</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/htb-ctf-operation-cymbal-cold-room-unable-to-re-retrieve-login-credentials-8504</link>
            <description>Hi, I got my login credentials for the SecOps site yesterday but didn’t save them, and re-entering my details into the site from which I got the credentials gives me the error “All accounts have been handed out. Please contact the help desk.” I can’t log back into the SecOps site, nor can I retrieve the existing credentials, and I’m not exactly sure where the “help desk” is.</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 15:00:01 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>What’s New in Google SecOps: 2026–11–02</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/what-s-new-in-secops-91/what-s-new-in-google-secops-2026-11-02-8508</link>
            <description>What’s New in Google SecOps for the interval Oct 26th through Nov 1st, 2026. What’s New in Google SecOps, November 1st 2026 Highlights In Google SecOps news:	Agentic Chat into public preview, providing in-platform MCP access to SecOps			Basic mode search for UDM, enabling more efficient payload responses, making for a quicker search experience.			The SOAR Google TI Integration now includes a query Google TI Agent Action	There are also several important new and updated Google SecOps documentation releases this week, new OTEL collector version releases, as well as several interesting blogs from Google Cloud on AI Skills and Agent building.I released a blog post on using Skills with Google SQL and OTTL to filter out low value data in Google SecOps that I delivered at the SecOps SIEMPosium a few weeks back.Wiz posted several really interesting blog posts with thoughts and analysis the recent PHP2Shell exploitation and insights on where this is all going. Product Updates &amp;amp; New Features Google SecOps  Release Notes from Google Cloud Docs	The Operations feature in the Emerging Threats Center feed has reached General Availability (GA). Read More			 Google SecOps is completing the final shutdown of legacy Google-managed BigQuery export datasets (chronicle-tla) and associated API keys for non-Enterprise+ customers, following a deprecation announcement from March 2025. Read More			You can now resize inline images directly in rich-text comments on the Case Wall. Read More	️   Now in Public Preview: The New Agentic Chat in Google Security Operations from Google Cloud Security Community	Google SecOps Agentic Chat has launched in Public Preview, offering a re-architected multi-turn conversational experience built on ADK 2.0 and MCP for enhanced security incident investigations. Read More	SecOps Chat Overview | Google Security Operations | Google Cloud DocumentationThis feature is covered by Note: Pre-GA Offerings Terms of the Google Security Operations Service Specific Terms…docs.cloud.google.com  Speed Up Your Investigations: Basic Mode Now Available in Google SecOps SIEM Search (Public Preview) from Google Cloud Security Community	Google SecOps has introduced a new “Basic Mode” for its SIEM Search, now in Public Preview, enabling faster investigations by quickly displaying matching events and field counts without waiting for extra charts to load. Read More	Understand search | Google Security Operations | Google Cloud DocumentationThis guide is for security analysts who want to query, correlate, and analyze security data across their enterprise…docs.cloud.google.com SecOps SIEM  New Docs: Reference &amp;gt; Verify Firewall Configuration from Google Cloud Docs	This new document provides comprehensive guidance for configuring firewalls and proxies to enable communication with the Google Security Operations Chronicle API. Read More	 Updated Docs: YARA-L: Outcome Syntax from Google Cloud Docs	Added a critical warning regarding potential runtime errors when performing arithmetic or modulo operations between standard signed 64-bit integer literals and unsigned 64-bit UDM fields (e.g., network.received_bytes, principal.file.size). Read More	 Updated Docs: Administration &amp;gt; Feed Management from Google Cloud Docs	A comprehensive new section details the setup and management of Custom API feeds (also known as Codeless Connectors), a new feature for ingesting telemetry from third-party REST APIs. This feature is currently in Pre-GA and Private Preview. Read More	 Updated Docs: Investigation: Search LRO API from Google Cloud Docs	This update introduces significant functional changes and clarifications for Long-Running Operation (LRO) APIs, particularly concerning search operations. Read More	 Updated Docs: Ingestion &amp;gt; Configure Multiple Feeds from Google Cloud Docs	This update introduces a new feature for filtering objects by prefix in Storage Transfer Service (STS) feeds. This feature, currently in Limited Preview and requiring allowlist access, enables more granular control over data ingestion from sources like Google Cloud Storage, Amazon S3/SQS, and Azure Blob Storage. The documentation details supported feed types, prefix syntax, validation rules, and configuration steps. Additionally, the availability status of Custom API feeds has been updated from ‘Pre-GA’ to ‘Private Preview’, indicating a more restrictive access. A new troubleshooting entry for the Generic::failed_precondition: include_prefixes is not enabled for this customer error has also been added. Read More	 Updated Docs: Detection &amp;gt; Mitre Dashboard from Google Cloud Docs	Updated the supported MITRE ATT&amp;amp;CK version from 17 to 19.1. Read More	 SecOps SOAR   SecOps SOAR Integrations from Google Cloud Docs	New integrations for SAP ERP and a new action for Google Threat Intelligence, along with a fix for Microsoft Graph Mail Delegated. Read More	Note, this update adds the ability to query Google TI Agentic from SOAR Playbooks. New Docs: Respond &amp;gt; Ide &amp;gt; Creating A Custom Connector from Google Cloud Docs	This document provides a comprehensive guide for creating custom Google SecOps SOAR connectors for third-party tools not available in the Content Hub. It details the process from building a Manager class for API logic to implementing the connector in the IDE. Read More	  Updated Docs: Marketplace &amp;gt; Power Ups &amp;gt; Gitsync from Google Cloud Docs	This update introduces a critical warning and reversal regarding GitSync version 53.0, which contains known synchronization issues. Read More	 Google Threat Intelligence  Release Notes from GTI Docs	New features and updates, including the introduction of GTI Mail Hub, agentic updates, and process tree enhancements, as part of a changelog. Read More	 BindPlane  v1.111.0 from GitHub	This article announces the release of version 1.111.0 for the observIQ BindPlane OTel Collector, introducing a new feature to the Windows install script. Read More	 v2.0.1-beta.7 from GitHub	This article announces the v2.0.1-beta.7 software release, detailing refactors to the internal versioning and updates to the Makefile. Read More	 Google Cloud  Innovate on your own business terms: Google Cloud spend caps now generally available from Google Cloud Docs	Google Cloud’s spend caps on Budgets are now generally available, providing new ways to protect workloads from runaway costs with updates inspired by user feedback. Read More	Google SecOps spend in its associated Google Cloud project is expected to be nominal depending on feature usage, but this post covers important to know about features to provide assurance on alerting and controlling potential costs. AI  Behind the scenes, two months later: How we ship Google Agent Skills like products from Google Cloud Docs	This article is a follow-up piece detailing Google’s internal processes for shipping Agent Skills as complete products, covering their development, quality maintenance, and scaling efforts. Read More	 Scale agents securely with IAM Helper Agent Skills and MCP Tools from Google Cloud Docs	The article explains how organizations can securely scale autonomous agents using IAM Helper Agent Skills and MCP Tools to manage identities and access, thereby reducing security friction in CI/CD pipelines. Read More	 Hill-Climbing Agent Quality with Agents CLI Evaluation from Google Cloud Docs	This post details using the Agents CLI evaluation loop to systematically improve agent performance, covering prompt regression detection, model backend swaps, automated evaluation, and quality tracking with alerts. Read More	 Fast, reliable A2UI, with swappable inference formats from Google Cloud Docs	A2UI now supports swappable inference formats including A2UI Express, significantly reducing token usage and latency while improving screen rendering times for generative UIs without requiring frontend changes. Read More	 Preview, edit, and collaborate on markdown (.md) files natively in Google Docs and Drive from Google Cloud Docs	Google Workspace now provides native support for Markdown (.md) files, enabling seamless editing and collaboration directly within Google Docs and Drive while preserving file fidelity for developer tools. Read More	 Community &amp;amp; Events  Tuesday’s Tip of the Week — Retrohunt: Test Your Rules Against the Past from Google Cloud Security Community from Google Cloud Security Community	Retrohunt allows security professionals to test YARA-L rules against previously ingested UDM data, enabling quick validation of new rules, indicator sweeps, and incident scoping without waiting for live detections. Read More	 3rd Party Blogs   Data filtering 101: What’s new(ish) in Google SecOps from Chris Martin (@thatsiemguy)	The article introduces data filtering techniques and highlights new features within Google SecOps, providing an educational overview. Read More	  Wiz I’m marking the entirety of Wiz’ blogs this week as , highly recommended reading. “Black October” for AI Developer Platforms from Wiz Blog	A series of agentic attacks, termed “Black October,” are targeting AI developer platforms, resulting in widespread LLMJacking incidents. Read More	 Key Takeaways: AI Threat Readiness Survey Report 2026 from Wiz Blog	The article provides key findings from a survey on AI threat readiness, highlighting risks such as shadow AI and the need for AI-against-AI defensive models. Read More	 The Rise of Agentic Attacks: What They Look Like, and Where They’re Headed from Wiz Blog	The article explores the evolving landscape of cyberattacks due to AI agents, examining real-world examples, identifying their characteristics, and discussing their future impact on cybersecurity. Read More	 PHP2Shell: Exploitation Attempts and Remediation Trends from Wiz Blog	Wiz research has been monitoring PHP2Shell exploitation attempts, finding that none have succeeded so far, and analyzing the techniques used, prevention factors, and changes in exposure since disclosure. Read More	 The Pwn Request Reckoning: What Still Works Against GitHub Actions from Wiz Blog	The article discusses how ‘pull_request_target’ attacks still pose a threat to GitHub Actions despite recent security enhancements, outlining the remaining attack surface and how to audit for it. Read More	 Platform Issues  RESOLVED: Google Security Operations (SIEM) customers using Customer-Managed Encryption Keys (CMEK) in all US regions are experiencing indexing delays on newly ingested events from Google Cloud Status	Google Security Operations (SIEM) customers utilizing Customer-Managed Encryption Keys (CMEK) across all US regions are experiencing delays in indexing newly ingested events. Read More	 RESOLVED: Google SecOps SIEM: Log ingestion failures for HTTPS Push feeds using custom log types from Google Cloud Status	Google SecOps SIEM is experiencing log ingestion failures for HTTPS Push feeds utilizing custom log types, with the engineering team actively investigating the issue. Read More	 RESOLVED: Google SecOps customers across multiple regions may not be able to create or edit data feeds from Google Cloud Status	Google SecOps customers in multiple regions are currently unable to create or edit data feeds due to an ongoing incident, which Google’s engineering team is actively investigating. Read More	 RESOLVED: Google SecOps customers in the EU multi-region may experience delays with data normalization, search and detections from Google Cloud Status	Google SecOps customers in the EU multi-region are experiencing delays with data normalization, search, and detections due to an ongoing incident. Read More</description>
            <category>What&#039;s New in SecOps</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 12:55:28 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Seeking Recommendations for Multi-Organization Alert Segregation, Curated Detections, and SOAR Environment Routing in Google SecOps</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/seeking-recommendations-for-multi-organization-alert-segregation-curated-detections-and-soar-environment-routing-in-google-secops-8489</link>
            <description>Hello Team,We are currently ingesting logs from two different organizations into a single Google SecOps instance, with logs segregated using namespaces during ingestion.Our requirement is to use common detection rules across both organizations while ensuring that alerts are routed to their respective Google SecOps SOAR environments.The expected routing is as follows:	Organization 1: Alerts should be routed to Environment 1 (SOC Team 1).			Organization 2: Alerts should be routed to Environment 2 (SOC Team 2).	Current ApproachWe have configured common YARA-L detection rules and are using the namespace field in the rule outcome to identify the originating organization and route alerts to the appropriate SOAR environment.During testing, this approach worked as expected in most scenarios.Issue ObservedIn certain cases, the namespace field does not contain the expected namespace value. Although the field is present, its value appears as &quot;outcome&quot; instead of the actual namespace.As a result, some alerts are not correctly segregated or routed to their respective environments.Additional Requirement – Curated DetectionsApart from our custom YARA-L detection rules, we are also using Google SecOps curated detections.Since curated detections are managed by Google, we would like to understand how alerts generated by these detections can be segregated based on the originating organization&#039;s logs.Specifically, when a curated detection triggers on events belonging to Organization 1 or Organization 2, we need the corresponding alert to be routed to the respective SOAR environment.Looking forward for your suggestions.Thank you in advance </description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Nov 2026 06:55:09 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Operation Cymbal: Cold Room — Missing Google SecOps Tenant Access &amp; Login Link</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/operation-cymbal-cold-room-missing-google-secops-tenant-access-login-link-8499</link>
            <description>Hi Google Cloud Security Team &amp;amp; Community Managers,I am registered for Operation Cymbal: Cold Room and currently enrolled on the Hack The Box CTF platform under team Kudrat_1989.While I received the initial HTB passcode confirmation and the StreamYard session notifications, I have not received the follow-up email containing the Google SecOps (Chronicle SIEM / SOAR) tenant claim link, tenant ID, and analyst login credentials.With the 72-hour competition window currently active, could an admin or community manager please help provision or resend my tenant access details?Could an organizer please verify my access or send the tenant claim instructions? If you need my registered email to look up the enrollment, please let me know where I can send it via direct message. Thank you!</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 23:20:21 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>&quot;&#039;Description&#039; must not be empty.&quot;  IDE error message</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/description-must-not-be-empty-ide-error-message-8491</link>
            <description>Hello ! for some of my devs, I have this error message : and it is impossible to save. (Of course, the description is not empty)  Does anyone encounter this issue and find a cause to fix it?Thank you!</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 14:28:16 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Security Vulnerability: Inability to disable Push Prompts in favor of TOTP/Authenticator</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/cloud-security-foundation-7/security-vulnerability-inability-to-disable-push-prompts-in-favor-of-totp-authenticator-7036</link>
            <description>I am requesting the ability to disable &quot;Google Prompts&quot; (Push notifications) without signing out of my mobile devices. Currently, Google defaults to Push even when a more secure TOTP (authenticator) or hardware key is available. This creates a high risk of &quot;Push Fatigue&quot; attacks where a single accidental tap grants unauthorized access. Users should have the option to choose their primary 2FA method for high-security accounts. I believe this lack of control over 2FA increases the success rate of Account Takeover (ATO) attempts, as attackers can exploit Push Fatigue during the credential recovery process.  Unfortunately, my Gmail address has been compromised in a number of third-party breaches, and I am subject to frequent ATO attempts.  Because I use VPN, a push notification alerting me to a login attempt from a remote city is not necessarily a red flag for me.  But the bigger concern I have is the inadvertent tap--my screen wakes up, my left thumb is in the wrong place, and I’ve given the attacker the keys to the kingdom by accidentally granting them access to my Gmail account.</description>
            <category>Cloud Security Foundation</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 14:24:03 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Now in Public Preview: The New Agentic Chat in Google Security Operations</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/now-in-public-preview-the-new-agentic-chat-in-google-security-operations-8502</link>
            <description>We are excited to announce that Google SecOps Agentic Chat has officially reached Public Preview!  Overview (TL;DR)Google SecOps Chat has been completely re-architected from a single-turn assistant into a multi-turn Agentic Chat built on the Agent Development Kit (ADK) 2.0 and Model Context Protocol (MCP) for advanced tool calling and platform integrations. Security analysts can now investigate security incidents across multiple conversational turns, query live tenant state using 24+ foundational SIEM, SOAR, and Automated Triage tools, generate validated YARA-L 2.0 and UDM Search queries, and resolve complex platform &quot;How-To&quot; Q&amp;amp;A via Gemini Cloud Assist with inline source citations. Additionally, with built-in service account authentication and full Customer-Managed Encryption Keys (CMEK) compliance, regulated enterprises and third-party IdP (Okta/SAML) customers can use Agentic Chat and documentation Q&amp;amp;A out-of-the-box without requiring individual GCP IAM role bindings for end-users. What’s New in Public Preview?Building upon extensive Private Preview validation and customer workshops, this release delivers major architectural and user experience advancements across investigation workflows, knowledge grounding, and enterprise compliance:🧠 Multi-Turn ADK Reasoning: Powered by the Agent Development Kit (ADK), the agent maintains deep conversational context across multi-step investigations, dynamically selecting and chaining tools to answer follow-up questions and pivot across data sources.	️ 24+ Live SIEM, SOAR &amp;amp; Triage MCP Tools: Directly queries live tenant data across key capabilities:	Cases &amp;amp; Alerts: List cases (list_cases), inspect alert details (get_case_alert), and review case comments (list_case_comments).	Entity &amp;amp; Threat Enrichment: Summarize entities (summarize_entity), check IoC matches (get_ioc_match), and retrieve alert data (fetch_alert_data).	SIEM Content &amp;amp; Rules: Generate and refine UDM Search queries (generate_yl_search) and YARA-L 2.0 rules (generate_yl_rule), list detection rules (list_rules), inspect rule execution errors (list_rule_errors), view parsers and log types (list_parsers, list_log_types), and inspect data tables and reference lists (list_data_tables, get_reference_list).	SOAR Automation: Browse playbooks (list_playbooks), integrations (list_integrations), integration actions (list_integration_actions), and enrichment actions (fetch_enrichment_actions).	Automated Triage Reports: Retrieve the latest automated triage investigations and reports for alerts (get_alert_latest_investigation, get_investigation_by_id, get_agent_settings).	 Enhanced &quot;How-To&quot; Q&amp;amp;A via Gemini Cloud Assist with Zero-Touch Auth: Grounds product and workflow answers in official Google SecOps documentation with clickable inline citations. Authenticated automatically at the tenant level so third-party IdP (Okta/SAML) analysts need zero additional GCP IAM permissions.	 UX Enhancements &amp;amp; Context-Aware Prompt Suggestion Chips: Features a redesigned chat drawer with dynamic, context-aware starter prompts tailored to the active console view (harvesting context such as caseId, alertId, or ruleId), structured markdown and table rendering, and streamlined conversational responses without repetitive follow-up prompt clutter.	 Enterprise CMEK Compliance &amp;amp; Strict Read-Only Guardrails: Full support for Customer-Managed Encryption Keys (CMEK) across session persistence, grounding, and caching—unblocking regulated enterprise tenants while enforcing strict read-only tool guardrails. What’s the Difference? (Legacy Chat vs. New Agentic Chat)This release overhauls the architecture, tool ecosystem, and answer quality of Chat in Google SecOps:			Feature									Legacy SecOps Chat									New SecOps Agentic Chat (Public Preview)								Core Architecture									Single-turn intent routing with static templates.									Multi-turn ADK reasoning loop with dynamic tool chaining and persistent session memory.								Live Platform Tools									Limited coverage; unable to chain SIEM, SOAR, Parser, and Triage tools together.									24+ native MCP tools spanning SIEM (UDM/YARA-L, Rules, Parsers, Data Tables), SOAR (Cases, Playbooks, Integrations), and Triage Reports.								Platform &quot;How-To&quot; Q&amp;amp;A									Legacy documentation search with lower citation coverage.									Gemini Cloud Assist grounding delivering high factual accuracy and clickable inline source citations.								3P IdP / SAML Permissions									Required manual GCP IAM bindings for end-users on the underlying project.									Zero-touch tenant service account integration enables documentation Q&amp;amp;A out-of-the-box with zero end-user GCA IAM roles.								Conversational UX									Frequent repetitive follow-up prompt suggestions.									Clean multi-turn responses with dynamic, context-aware prompt suggestion chips.								CMEK Support									Not supported on CMEK-enabled enterprise tenants.									Full CMEK compliance across chat storage, grounding, and caching.					 Example Prompts to TryOnce you enable Agentic Chat, try chaining multi-step questions in a single conversation:&quot;Show me the highest-priority open cases right now, and summarize the alerts and comments in the most recent one.&quot;	&quot;Are there any automated triage investigation findings for alert ID ? Summarize the key entities involved and check if any match known IoCs.&quot;	&quot;List any detection rules that have execution errors, and help me write a YARA-L 2.0 rule to detect suspicious PowerShell encoded commands.&quot;	&quot;What data tables and reference lists do we have available, and how can I reference them in a YARA-L rule?&quot;	&quot;What integrations and enrichment actions are configured in our SOAR environment?&quot;Known Limitations in Public Preview Read-Only Tool Posture (Write Tools in Progress): In Public Preview, Agentic Chat strictly executes read-only (GET/LIST) tools and query/rule generation (generate_yl_search, generate_yl_rule). It does not mutate production state (such as closing cases, modifying detection rules, or triggering live containment actions) without analyst execution in the console.	 Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) for Write Actions: Interactive confirmation cards for mutating SOAR and SIEM actions are currently under development and targeted for upcoming General Availability (GA) and follow-on milestones.	 Tenant RBAC Enforcement: Live SIEM and SOAR tools strictly enforce the logged-in analyst&#039;s existing Google SecOps IAM and SOAR RBAC permissions (roles/chronicle.viewer, editor, admin, and SOAR Case/Playbook permissions).Eligibility &amp;amp; How to Get StartedThis feature is available to all Google SecOps Enterprise and Enterprise Plus customers across supported operational regions (including CMEK-enabled tenants):Due to wave-wise rollout, availability is staggered progressively across regions.	Existing Private Preview customers are automatically transitioned to the Public Preview experience.	Analysts can activate the experience immediately using the &quot;Agentic Chat&quot; toggle inside the SecOps Chat pane.	No extra setup is required for standard tenants—end-users only need their existing Google SecOps IAM and SOAR RBAC roles.	Learn more: Check out the Gemini in Google Security Operations documentation.What’s Next?As we work toward General Availability (GA), we are actively developing: Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) Write Actions: Enabling controlled, analyst-approved write operations (such as adding case comments, executing enrichment/containment playbooks, and saving detection rules) with explicit confirmation guardrails.	 Expanded Context-Aware Console Integration: Deeper page-level context harvesting across SecOps console surfaces so Agentic Chat proactively surfaces relevant investigation actions for the exact entity, alert, rule, or case on screen.	 Multi-Agent Orchestration (A2A): Seamless handoffs between Agentic Chat and specialized domain sub-agents (Threat Hunting, Parser Generation, and Detection Rule Tuning). We’d love to hear your thoughts! Turn on the Agentic Chat toggle in your console and let us know in the comments below how it’s working for your team and what workflows you’d like to see next.  </description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 08:22:33 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Speed Up Your Investigations: Basic Mode Now Available in Google SecOps SIEM Search (Public Preview)</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/speed-up-your-investigations-basic-mode-now-available-in-google-secops-siem-search-public-preview-8500</link>
            <description> Run faster searches in Google SecOps with Basic Mode in SIEM Search (now in Public Preview)When you are hunting for threats, testing a query filter, or checking high-volume logs, you usually just want to see matching events and field counts right away without waiting for extra charts and background calculations to load.The SIEM Search page now includes a mode selector (Basic Mode and Advanced Mode) in the query editor controls bar next to the query language selector, so you can choose between fast event retrieval and full visual enrichment.  Figure 1: Selecting Basic Mode (default) or Advanced Mode in the SIEM Search query editor controls.What is Basic Mode?Basic Mode (now the default) focuses only on fetching your matching events and field aggregations. By skipping extra background lookups and chart data, Basic Mode reduces network payload size and speeds up UI rendering. Your search results transfer over the network faster and render more quickly in your browser—while keeping the exact same event data, query syntax (UDM, YARA-L 2.0, Reference Lists, and Data Tables), and Data RBAC permissions.Advanced Mode gives you the full search experience with timeline charts, prevalence scores, entity context, and alert correlations.Why Basic Mode is FasterSmaller Network Payloads &amp;amp; Faster Backend Execution:	Skips prevalence lookups: Doesn&#039;t fetch historical indicator counts (domains, IP addresses, and file hashes) across your environment during the initial search.		Skips alert correlation: Doesn&#039;t query the rules engine for matching YARA-L 2.0 alerts while pulling events.		Skips timeline chart data: Streams matching events directly to your browser without generating or transferring bucketed timeline data, keeping the network payload lightweight.		Faster UI Rendering &amp;amp; Cleaner Layout:	Less browser rendering work: Hides the Alerts &amp;amp; Detections, Overview, and Visualize tabs—along with timeline charts (Activity Over Time and Trend Over Time), the Prevalence tab, and the Activity heatmap table—so the browser spends less time rendering heavy visual widgets and gives you more screen space for the Event Viewer.		Events and Aggregations ready right away: Opens directly to the Results panel (with the Events view) and keeps the Aggregations panel active so you can check field counts and apply Show only or Filter out filters immediately.		Built for Everyday Investigations:	Easy mode switching: Start in Basic Mode to test queries and spot suspicious events quickly. Switch to Advanced Mode in the dropdown and rerun the query whenever you want timeline charts, heatmaps, Entity Context Graph (ECG) details, prevalence scores, or correlated alerts.		Saves your preference: Remembers your selected mode (searchMode) in your browser across refreshes, tabs, and sessions.		Shareable links: Adds the active mode (&amp;amp;searchMode=FAST for Basic Mode or &amp;amp;searchMode=ADVANCED for Advanced Mode) to the page URL, so links shared with teammates open in the same mode.		Saved in Search History: The History dialog tracks which mode each search used and restores it when you rerun the query.	Quick Comparison: Basic Mode vs. Advanced ModeThe following table summarizes the differences between the two modes on the SIEM Search page: 			Feature									Basic Mode (Default)									Advanced Mode								Main goal									Fast event retrieval, smaller network payload, and quick UI rendering									Full visual analysis and background enrichment								Visible tabs									Results only									Results, Alerts &amp;amp; Detections, Overview, and Visualize								Field aggregations									Included (Aggregations panel active)									Included (Aggregations panel active)								Timeline charts &amp;amp; heatmaps									Hidden (reduces network payload and UI rendering time)									Displayed (the Activity Over Time chart, the Trend Over Time chart, and the Activity heatmap table)								Prevalence scoring									Skipped									Included								Correlated detections									Skipped									Included								Entity Context Graph (ECG)									Skipped									Included								Query syntax &amp;amp; Data RBAC									Same in both modes									Same in both modes								Network payload &amp;amp; UI speed									Smaller payload and faster browser rendering									Larger payload (transfers and renders full enrichment data)					When to Use Each ModeUse Basic Mode for:	Quick threat hunting: Check indicators across broad time ranges without waiting for timeline charts to transfer and render.		High-volume log searches: Search noisy log sources with smaller network payloads and faster browser rendering.		Building and tuning queries: Test UDM syntax, regular expressions, reference lists, and data table filters quickly before running a deeper investigation.		Use Advanced Mode for:	Building incident timelines: Use the Activity Over Time chart and Activity heat-map to spot spikes in activity.		Checking indicator rarity: View enterprise prevalence scores to see whether an IP, domain, or file hash is common or unusual.		Checking triggered alerts: See whether matching events triggered YARA-L 2.0 rules in the Alerts &amp;amp; Detections tab.	 Have you tried Basic Mode in your threat hunting workflows yet? Share your feedback and use cases in the replies below!</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 07:02:39 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>[Google SecOps Dashboards] Drilldown Not Working on Individual Array Elements</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/google-secops-dashboards-drilldown-not-working-on-individual-array-elements-8418</link>
            <description>I&#039;m trying to configure drilldown functionality on a Table widget in Google SecOps Dashboards, where one of the displayed fields is an array (repeated field). I&#039;m running into a rendering/drilldown limitation and would appreciate guidance or confirmation if this is a known gap.metadata.log_type = &quot;ZSCALER_DNS&quot;additional.fields[&quot;dns_record_type&quot;] = &quot;A&quot;network.dns.questions.name = $requestnetwork.dns.answers.data = $responsematch:    $requestoutcome:    $ips = array_distinct($response)limit:    10000This groups results by $request (the queried domain) and aggregates all resolved IPs into a deduplicated array $ips.Problem:When $ips is displayed as a column in a Table widget, the array is rendered as a single comma-separated string in one cell, e.g.:142.250.122.94, 142.251.106.94, 142.250.118.94  I configured a drilldown mapping on $ips pointing to the UDM field network.dns.answers.data (operator . However, since the entire array is flattened into one string value per cell, clicking on it attempts to search for the full concatenated string as a single value — rather than letting me click an individual IP and drill down into just that value.What I&#039;m trying to achieve:I want each IP address within the array to be individually clickable, triggering a drilldown search for network.dns.answers.data = &amp;lt;that specific IP&amp;gt; — while still keeping my match clause scoped to $request only (i.e., without exploding the aggregation at the query level by adding $response/network.dns.answers.data into the match block, which would change the grouping granularity of my results).</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 21:01:30 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Cold Cymbal CTF tenant authentication fails, returning an HTTP 400, due to identity verification failure.</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/cold-cymbal-ctf-tenant-authentication-fails-returning-an-http-400-due-to-identity-verification-failure-8494</link>
            <description>At coldroom-claim- [removed by moderator] .us-central1.run.app, I was issued Tenant 48. However, although my credentials are accepted, I am unable to authenticate, for I observe:400. That’s an error.There may be an issue in your organization’s identity configuration. Contact your admin or try again.Additional detailsVerification failure: invalid session ID in request.If this is the correct place to ask, what may be the cause, and ahow] can it be resolved? If that is infeasible to ascertain on your end, how should I diagnose this? If I should ask elsewhere, where?</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 18:27:00 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Stop Guessing, Start Isolating: A User&#039;s Guide to Latency Monitoring in Google SecOps</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/community-blog-42/stop-guessing-start-isolating-a-user-s-guide-to-latency-monitoring-in-google-secops-8492</link>
            <description>Author: Matan Hayun, Product Manager, Google SecOps A unified technical guide for isolating ingestion pipelines and troubleshooting delay patterns using core latency metrics. In the realm of security operations, data freshness is not merely a technical parameter—it is the lifeblood of threat detection, real-time alerting, and rapid incident triage. When a critical detection rule fails to fire, or an active security incident investigation stalls, security analysts and administrators inevitably confront the same core question: Is there a delay in our security telemetry ingestion pipeline?Historically, answering this question was a frustrating, multi-step chore. Analysts were forced to manually query raw logs, build complex, custom dashboards to compare timestamps across disparate logging layers, or open support tickets with Google SecOps just to locate where a processing delay was occurring. To solve this, Google SecOps is proud to introduce Granular Latency Monitoring inside the Data Health Hub (DHH). Surfaced in Public Preview, this powerful feature set delivers end-to-end, high-resolution transparency into the entire data ingestion and normalization lifecycle. By exposing two distinct, mathematically precise latency metrics, administrators and SOC engineers can immediately isolate whether an ingestion bottleneck resides upstream within the customer&#039;s on-premises/cloud network (the source) or downstream inside the Google SecOps internal network. 2. The Log Lifecycle and Core Latency Metrics To enable robust, self-service troubleshooting, Google SecOps maps and records the journey of every security log. This data lifecycle is segmented into three primary milestones, which are mapped to specific timestamps in our pipeline database: 			Key Pipeline Milestamps and Timestamps			Event Time (T_event):The exact timestamp the event originally occurred at the source. This is extracted from the log payload during parsing.			Collection Time (T_collection):The timestamp recorded when the log or file first crosses the gateway boundary into the Google SecOps network.			Ingestion Time (T_ingestion): The database commit timestamp recorded when the log is successfully saved to SecOps, before it gets parsed 					 By calculating the delta between these milestones, Google SecOps derives two core, customer-facing latency metrics designed to isolate pipeline lag:  Real-World Examples of Collection Time Example 1: Scheduled API Polling (Cloud SaaS / Feed Ingestion) In an API-based feed setup (such as Okta, Google Workspace, or Cloud Audit logs), Chronicle periodically polls the provider’s API endpoint to fetch new activity.10:00:00 AM — Event Time: A user logs into Okta. Okta records the event in its system log.10:01:00 AM — Collection Time: Chronicle’s feed collector executes its routine scheduled 1-minute API poll, connects to the Okta API, and receives the log payload.10:01:02 AM — Ingestion Time: Chronicle normalizes, enriches, and indexes the event. Takeaway: The Collection Time (10:01:00 AM) represents the exact second Chronicle pulled the data from the vendor API during its routine execution schedule. Example 2: Push / Agent Streaming (Chronicle Collection Agent) In an agent-based setup (such as a Chronicle Collection Agent or BindpPlane agent installed on a Linux or Windows server), logs are streamed continuously as they occur.02:00:00 PM — Event Time: An administrator executes a `sudo` command on a Linux server.02:00:01 PM — Collection Time: The Chronicle agent running on the server captures the log entry from the local OS audit system and prepares the payload.02:00:03 PM — Ingestion Time: Chronicle processes and indexes the event in the cloud.Takeaway: For streaming agents, Collection Time (02:00:01 PM) occurs almost instantaneously after the Event Time, marking the precise moment the agent captured the log payload locally. A. SecOps Ingestion Latency (Collection-to-Ingestion) 	Technical Definition: Calculated as T_ingestion - T_collection.			What it Measures: The internal processing and write efficiency of the Google SecOps backend ingestion pipeline.			Operational Actionability: In a healthy, un-throttled environment, this metric is highly stable. A persistent spike in SecOps Ingestion Latency indicates an internal bottleneck—such as account quota breaches, compute resource limits, or databasedata base queries.	 B. Source-to-Ingestion Latency (Event-to-Ingestion) 	Technical Definition: Calculated as T_ingestion - T_event.			What it Measures: The total end-to-end delay representing the real-world age of the data when it finally becomes available for parsing.			Operational Actionability: This metric tracks true telemetry freshness. It combines upstream source-side delays (collector buffering, forwarder queues, network transit) with internal SecOps pipeline processing. If this spikes while SecOps Ingestion Latency remains low, the delay resides entirely on the customer&#039;s or vendor&#039;s end.	3. Navigating Latency Metrics in the UI Google SecOps surfaces these metrics across two critical layers in the console to balance high-level monitoring with deep-dive performance analysis: A. The Health Hub Dashboard Tables We have integrated high-level latency visibility directly into your active monitoring grids. We have introduced two new interactive latency tables to streamline pipeline troubleshooting - “Latency Status by Source” and “Latency Status by Log Type”. Measured using 95th percentile (P95) metrics to eliminate outlier noise, these tables break down end-to-end delays across your feeds, agents and log types to provide an accurate baseline of your pipeline’s health. While “Latency Status by Source” monitors performance at the individual feed, agent or collector level, “Latency Status by Log Type” aggregates arrival metrics across entire log categories to highlight broader trends. Together, they allow you to easily differentiate between upstream delivery delays (Source to Ingestion Latency) and internal processing times (SecOps Ingestion Latency), while also providing visibility into API polling behavior (Polling Frequency and Lookback Window) and direct access to filtered deep-dive dashboards via View links. B. The Data Health Deep Dive Dashboard Clicking the &#039;Dashboard&#039; link on any table row opens a high-resolution deep-dive interface. Scrolling to the &#039;Latency Monitoring&#039; section exposes parallel time-series charts visualizing P50, P90, and P95 latency trends simultaneously. This dashboard supports granular Source-Level Filtering, allowing engineers to filter curves by either collectorId or feedID, along with Log Type—a vital feature for debugging complex BindpPlane agent topologies. 4. Troubleshooting Playbook: Real-World Scenarios When investigating pipeline delay issues, comparing the visual curves and percentiles of Source-to-Ingestion Latency and SecOps Ingestion Latency is the single most effective way to identify a root cause. The following four operational scenarios outline how these metrics interact in the field: Scenario 1: Normal Baseline Operation (Near Real-Time Delivery)  	Visual Pattern: Both Source-to-Ingestion Latency and SecOps Ingestion Latency remain flat, low, and stable. The two curves track closely within a tight, healthy baseline band. Neither metric breaches normal operating thresholds.			Technical Interpretation: Google SecOps and all upstream log collectors are operating optimally. Telemetry is crossing the entire ingestion pipeline in near real-time.			Recommended Action: No action required. The pipeline is performing healthy.	 Scenario 2: Transient Ingestion Spikes (Self-Healing Workers)  	Visual Pattern: SecOps Ingestion Latency displays a sharp, isolated spike but immediately recovers back to its low baseline. Crucially, the Source-to-Ingestion Latency curve remains unaffected, tracking its regular baseline or expected polling cycle without any persistent delay.			Technical Interpretation: A temporary, isolated processing delay occurred, but the SecOps pipeline self-healed instantly. Because the system recovered before a backlog could form, real-time data freshness was maintained.			Recommended Action: Monitor for recurrence. If the spikes are highly isolated and auto-recovers without impacting ongoing log freshness, no manual intervention is required.	 Scenario 3: Source-Side Issue (Upstream Bottleneck)  	Visual Pattern: Source-to-Ingestion Latency exhibits a sharp, sustained spike or elevated plateau (frequently jumping from seconds to hours). Meanwhile, internal SecOps Ingestion Latency remains healthy at baseline.			Technical Interpretation: Google SecOps is ingesting, writing, and making your security data ready for parsing almost instantly upon receiving it. The bottleneck resides entirely upstream before the logs ever reach our front-door gateway.			Typical Root Causes:	1. Local collection agent backlog or CPU/Memory throttling on host servers (e.g., overloaded BindpPlane collectors).2. On-premises network proxy or firewall rate-limiting/throttling.3. API provider publishing or export delays on the vendor side (e.g., GCP Cloud Audit logs, AWS S3 export lag, Okta API delays).4. An administrator performing a deliberate manual backfill of large, historical archives, which naturally pushes back the original event time.	Recommended Action: Check the data source ; Filter by Collector ID or feedId in the deep dive dashboard to isolate the overloaded source. We recommend not opening a Google support case, as the issue is external.	 Scenario 4: SecOps Ingestion Issue (Internal Platform Bottleneck)  	Visual Pattern: SecOps Ingestion Latency spikes significantly, causing an identical, lockstep parallel spike in the overall Source-to-Ingestion Latency curve. Both lines rise and fall in perfect synchronization.			Technical Interpretation: Security logs are arriving at the Google SecOps gateway on time, but there is an increase in delay within the SecOps pipeline.			Typical Root Causes:			1. Tenant ingestion throughput exceeding provisioned contractual limits or pipeline quotas.						2. Extreme parser computation overhead or inefficient regex evaluations during a high-throughput burst.						3. Intermittent downstream database write delays or upstream Pub/Sub message queue backlogs.						4. Ingesting exceptionally large individual log files (e.g., &amp;gt; 1GB chunks). These massive files will be diverted to retry queues, which temporarily increases the processing time.						5. An unanticipated surge in log volume that outpaces the backend&#039;s immediate compute capacity.					Recommended Action: One reason for the spike in latency could be the quota breaches happening during ingestion. Check the deep dive dashboard for an &#039;OUT_OF_QUOTA&#039; status tag in the SecOps Ingestion Latency graphs. If your tenant has exceeded its ingestion quota, review your contractual limits or throttle non-critical log sources. If there is no quota breach, open a Google SecOps Support Case for immediate engineering investigation.	 5. Support Case Decision Matrix To help your team streamline operational ticketing, prevent unnecessary cases, and ensure rapid resolution when issues arise, use the following diagnostic decision matrix: 			Scenario									Diagnostic Indicator									Recommended Action									Open Case?								Spike in Source to Ingestion ONLY									SecOps Ingestion curve is healthy with minor ups and downs. Only end-to-end latency shows a spike.									Check local forwarder resource allocation, BindpPlane collector CPU/memory loads, or network proxy rules. Isolate by Collector ID.						No					Spike in SecOps Ingestion (Quota Breach)									Secops Ingestion latency spikes; UI displays &#039;OUT_OF_QUOTA&#039; status labels.									Check ingestion throughput against your contracted limits. Throttle non-critical sources or contact sales to increase your tier.						No, the data will be ingested on retry					Spikes in SecOps Ingestion Latency									SecOps Ingestion Latency Spikes: Ingestion requests for unusual large files, database write latency or internal service outages									Check ingestion pipeline for unusual big files. Otherwise, gather the affected Log Type, collector IDs, and timestamp range.						Yes					Internal Platform Error									SecOps Ingestion Latency spikes; status returns &#039;Internal_Error&#039; or Spanner database commit failures.									No self-remediation is possible. Gather the affected Log Type, collector IDs, and timestamp range.						Yes		  			 Stay Tuned!			 			We are working on an upcoming series of community blog posts and video walkthroughs to help you better understand how the Data Health Hub can benefit your security operations!			Less searching, more SecOps.					 For full documentation, visit the Google SecOps Documentation Portal and join the conversation in our Google Cloud Security Community Forums.</description>
            <category>Community Blog</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 15:53:26 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Hello, Cloud Security Enthusiast! 👋 Introduce Yourself!</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/news-announcements-9/hello-cloud-security-enthusiast-introduce-yourself-5450</link>
            <description>Hey Everyone!Welcome to the Google Cloud Security Community! We want to kick things off by getting to know each other better. This space is all about connecting, sharing, solving, and building the future of cloud security – and that journey starts with you!So, don&#039;t be shy! Drop a quick intro below and tell us:Who are you? (Your name, role, etc.)	What&#039;s your cloud security superpower? (What area excites you most, or a cool project you&#039;re working on?)	What are you hoping to learn or share here? (Let&#039;s help each other grow!)We&#039;re incredibly excited to learn from your unique experiences and build a vibrant hub where we can all protect, create, and innovate together.Can&#039;t wait to meet you all!Matt </description>
            <category>News &amp; Announcements</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 15:28:15 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Introducing the Google SecOps Data Health Hub: Centralized Pipeline Observability</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/community-blog-42/introducing-the-google-secops-data-health-hub-centralized-pipeline-observability-8490</link>
            <description>Author: Matan Hayun, Product Manager, Google SecOps Eliminate ingestion blind spots, verify log freshness, and isolate pipeline issues with a unified control plane. 			TL;DR: The Google SecOps Data Health Hub (DHH) is now live in Public Preview! DHH delivers a centralized, real-time control plane for log ingestion monitoring, parser normalization tracking, and automated anomaly detection. Get instant pipeline visibility, actionable status badges, and direct one-click remediation pathways.			 			 Prefer watching over reading? Catch a quick high-level overview video of the Health Hub in action here: 					  The Ingestion Challenge: Ending Pipeline Blind Spots Security detections depend strictly on data freshness and complete log coverage. When a rule stops firing, security teams face immediate questions: Are logs arriving? Did a vendor update break parser normalization? Is an API collector experiencing lag?Historically, answering these questions required hopping between fragmented dashboards, checking timestamps manually, or opening support tickets. The Data Health Hub replaces this manual guesswork with continuous, automated pipeline observability across the ingestion lifecycle. What is the Data Health Hub? The Data Health Hub provides a single, integrated command center built on three core capabilities:	Real-Time Transparency: Tracks live ingestion volumes, collection health, and normalization success across all feeds and log types.			Actionable Diagnostics: Automatically flags volume drops, spikes, or parsing errors with direct links to edit feeds or inspect active parsers.			Contextual Integration: Embeds health badges (mini-maps) across SecOps workflows, including Rules, Search, and Content Hub.	At its core, DHH features an automated Irregularity-Detection Engine that calculates z-score statistical baselines against a personalized 15-day rolling average, catching true anomalies while ignoring normal seasonal fluctuations. Key Operational Use Cases: Accelerating SOC Operations Whether you are a security engineer troubleshooting an active alert or a SOC manager auditing overall coverage, DHH streamlines core operational workflows:	Rapid Troubleshooting &amp;amp; Self-Remediation: When detections stop firing, analysts check DHH to see if raw logs dropped or parsing failed, using direct links to Edit Feed or View Parser to self-remediate immediately.			Post-Onboarding Feed Verification: Engineers onboarding new feeds (e.g., CrowdStrike or GCP Audit) instantly confirm that events are flowing and normalizing into UDM correctly.			Proactive Pipeline Maintenance: SOC managers audit health weekly to spot ballooning sources, monitor quota thresholds, evaluate parsing errors, and catch silent host outages before they impact detection coverage.	 Core Workspace: Dashboard &amp;amp; Deep-Dive Analytics DHH combines high-level system summaries with granular deep-dive views across three main visual components: 1. System Summary &amp;amp; Metrics Overview Top-level metric cards surface Total Data Sources, Total Parsers, Overall System Status, active anomaly counts, and more. 2. Dual High-Density Health Tables	Health Status by Data Source: Monitors raw log streams, collector feeds, and status badges (Healthy, Warning, Critical).			Health Status by Parser: Tracks log parsing success rates. When errors or anomalies occur, DHH pinpoints the primary cause—such as configuration issues, regex errors, or filter drops—and provides clear, actionable remediation guidance.	 3. Precise Deep-Dive Analytics &amp;amp; Metrics Workspace Clicking &#039;Dashboard&#039; on any row opens a comprehensive deep-dive workspace. Far beyond basic uptime counters, the Deep-Dive Dashboard delivers rich, multi-dimensional analytics to diagnose complex pipeline behaviors:	Ingestion &amp;amp; Throughput Volumetrics: High-resolution time-series charts displaying volume trends, feed run history and unexpected traffic spikes or drops.			Parsing &amp;amp; Normalization Ratios: Detailed breakdowns of parsed vs. unparsed events, error code distributions, and field-level mapping success rates.			Granular Latency Tracking: Correlated curves for SecOps Ingestion Latency (gateway-to-database write) and end-to-end Source-to-Ingestion Latency, filterable by Collector ID.	 Summary of Latency Metrics Available in Deep-Dive Dashboard: 			Metric Name									Pipeline Stage / Calculation									Operational Purpose					SecOps Ingestion Latency			Collection-to-Ingestion			(T_ingestion - T_collection)			Measures internal SecOps gateway-to-database processing speed. Flat low lines indicate optimal SecOps backend performance.		Source-to-Ingestion Latency			Event-to-Ingestion			(T_ingestion - T_event)			The total end-to-end delay represents the real-world age of the data when it finally becomes available for parsing . Spikes alongside flat SecOps latency point to external network or agent delays.		  			 Stay Tuned!			We are working on an upcoming series of community blog posts and video walkthroughs to help you better understand how the Data Health Hub can benefit your security operations!			Less searching, more SecOps.					 For full documentation, visit the Google SecOps Documentation Portal and join the conversation in our Google Cloud Security Community Forums.</description>
            <category>Community Blog</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 15:10:55 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Detecting Critical Telemetry Blind Spots: Silent Log Detection with YARA-L 2.0</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/detecting-critical-telemetry-blind-spots-silent-log-detection-with-yara-l-2-0-8487</link>
            <description>Hi SecOps Community,One of the biggest operational risks in any SOC is silent telemetry loss—critical infrastructure servers that suddenly stop forwarding logs without raising an immediate alert. Whether due to an agent crash, network misconfiguration, or deliberate adversary tampering, missing logs create massive blind spots during incident response.To solve this, I designed a YARA-L 2.0 detection rule called Silent Log Detection. It tracks monitored servers across a sliding window, evaluates their activity, and triggers an alert if an active host stops forwarding events for more than 2 hours.How the Rule WorksLog Source Filtering: Scopes down high-value operating system, system, and EDR feeds (winevtlog, windows_ad, syslog, linux, edr).	Entity Normalization: Strips domain/FQDN suffixes and normalizes hostnames to lowercase to ensure clean aggregation.	Naming Taxonomy Scope: Uses regex patterns to identify server assets (srv, dc, db, app, etc.) while explicitly excluding end-user workstations (desk, lap, ws, etc.) to prevent false positives from expected sleep/shutdown behavior.	Time Delta Evaluation: Aggregates by $server across a 6-hour window and calculates the delta between the current timestamp and the most recent event timestamp (diff_seconds &amp;gt; 7200).	Noise Gate: Requires #e &amp;gt;= 5 events within the window to prevent single-event transient noise from generating alerts.rule silent_log_hosts {  meta:    author = &quot;Diogo Caldas&quot;    description = &quot;Detects monitored servers that stopped sending telemetry for more than 2 hours within a 6-hour evaluation window.&quot;    severity = &quot;High&quot;    priority = &quot;High&quot;  events:    // 1. Filter by common OS, system, and EDR log types    re.regex($e.metadata.log_type, &quot;(?i)(winevtlog|windows_ad|syslog|linux|edr)&quot;)    // 2. Extract hostname (stripping domain/FQDN and converting to lowercase)    $server = strings.to_lower(re.capture($e.principal.hostname, &quot;^(n^.]+)&quot;))    // 3. Match server naming conventions (Customize with your organization&#039;s naming taxonomy)    re.regex($server, &quot;(?i)(srv|dc|db|sql|app|web|prd|vm)&quot;)    // 4. Exclude workstation patterns to reduce false positives    not re.regex($server, &quot;(?i)(desk|wk|ws|note|nb|lap|pc)&quot;)  match:    $server over 6h  outcome:    $server_name = array_distinct($server)    $log_types = array_distinct($e.metadata.log_type)    $events_count = count($e.metadata.id)    $last_event_sec = max($e.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)    $diff_seconds = timestamp.current_seconds() - max($e.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)    $diff_minutes = (timestamp.current_seconds() - max($e.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)) / 60  condition:    #e &amp;gt;= 5 and $diff_seconds &amp;gt; 7200} Implementation Tips &amp;amp; Best PracticesTuning Asset Tags: Be sure to adjust the server patterns in step 3 and workstation exclusions in step 4 to match your organization’s internal naming conventions, or swap them for entity context tags if you maintain an enriched CMDB/Asset table in SecOps.	Tuning Inactivity Thresholds: You can adjust $diff_seconds &amp;gt; 7200 (2 hours) and the match window (over 6h) based on your ingestion latency and SLA tolerance.	Context in Alert: The rule populates $diff_minutes and $log_types in the outcome section, giving analysts immediate context on how long the asset has been dark and what feeds were affected. </description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 20:16:56 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Automigrated reCAPTCHA project 474223265113: &quot;Accept invitation&quot; redirects but the invitation stays pending for every owner</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/fraud-defense-recaptcha-6/automigrated-recaptcha-project-474223265113-accept-invitation-redirects-but-the-invitation-stays-pending-for-every-owner-8472</link>
            <description>Our classic reCAPTCHA v3 key (domain archetravel.com, used by WordPress Contact Form 7) was auto-migrated to Google Cloud project number 474223265113. The classic admin shows &quot;Action required: accept the invitation to the Google Cloud project&quot;.What happens: the invitation page shows &quot;Welcome, &amp;lt;name&amp;gt;. A project owner invited you to join the project (ID: 474223265113)&quot;. Clicking Accept redirects to Resource Manager, but no access is granted. IAM for the project still reports missing resourcemanager.projects.get / getIamPolicy. Reopening the invitation shows the same pending dialog. This has been happening for months.Affected: all key owners. Tested today (22 Oct 2026) with two Google Workspace users of archetravel.com (org ID 1095431403131), one of them the super admin. Same result with both the banner link and /invitation?project=474223265113&amp;amp;account=...&amp;amp;memberEmail=...Already ruled out:- Correct account (verified in the dialog greeting and the account menu)- No pending Cloud Terms of Service or onboarding prompt on either account- Workspace &quot;Google Cloud Platform&quot; service is ON for everyone- Context-Aware Access is not available on our licence, so it isn&#039;t configured- Both users use Google Cloud normally and own other projects in our org- No invitation email received- The browser network log during Accept shows no 4xx/5xx and no error payload, and no request that seems to commit the membershipNote: the classic reCAPTCHA admin still lets owners edit and save the key&#039;s settings, and the key works.Request: could someone check the invitation records and IAM policy of project 474223265113, and repair or reissue the owner invitations without recreating the live key?</description>
            <category>Fraud Defense (reCAPTCHA)</category>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 18:47:37 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>How Should I Prepare for the Google Cloud Professional Cloud Security Engineer Certification?</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/how-should-i-prepare-for-the-google-cloud-professional-cloud-security-engineer-certification-8486</link>
            <description>Hi everyone,I&#039;m planning to prepare for the Google Cloud Professional Cloud Security Engineer certification and would appreciate some advice from people who have already taken the exam or are currently studying for it.I&#039;m particularly interested in understanding which topics deserve the most attention, including IAM, network security, data protection, compliance, and securing cloud workloads. I&#039;m also looking for recommendations on official Google Cloud training, hands-on labs, and practice questions that can help me assess my knowledge.For those who have completed this certification, how did you organize your study plan? Did you focus more on Google Cloud documentation and practical exercises, or did you also use practice tests to identify weak areas?I&#039;d appreciate any suggestions for useful resources and common preparation mistakes to avoid.</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 17:12:30 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Google Cloud Run Direct IAP Error 11 After OAuth Consent — Custom OAuth Client</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/cloud-security-foundation-7/google-cloud-run-direct-iap-error-11-after-oauth-consent-custom-oauth-client-8485</link>
            <description>We are troubleshooting Google Cloud Run direct Identity-Aware Proxy (IAP) authentication using a custom OAuth Web client in a standalone Google Cloud project without an Organization.Expected behavior:The authorized Google account completes OAuth authentication and reaches the Cloud Run application login page. Other users remain denied.Actual behavior:After successful Google account selection and OAuth consent, IAP returns:Error Code 11 — There was a problem with your request.The request never reaches the Cloud Run application.Configuration:	Region: asia-southeast1 (Singapore)			Cloud Run revision: Ready			Direct Cloud Run IAP: Enabled			Public unauthenticated access: Disabled			IAP authorization: One approved Google identity			OAuth audience: External / Testing			OAuth test users: Authorized account included			OAuth client: Web application			Redirect URI: Verified against the required IAP callback			Service-level custom OAuth credentials: Configured			No conflicting project-level OAuth settings identified	Troubleshooting completed:	Confirmed Cloud Run revision is ready.			Verified IAP redirects to Google OAuth rather than the original HTTP 502.			Verified the configured OAuth client ID and redirect URI.			Added the approved Google account as the OAuth test user.			Completed OAuth consent successfully.			Tested using a fresh private browser session.			Rotated the OAuth client secret once and securely rebound it to IAP.			Verified effective IAP settings and secret fingerprint.			Confirmed the same Error 11 persists after rotation.			Confirmed that the existing direct Cloud Run Console interface does not expose Auto Generate Credentials without a configuration change/redeployment.	Questions:	What additional diagnostics can identify why IAP rejects the OAuth client configuration after successful consent?			Is there a supported method to repair the service-level OAuth binding without disabling IAP, exposing the service publicly or redeploying Cloud Run?			Are there any known restrictions or configuration requirements for External custom OAuth clients used with direct Cloud Run IAP in standalone projects?	We would appreciate guidance on the minimum secure remediation. We can provide sanitized configuration and error evidence if required.No client secrets, authentication tokens or private employee data are included in this report.</description>
            <category>Cloud Security Foundation</category>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 10:16:18 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Does closing a case from a Playbook Block stop all remaining actions?</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/does-closing-a-case-from-a-playbook-block-stop-all-remaining-actions-8482</link>
            <description>Hi everyone,We are reviewing the behavior of the Close Case action in Google SecOps SOAR.We would like to determine whether there are scenarios where an action can still run after another action has closed the case.(this behavior could affect the SOC&#039;s SLA metrics)I haven&#039;t found any official documentation clearly explaining the expected behavior.Could someone help me to clarify these points?Does Close Case officially stop the entire playbook execution?	If the action is executed inside a block, does it stop only the current block or also the parent playbook?	What happens to asynchronous actions that started before the case was closed? Can they continue and complete afterward?	What happens to parallel branches and pending or manual actions?	Can a new action start after the case has been closed, or can only actions that were already running continue?	Is the behavior consistent and reproducible, or can it vary depending on the action type and execution timing?Finally, what is the recommended design pattern?Should the Close Case action always be managed by the parent playbook and placed outside reusable blocks? For example, should a block return an outcome to the parent playbook and let the parent decide whether to close the case?Many tank you for your help!!!</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 16:35:43 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Unable to grant IAM permissions on Firebase project created via Google AI Studio</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/unable-to-grant-iam-permissions-on-firebase-project-created-via-google-ai-studio-8478</link>
            <description>Hello Google Cloud Community,I&#039;m developing a web application using Firebase Authentication and Cloud Firestore. My original Firebase project is associated with Google AI Studio and is currently on the Starter tier.I need to grant a service account from a separate Firebase project permission to access my original Firestore database securely.However, I am encountering the following issues:	When attempting to modify IAM permissions, Google Cloud displays: &quot;Failed to update IAM policy. You do not have the required permissions.&quot;			I cannot access certain service account settings because the iam.serviceAccounts.get permission is missing.			My account does not appear to have the Owner or IAM Administrator role.			I also encountered a RESOURCE_USAGE_RESTRICTION_VIOLATED error involving an organization policy.	My questions are:	How can I identify the administrator or owner who can grant IAM permissions on this project?			Are these restrictions related to the Google AI Studio Starter environment?			Is there an official way to obtain the necessary permissions without migrating my Firebase project?			Can an authorized administrator grant a separate service account the roles/datastore.user role on my existing project?	Important: I need to preserve all existing Firebase Authentication users and Firestore data.Any guidance would be greatly appreciated.Thank you!</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 16:24:03 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>GTI Monitor/Connector Identification within SOAR playbook</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/gti-monitor-connector-identification-within-soar-playbook-8460</link>
            <description>Hey all,What have you found to be the best way to determine which connector a SOAR alert originated from?|We have monitors within GTI, with all of them having their own connector within SecOps. We are looking for either the ability to determine monitor and/or connector.Thanks!</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 15:46:57 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>Tuesday&#039;s Tip of the Week - Retrohunt: Test Your Rules Against the Past</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/tuesday-s-tip-of-the-week-93/tuesday-s-tip-of-the-week-retrohunt-test-your-rules-against-the-past-8484</link>
            <description>October 27, 2026 Audience: SOC managers, detection engineers, incident respondersSummary: Retrohunt runs a YARA-L rule against UDM data you’ve already ingested. Instead of waiting weeks for live detections, you can see how a new rule behaves, sweep for new indicators, or scope an incident in a single run. This briefing covers:how retrohunt works and its limits	the settings that keep it from causing problems	four use cases with example rules	dashboard queries for reviewing results	criteria for promoting a rule to live1. Retrohunt compared with the other ways to test a ruleTool			What it does			Saves detections?			Best for		Run test (Rules editor)			Runs the rule over a time range and shows matches in the Test rule results window			No. Results aren’t saved, don’t generate alerts, and don’t appear on the Rules Dashboard.			Checking syntax and logic while you write the rule		Retrohunt			Runs a saved rule version over a historical time range			Yes, labeled as retrohunt detections			Measuring volume and precision before going live, IOC sweeps, incident scoping		Live rule			Runs the rule against incoming data			Yes			Production detection		UDM search			Runs a one-off search for events			No			Quick lookups and pivots on a single indicator		Google notes that Run test results can differ from retrohunt and live results, because the evaluation windows may be aligned differently. Use Run test while you’re writing a rule. Use retrohunt when you need saved detections and real volume numbers to decide whether a rule is ready for production.2. Before you run: checklistCheck			Why		Turn alerting off for the rule			With alerting on, every retrohunt detection creates a SOAR alert. Google warns this can flood the system with overflow cases and temporarily block case creation for other alerts. If you need cases for historical hits, create a new rule version with alerting on and run the retrohunt again.		No more than 3 running at once			That’s the maximum per instance. Parallel retrohunts draw on the same instance resources, so they can slow each other down.		Time range at least as long as the match window			Required for multi-event rules. A rule with over 24h needs at least 24 hours.		Range within your available data			The retrohunt dialog shows the date range you can search.		Know the detection cap			Each rule version can produce 10,000 detections per day, and the count resets at midnight UTC. If a day in your results is at or near 10,000, that count is capped and the real volume is higher.		Save a new rule version after list changes			Rerunning a retrohunt after a reference list update doesn’t reset the daily cap. Removing list items doesn’t delete existing detections. Save a new version of the rule before you retrohunt again. Google documents this for reference lists; treat data tables the same way.		Retrohunt again after every rule edit			Each retrohunt belongs to a specific rule revision, and saving an edit creates a new version.		Don’t promise a finish time			Retrohunts are scheduled based on available system resources, and Google says completion times vary.		3. How to run a retrohuntIn the console:Open the Rules Dashboard, click the rule’s options icon, and select Yara-L Retrohunt.	Choose the start and end times. The default range is one week.	Click RUN. Progress shows in the rule’s detections view. If you cancel a run partway through, you keep the detections it already found.	To see earlier runs, click the date range link in the rule’s detections view. Each run’s results appear in the Timeline and Detections graph.Through the API (for automation and detection-as-code):The caller needs the chronicle.retrohunts.create IAM permission.curl -X POST \  -H &quot;Authorization: Bearer $(gcloud auth print-access-token)&quot; \  -H &quot;Content-Type: application/json&quot; \  &quot;https://REGION-chronicle.googleapis.com/v1/projects/PROJECT_ID/locations/REGION/instances/INSTANCE_ID/rules/RULE_ID/retrohunts&quot; \  -d &#039;{&quot;processInterval&quot;: {&quot;startTime&quot;: &quot;2026-09-27T00:00:00Z&quot;, &quot;endTime&quot;: &quot;2026-10-27T00:00:00Z&quot;}}&#039;Item			Detail		REGION			Your instance’s region, for example us or europe-west2		Response			A long-running operation, not the retrohunt itself		Tracking progress			Send a GET to the same /retrohunts path to list the rule’s retrohunts. Then use retrohunts.get with the retrohunt’s name.		state			RUNNING, DONE, CANCELLED, or FAILED		progressPercentage			0 to 100		4. Use casesUse case 1: Validate and tune a new ruleScenario: You want to detect lateral movement where one source opens RDP connections to many hosts.Version 1:rule rdp_fan_out {  meta:    author = &quot;Detection Engineering&quot;    description = &quot;One source connects to 5 or more distinct hosts over RDP within 1 hour&quot;    severity = &quot;Medium&quot;  events:    $e.metadata.event_type = &quot;NETWORK_CONNECTION&quot;    $e.target.port = 3389    $e.principal.ip = $src    $e.target.ip = $dst  match:    $src over 1h  outcome:    $distinct_targets = count_distinct($dst)    $source_hosts = array_distinct($e.principal.hostname)  condition:    $e and $distinct_targets &amp;gt;= 5}Tuning loop (the numbers are only an example):Run a 7-day retrohunt with alerting off. It returns about 1,400 detections, roughly 200 a day.	Find where the detections come from. Use the top sources query in Section 5. Most of the volume comes from three machines: a jump host, a vulnerability scanner, and an IT management server.	Add exclusions. Put those hosts in a data table and add one line to the events: section:	not $e.principal.hostname in %rdp_admin_hosts.hostname		Save and run again. Saving creates version 2. Retrohunt the same 7 days. This time it returns 6 detections, and 4 of them line up with a known red team exercise.	Widen the range. Run it over 30 days to confirm the rule stays quiet, then enable live detection.Note: Once a rule uses a data table, it can’t run at real-time frequency. Google doesn’t support real time for rules with data tables.Use case 2: Sweep for new threat intel indicatorsScenario: Your intel team receives IP addresses and domains linked to an active campaign. You need to know whether any of them have already appeared in your environment.Check IoC matching first. If the indicators came from a threat intel feed already integrated with SecOps, SecOps may have matched them already. Use retrohunt for indicators you collected yourself, for example from a vendor report, an ISAC alert, or your own analysis.Set up two data tables. Use campaign_x_ips with an ip column and campaign_x_domains with a domain column. Keeping them separate means neither table has blank cells.rule ti_campaign_x_sweep {  meta:    author = &quot;Threat Intel&quot;    description = &quot;Connections or DNS lookups to campaign X indicators&quot;    severity = &quot;High&quot;  events:    (      $e.target.ip in %campaign_x_ips.ip or      $e.network.dns.questions.name in %campaign_x_domains.domain    )    $e.principal.ip = $src  match:    $src over 1h  outcome:    $hostnames = array_distinct($e.principal.hostname)    $matched_ips = array_distinct($e.target.ip)    $matched_domains = array_distinct($e.network.dns.questions.name)    $first_seen = min($e.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)  condition:    $e}Design choice			Reason		Two lookups in one OR block			YARA-L lets you join data table lookups with OR when they all reference the same event variable. You can’t mix a normal field comparison and a data table lookup inside the same parentheses, so keep other conditions on their own lines.		Grouped on source IP, not hostname			YARA-L drops events where a match variable is empty. Many firewall and DNS logs have no hostname, so grouping on hostname would silently skip them. Hostnames still appear in the outcome when the logs include them.		How to run it: Retrohunt as far back as your retention and the campaign timeline justify. Then leave the rule live with alerting on so future hits come through as cases. Because the rule uses data tables, it can’t run in real time, so expect some delay on live hits.When indicators change: Update the data tables, save a new rule version, and retrohunt again.Use case 3: Scope an incidentScenario: Forensics gives you SHA-256 hashes from a compromised host. You need to know how far back the activity goes and which other machines ran the same files.rule ir_case_1234_hash_sweep {  meta:    author = &quot;Incident Response&quot;    description = &quot;Process launches matching hashes from IR case 1234&quot;    severity = &quot;High&quot;  events:    $e.metadata.event_type = &quot;PROCESS_LAUNCH&quot;    $e.target.process.file.sha256 in %ir_case_1234_hashes.sha256    $e.principal.hostname = $host  match:    $host over 24h  outcome:    $first_seen = min($e.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)    $last_seen = max($e.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)    $users = array_distinct($e.principal.user.userid)  condition:    $e}Tip			Detail		Match the hash case			Store hashes in the same case your EDR logs use, usually lowercase. Lookups are case-sensitive by default.		Watch for empty hostnames			If your EDR leaves hostname empty on some events, those events are skipped (same reason as use case 2). Group on principal.asset_id or principal.ip instead.		Use the dashboard for the full list			Lists in rule outcomes, like $users, are capped at 25 values. The scoping query in Section 5 shows every affected host with its first and last activity.		Check first-seen dates			A host whose first activity comes before the earliest known compromise means the intrusion started earlier than you thought.		Repeat until nothing new appears			Each new indicator from forensics, such as a C2 domain, service name, or command line, goes into a new rule version and another retrohunt. Scoping is done when a sweep stops finding new hosts.		Use case 4: Check that tuning didn’t drop real detectionsBefore you deploy a tuned version, retrohunt it over the same time range you used for the previous version, then compare the two result sets. Every true positive from the old version should still appear in the new one. If one disappeared, your exclusion is too broad.5. Reading the results: dashboard queriesRetrohunt detections are labeled in the detection.detection_timing_details field, so you can chart them separately from live detections. Both queries use the Detections data source. If the results look cut short, widen the dashboard time range to cover the full retrohunt window.Retrohunt detections per rule, by the date the activity happened:detection.detection_timing_details = &quot;DETECTION_TIMING_DETAILS_RETROHUNT&quot;$rule_name = detection.detection.rule_name$event_date = timestamp.get_date(detection.collection_elements.references.event.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)match:  $rule_name, $event_dateoutcome:  $detection_count = count_distinct(detection.id)order:  $event_date ascUse this chart for capacity planning. The daily counts are roughly what the SOC would have received if the rule had been live.Scoping: affected hosts with first and last activity:detection.detection_timing_details = &quot;DETECTION_TIMING_DETAILS_RETROHUNT&quot;detection.detection.rule_name = &quot;ir_case_1234_hash_sweep&quot;$host = group(detection.collection_elements.references.event.principal.hostname, detection.collection_elements.references.event.target.hostname)$host != &quot;&quot;match:  $hostoutcome:  $detection_count = count_distinct(detection.id)  $first_seen = timestamp.get_timestamp(min(detection.collection_elements.references.event.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds))  $last_seen = timestamp.get_timestamp(max(detection.collection_elements.references.event.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds))order:  $first_seen ascChange the rule name for each sweep.To find top sources for tuning (use case 1):Replace the group() line with $host = detection.collection_elements.references.event.principal.hostname. If your network logs don’t carry hostnames, use principal.ip instead.	Order by $detection_count desc.The top rows are your exclusion candidates.How to read the results:Result			Meaning			Action		Thousands of detections from a few hosts or users			Known-benign sources such as admin tools or scanners			Exclude them with a data table, then run again		Thousands of detections spread evenly			The logic is too broad			Tighten the conditions or raise the thresholds		A day at or near 10,000 detections			You hit the daily cap, so real volume is higher			The rule is far too noisy to deploy		A handful of detections that match known activity			The rule works as intended			Widen the range, then promote it		Zero detections			Either nothing happened, or the rule can’t see the activity			Test with a known positive before trusting the result		Don’t trust a zero without a known positive.Run the technique in a test environment, for example an Atomic Red Team test or a red team exercise.	Retrohunt the window that covers it.	If the rule doesn’t fire, use the Week 19 field coverage query to check that the log source is arriving and the fields the rule needs are populated.6. For SOC managers: promotion criteria and capacityCriteria for promoting a rule to live (a starting point; adjust to your team):Criterion			Suggested bar		Retrohunt range			At least 30 days, or at least 7 days for very high-volume sources		Known-positive test			The rule fires on a known positive within the range		Expected volume			Average daily detections fit within triage capacity (below)		Precision			All detections reviewed, or a sample of at least 20, meeting a true positive rate your team has agreed on		Regression check			Every true positive from the previous version is still detected (use case 4)		Record kept			Rule name and version, time range, detection count, true and false positive counts, reviewer, and date		Capacity math: Multiply expected daily detections by average triage minutes per alert. For example, 40 a day at 10 minutes each is about 6.7 analyst hours a day. If you don’t have that capacity, tune the rule further, automate its enrichment, or hold it back.Validation record: Keep promotion evidence in a data table such as rule_validation_log, with these columns:rule	version	time range	detections	true positives	false positives	reviewer	dateThe table is searchable inside SecOps and survives staff changes. It also gives auditors evidence when they ask how you validate detections.Keep retrohunts out of performance metrics: A retrohunt detection is created when the retrohunt runs, but the events behind it can be weeks old. If retrohunt detections land in your Week 18 MTTD query or Week 17 detection volume charts, one retrohunt shows up as a large spike in both. Add this filter to those queries. In the MTTD query, put it inside the per_alert stage next to the alert_state filter.not detection.detection_timing_details = &quot;DETECTION_TIMING_DETAILS_RETROHUNT&quot;7. For response engineers: operating retrohuntsPractice			How		Automate in the pipeline			In a detection-as-code workflow: create or update the rule with alerting off, start a retrohunt through the API, wait for DONE, pull the detection count, and compare it with the promotion criteria. Enable alerting only after it passes.		Protect the three slots during an incident			Scoping sweeps come first. Cancel lower-priority runs, like routine tuning, so incident work can start.		Start narrow, then widen			Run 24 hours, then 7 days, then 30, then 90. Broad rules over long ranges take the longest and are the most likely to hit the daily cap.		Fix resource errors with filters			If a retrohunt fails with “Spilled bytes exceed limit” or “Your query resource usage is exceeding its allocation”, the rule is processing too many events. Google’s fix for both is to add filters, starting with metadata.log_type.		 8. Things to know about historical dataTopic			Detail		Parser changes			Retrohunt runs against UDM events as they were stored. Google doesn’t describe any way to reparse historical data after a parser update, so assume older events keep their original field mappings. A rule that depends on a recently fixed field can miss older activity even when the rule is correct.		New UDM fields			If a rule uses a field added to the schema recently, a retrohunt over an earlier range can fail with “Accessing a new field that did not exist for this time range”. Start the range after the field existed, or change the rule to handle the field being empty.		Removed list items			Google doesn’t delete detections when you remove items from a reference list. Save a new rule version to get clean results.		Run time			Retrohunts are scheduled when resources are available, so completion time varies. Don’t commit to an incident scoping deadline until the run has started.		9. Action itemsMake “disable alerting before a retrohunt” a written standard step	Adopt the promotion criteria, and require a retrohunt record before any rule goes live	Build the two retrohunt dashboard charts: volume by event date, and scoping by host	Create a rule_validation_log data table for promotion evidence	Set up data table templates for IOC sweeps (separate IP and domain tables) and incident hash sweeps	Add a retrohunt step to the detection-as-code pipeline through the API	Exclude retrohunt detections from MTTD and detection volume charts  </description>
            <category>Tuesday&#039;s Tip of the Week</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 15:35:09 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>How to acquire the Operation Cymbal: Cold Room event entry key?</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/how-to-acquire-the-operation-cymbal-cold-room-event-entry-key-8483</link>
            <description>I want to enroll in the event through the HacktheBox platform, but whenever I try to enter the event it requests the entry key</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 06:07:37 +0100</pubDate>
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                <item>
            <title>What’s New in Google SecOps: 2026–10–26</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/what-s-new-in-secops-91/what-s-new-in-google-secops-2026-10-26-8481</link>
            <description>What’s New in Google SecOps for the interval Oct 19th through Oct 25th, 2026. What’s New in Google SecOps, October 25th 2026 Highlights  New to Google SecOps: Don’t Get Aggravated, It’s Just |&amp;gt; AGGREGATE: John Stoner introduces the new AGGREGATE SQL pipe operator in Google SecOps for statistical analysis and grouping of events. Adoption Guide: Best practices for using Gemini for Rules: Ivan Ninichuck outlines best practices for leveraging Gemini’s Detection Engineering Agent to automate and enhance threat detection. PHP Agentic Detection: A SecOps UEBA Workflow: Greg Kushmerek details a SecOps UEBA workflow designed to detect agent-like behavior in PHP environments. Product Updates &amp;amp; New Features Google SecOps  Release Notes from Google Cloud Docs	Google SecOps has added a new feature allowing users to configure whether closed cases are reopened when new alerts arrive with the same Source Grouping Identifier. Read More			Updates to Google Chronicle SOAR marketplace integrations, including the addition of a new Google Threat Intelligence — GTI Alerts Connector and an improvement to Siemplify’s case loading.Read More	SecOps SIEM Updated Doc: Investigation &amp;gt; Outer Joins from Google Cloud Docs	New Syntax for Detection Rules: Outer joins are now achievable in detection rules by defining join relationships using equality (=) in the events section and specifying an unbounded condition (# data_table &amp;gt;= 0 for left outer join, # data_table = 0 for anti-join exclusion) in the condition section.			Comprehensive Examples: New rule examples are provided for left outer joins (enrichment) and anti-joins (exclusion), demonstrating single-column and multi-column scenarios.			Null Handling Guidance: Includes best practices for handling null values from unmatched join fields in the outcome section using functions like strings.coalesce and conditional if expressions.			Correction/Clarification: The previous statement that outer joins are not supported in detection rules has been clarified; explicit left join/right join keywords are not used, but the functionality is available through specific condition-based logic.	 Updated Doc: Detection &amp;gt; Ati Fusion Feed from Google Cloud Docs	Processing Differences: A note clarifies that the ingestion and processing methods for GTI_IOC feed IoCs differ from legacy feeds, which may lead to discrepancies in IoC counts or rule matches.			IoC Stability: It is now explained that the GTI_IOC feed includes both stable (verified, high confidence) and unreviewed (pending verification) IoCs.			Ingestion Filtering Criteria: A new section details how Google SecOps filters GTI_IOC feed data to ensure high fidelity. IoCs are ingested if they meet at least one of the following criteria:- GTI confidence score of 80 or higher.- GTI verdict of malicious.- Known threat association.			Unreviewed IoC Tagging: Unreviewed IoCs that meet the ingestion criteria are marked with metadata.threat.stable = false until they are fully reviewed and validated, at which point the tag changes to true.	 Updated Doc: Investigation &amp;gt; UDM Search from Google Cloud Docs	Added a new permission requirement: chronicle.instances.suggestQueryFields is now needed for accessing “Historical usage ranking for UDM field auto-suggestions” in the query editor, specifically when using custom IAM roles.	 Updated Doc: Preview &amp;gt; Big Query from Google Cloud Docs	Added a note clarifying the processing and expected latency for “future events.” These events, where metadata.event_timestamp is later than metadata.ingested_timestamp, are not processed by the real-time pipeline and appear in the events table in approximately 3–4 days.	 Updated Doc: Administration: Create Azure Feed from Google Cloud Docs	The documentation now includes an important warning regarding Azure Event Hub configuration for Google SecOps feeds. Users are explicitly instructed to set the Event Hub’s Cleanup Policy to Delete and not Compact (Log Compaction). Using Compact is cautioned against as it only retains the latest value of a key, which can prevent Google SecOps from ingesting all historical events and may cause the feed to stop processing.	 Updated Doc: Reference: Chronicle API Feeds from Google Cloud Docs	Amazon SQS v2 feeds: Details have been added regarding the supported AWS S3 event notification types. It’s explicitly stated that Google SecOps uses Google Cloud Storage Transfer Service (STS) for these feeds, which enforces a strict allowlist of event types. Supported event types now include ObjectCreated:Put, ObjectCreated:Post, ObjectCreated:Copy, ObjectCreated:CompleteMultipartUpload, and ObjectRestore:Completed. Ingestion might fail silently if non-standard event types are received.	 SecOps SOAR Updated Doc: Soar &amp;gt; Building A Custom Integration from Google Cloud Docs	The document has been significantly updated to introduce and prioritize a new “Local IDE &amp;amp; GitHub workflow” as the recommended best practice for building custom integrations. This workflow emphasizes modern GitOps practices, local development with preferred IDEs, and version control via GitHub. It introduces the Marketplace CLI tool (mp CLI) and uv package manager as core tools for this process, outlining a conceptual GitOps lifecycle.			The previous method of building integrations directly within the built-in SOAR IDE is now positioned as an “Alternative” for legacy environments or quick prototypes. Extensive, detailed instructions for mp CLI setup and advanced dependency management using uv have been removed from this document and are now referenced as external links to the official Chronicle Content Hub GitHub Repository for up-to-date technical details.	 Updated Doc: Soar &amp;gt; My First Integration from Google Cloud Docs	Legacy Workflow Designation: The existing method of building custom integrations using the built-in IDE is now explicitly labeled as a “legacy workflow.” While still supported for rapid prototyping, it’s no longer the recommended best practice.			Modern GitOps Workflow: The document now strongly advocates for a modern GitOps workflow, where integrations are developed locally using a user’s own IDE and managed via GitHub. A link to new documentation detailing this approach has been added.			Python Version Update: The default Python version used for custom integrations has been upgraded from Python 3.7 to Python 3.11.	 Updated Doc: Soar &amp;gt; Working With Remote Agents &amp;gt; Troubleshooting from Google Cloud Docs	Added a new section, “Remote Agent tasks fail on hardened environments,” detailing how to diagnose and resolve issues where Remote Agent tasks fail on hardened Linux hosts (e.g., RHEL 8 with SELinux, AppArmor, or endpoint security enabled). This includes commands to check SELinux status and audit logs, and solutions like adding security options to docker run/podman run commands, configuring custom security policies for agent directories/executables, or setting SELinux to Permissive mode.	 Google Cloud  Responding to core PHP vulnerabilities CVE-2026–109618 and CVE-2026–109619 from Google Cloud Blog	Two critical vulnerabilities, CVE-2026–109618 and CVE-2026–109619, have been disclosed in the core PHP language runtime, potentially leading to unauthenticated remote code execution and memory disclosure, with Wiz Research and Gemini 4 Argon contributing to their discovery and remediation. Read More	 Google Cloud expands model choice and flexibility, bringing OpenAI models to customers from Google Cloud Blog	Google Cloud is enhancing its model choices by integrating OpenAI models into its Model Garden, providing customers greater flexibility and options for their AI workloads. Read More	 Claude Opus 5.5 and Claude Sonnet 5.5 are now available in Google Antigravity from Google Cloud Blog	Google Antigravity now offers Claude Opus 5.5 and Claude Sonnet 5.5 to Google Cloud customers, providing different AI models for various tasks. Read More	 Developer’s guide to implementing MCP apps in Gemini from Google Cloud Blog	This article is a developer’s guide explaining how to implement MCP Apps in Google’s Gemini to enhance enterprise assistants beyond text-only interactions for visual, multi-step tasks. Read More	 Google named a Leader in the 2026 IDC MarketScape for Agentic AI Platforms from Google Cloud Blog	Google has been recognized as a leader in the 2026 IDC MarketScape for Agentic AI Platforms, highlighting its role in addressing organizational challenges in deploying AI effectively. Read More	 Powering the Agent Development Lifecycle with any framework, from ADK to LangChain and beyond from Google Cloud Blog	The Agents CLI Extension System now supports various frameworks like LangChain, providing a unified deployment and evaluation workflow for AI agent development and enabling custom extensions for policy enforcement. Read More	 Adoption Guides &amp;amp; Deep Dives  ️ New to Google SecOps: Don’t Get Aggravated, It’s Just |&amp;gt; AGGREGATE from Google Cloud Security Community	The article from John Stoner introduces the new AGGREGATE SQL pipe operator in Google Security Operations (SecOps), which facilitates statistical analysis and grouping of events within datasets. Read More	 Community &amp;amp; Events  Tuesday’s Tip of the Week — Who Watches the Watchmen? Detecting When Your Detections Break from Google Cloud Security Community	This article addresses the silent failure of security detection pipelines, such as disabled rules or stopped log sources, and outlines methods for detection, relevant SecOps features, and setup procedures for alerts and dashboards. Read More	  Adoption Guide: Best practices for using Gemini for Rules from Google Cloud Security Community	This adoption guide outlines best practices for using Gemini for Rules within Google SecOps, emphasizing how its Detection Engineering Agent automates and systematically enhances threat detection through an end-to-end framework. Read More	 3rd Party Blogs   PHP Agentic Detection: A SecOps UEBA Workflow from Greg Kushmerek	The article from Greg Kushmerek outlines a SecOps UEBA workflow specifically designed for detecting agent-like behavior within PHP environments. Read More	Wiz  ASPM in the AI Era Part 2: Prioritize Exploitable Risks with Code-to-Cloud Context from Wiz Blog	This article, part of a series, focuses on enhancing Application Security Posture Management (ASPM) in the AI era by prioritizing exploitable risks using comprehensive code-to-cloud context to reduce triage times. Read More	 ARTEX in the Wild: Storm-0940 Expands Targeting of IT and Software Vendors from Wiz Blog	Wiz Research is tracking the ARTEX-using actor, Storm-0940, which is expanding its targeting of IT and software vendors, including attacks on Okta, Entra, and Cognito. Read More	 LiteLLM Compromised, Steals Credentials from Wiz Blog	A malicious version (1.107.0) of the LiteLLM package was uploaded to PyPI and Docker, actively stealing browser, cloud, and AI credentials. Read More	 PHP2Shell: AI uncovers critical RCE vulnerabilities affecting 70% of the Internet from Wiz Blog	AI has uncovered critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities in the core PHP engine, impacting 70% of the internet and allowing for Heartbleed-style memory disclosure. Read More	 Wiz Sensor on GKE. 1-Click Runtime Protection, Now Native from Wiz Blog	Wiz has launched a new native, one-click runtime protection add-on for Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE), automating deployment and providing kernel-level eBPF threat detection. Read More	 From Phishing to LLMjacking: Threat Actors Targeting Cloud Billing Accounts for LLM Usage from Wiz Blog	Threat actors are employing sophisticated phishing techniques, starting with malicious Google Search ads, to steal credentials and hijack cloud billing accounts. This allows them to incur hundreds of thousands of dollars in unauthorized Large Language Model (LLM) API usage. Read More	 Supply Chain Zero Days: Closing the Gap Between Publication and Detection from Wiz Blog	The article describes how Wiz’s supply chain pipeline can detect zero-day compromises in trusted software packages at the point of publication, enabling early detection before CVEs are issued. Read More	 Loud, Fast, and Everywhere: Anatomy of a Real AI-Driven Cloud Attack from Wiz Blog	The article analyzes real AI-driven cloud attacks impacting various cloud components like Kubernetes and CI/CD, and offers insights into their behavior and detection. Read More	 Platform Issues  RESOLVED: Google SecOps (SIEM and SOAR) customers are experiencing issues in the europe-west2 region from Google Cloud Status	Google Security Operations (SIEM and SOAR) customers in the europe-west2 region are experiencing an incident, which began on Monday, 2026–10–19 23:08 PDT. Read More	 RESOLVED: Google Security Operations (SIEM) customers may experience brief, intermittent delays or errors when running searches from Google Cloud Status	Google Security Operations (SIEM) customers are experiencing brief, intermittent delays and errors when running searches, an incident that began on October 18, 2026. Read More</description>
            <category>What&#039;s New in SecOps</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 12:30:24 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Android OAuth Client Registration Conflict — Recover Existing SHA-1 Without Original Developer Access</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/cloud-security-foundation-7/android-oauth-client-registration-conflict-recover-existing-sha-1-without-original-developer-access-8480</link>
            <description>Hello Google Cloud Security Community,I am seeking guidance on recovering an existing Android OAuth 2.0 client registration for Rimbers, a published Android application operated under Damac Hills Company.Application details: Application: Rimbers   Android package name: com.damac.rimber   Authentication: Flutter Google Sign-In with Supabase Auth   Current Google Cloud project: versatile-skein-508811-v6   Historical Google Cloud project number: [removed by moderator] (possible connection, not confirmed) Problem:Google Sign-In fails in our published Android application with unknownError [28444] before obtaining the Google ID token.When attempting to register the existing Android package name and Google Play app-signing SHA-1 in our current Google Cloud project, Google returns:&quot;The request failed because the Android package name and fingerprint are already in use.&quot;This suggests the package name and certificate fingerprint are already registered in another Google Cloud project, potentially controlled by the original developer.We do not have access to the original developer&#039;s Google account.Our questions: Is there an official process for identifying or recovering an Android OAuth registration associated with an inaccessible Google Cloud project?   Can Google verify Google Play Console ownership and help resolve the duplicate registration?   Is there a supported way to migrate or release the Android OAuth registration without changing the published application&#039;s package name or signing certificate?   Which Google support or escalation channel handles this type of OAuth ownership conflict? We can provide Google Play Console ownership evidence and the official signing certificate fingerprints through an appropriate private support channel.We want to preserve the existing published application, its signing identity, and working iOS Google Sign-In.Thank you for any guidance.</description>
            <category>Cloud Security Foundation</category>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 05:53:23 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Google SecOps Dashboards Drilldown Not Working on Individual Array Elements</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/google-secops-dashboards-drilldown-not-working-on-individual-array-elements-8420</link>
            <description>I&#039;m trying to configure drilldown functionality on a Table widget in Google SecOps Dashboards, where one of the displayed fields is an array (repeated field). I&#039;m running into a rendering/drilldown limitation and would appreciate guidance or confirmation if this is a known gap.metadata.log_type = &quot;ZSCALER_DNS&quot;additional.fields[&quot;dns_record_type&quot;] = &quot;A&quot;network.dns.questions.name = $requestnetwork.dns.answers.data = $responsematch:    $requestoutcome:    $ips = array_distinct($response)limit:    10000This groups results by $request (the queried domain) and aggregates all resolved IPs into a deduplicated array $ips.Problem:When $ips is displayed as a column in a Table widget, the array is rendered as a single comma-separated string in one cell, e.g.:142.250.122.94, 142.251.106.94, 142.250.118.94  I configured a drilldown mapping on $ips pointing to the UDM field network.dns.answers.data (operator . However, since the entire array is flattened into one string value per cell, clicking on it attempts to search for the full concatenated string as a single value — rather than letting me click an individual IP and drill down into just that value.What I&#039;m trying to achieve:I want each IP address within the array to be individually clickable, triggering a drilldown search for network.dns.answers.data = &amp;lt;that specific IP&amp;gt; — while still keeping my match clause scoped to $request only (i.e., without exploding the aggregation at the query level by adding $response/network.dns.answers.data into the match block, which would change the grouping granularity of my results).</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 14:20:48 +0200</pubDate>
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            <title>Announcing the 13th FLARE-On Challenge</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/community-blog-42/announcing-the-13th-flare-on-challenge-8279</link>
            <description>Author: Nick Harbour, Reverse Engineer We are proud to officially announce the thirteenth edition of the FLARE-On challenge! This is a Reverse Engineering contest that runs online for four weeks starting this Friday (September 25th, 2026) at 8pm Eastern. It will run for four weeks and official solutions and all challenge binaries will be available to download at the conclusion of the contest. The FLARE team has run this renowned capture-the-flag (CTF) competition for over a decade and provided a wealth of fun and engaging challenges for people looking to improve their reverse engineering and malware analysis skills. The challenges start easy and get harder with each stage. Complete all nine stages and earn a spot on our hall-of-fame and, while supplies last, win a small token of our appreciation. Head over to the official FLARE-On website to follow the live countdown timer, and trial run your AI assistants on the challenges and solutions from previous years. Follow the hashtag #flareon13 on Twitter for the latest updates and announcements throughout the contest. If you are looking for a way to schedule search in a Playbook leveraging the Synchronous API please refer to this article from Chris Martin https://medium.com/@thatsiemguy/windowing-and-scheduling-2be63779cd0a</description>
            <category>Community Blog</category>
            <pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 08:47:01 +0200</pubDate>
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            <title>Limitation in IP Enrichment via Entity Context</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/limitation-in-ip-enrichment-via-entity-context-8476</link>
            <description>Hi All,i was trying to ASN enrichment via Entity Context I tried both GLOBAL and ENTITY context but unable to trigger rule Code Snippet $ipcti.graph.entity.artifact.ip = $source_ip  //  e.g. 8.8.8.8(             $ipcti.graph.metadata.source_type = &quot;GLOBAL_CONTEXT&quot;              or              $ipcti.graph.metadata.source_type = &quot;ENTITY_CONTEXT&quot;        )        $ipcti.graph.metadata.entity_type = &quot;IP_ADDRESS&quot;        $ipcti.graph.entity.artifact.network.asn = /google|xyz/ nocaseany suggestion to enrich asn ?</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:26:57 +0200</pubDate>
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            <title>FLARE-On 13 Challenge Solutions</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/community-blog-42/flare-on-13-challenge-solutions-8475</link>
            <description>Author: Nick Harbour, Reverse Engineer The 13th annual FLARE-On contest has come to a close. This year proved to be a pivotal year for the venerable and celebrated Capture-the-flag contest, as AI solvers flooded the early scoreboards and leaderboards in an unprecedented fashion. Over 600 players finished this year with 89 of those coming within the first 24 hours. The prize for this year’s contest is a coin! FLARE-On has not had a coin prize since the first contest in 2014. These prizes were available to the first finishers while supplies lasted.  We would like to thank the challenge authors individually for their hard work and contributions this year:FLAreCAPTCHA - Nick Harbour (@nickharbour)	The Ghost Stream - Deepak Rajput (@deepakrajput)	FlareOn13.doc - Ange Albertini (@corkami)	ToxicMiner - Ana Maria Martinez Gomez (@ana06@fosstodon.org)	CatThief - Nick Taylor (@NickTaylorRE)	ThreatInvaders - Vince Weyell (@weyell)	FlareCalc - Paul Tarter (@woggins)	crux - Sam Kim (@sdkim)	NeonOutRun - Mustafa Nasser (@mustafanasser)All the binaries and solutions from this year’s challenge are now posted to the FLARE-On Website.  Email flare-external@google.com to join our mailing list. Your information will not be shared and will only be used to share announcements about FLARE’s community support.</description>
            <category>Community Blog</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:45:13 +0200</pubDate>
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            <title>Check user that last updated the rule</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/check-user-that-last-updated-the-rule-8438</link>
            <description>Hi, is there a way to check the user that has last updated a rule from the SecOps platform without checking cloud looging? </description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 19:42:18 +0200</pubDate>
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            <title>Unable to create manual case via SOAR API without setting data access scope for relevant environment</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/unable-to-create-manual-case-via-soar-api-without-setting-data-access-scope-for-relevant-environment-8257</link>
            <description>I have a workflow that requires a case be created in an environment if certain conditions are met. I was able to create a custom action to do this fine a few weeks ago, but since a new scope (also the first scope) was added in our SIEM settings, I notice the action is failing. Error: {&quot;errorCode&quot;:2000,&quot;errorMessage&quot;:&quot;DataAccessScope is required.&quot;,&quot;innerException&quot;:null,&quot;innerExceptionType&quot;:null, This new scope has nothing to do with the environment I am trying to create the case for. The environment itself does not have any scopes applied to it at all, it is ‘Global’. The Swagger docs for the CreateManualCase endpoint specify dataAccessScope should be a string, I’ve tried a selection of strings such as “*”, “Global”, “&amp;lt;ENVIRONMENT_NAME” etc but have had no luck. I’ve also tried not settings it obviously.  Is there a specific string I should be using here? Or should I create a new scope with access to all data? Thanks</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 19:40:20 +0200</pubDate>
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            <title>Can the Salesforce SOAR integration automatically create and synchronize tickets from Google SecOps cases?</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/can-the-salesforce-soar-integration-automatically-create-and-synchronize-tickets-from-google-secops-cases-8465</link>
            <description>Hi everyone,I’m evaluating the Salesforce integration for Google SecOps SOAR and would like to confirm whether it supports this workflow:A case is created in Google SecOps from any connected alert source.	A corresponding Salesforce Case (ticket) is created automatically.	Relevant changes in SecOps, such as priority updates, are reflected in the Salesforce ticket.	When I close the case in SecOps, the associated Salesforce ticket closes automatically.I would use Salesforce to escalate cases to customers and communicate through the customer portal instead of email. For now, I don’t need customer replies in Salesforce to synchronize back to SecOps.I already have Google SecOps SOAR with playbooks enabled.My questions are:Does this SOAR integration support creating and updating Salesforce tickets from SecOps, or is it intended only for ingesting Salesforce data into SecOps? I want to clarify the difference between this integration and the Salesforce SIEM ingestion feed.	Is the recommended approach to use the integration’s Create Case, Update Case, and Close Case actions within playbooks?	How can I synchronize subsequent changes, especially case closure after the initial playbook has completed? Should I use case-level triggers, a scheduled job, or a custom integration?	How should I maintain a one-to-one relationship between each SecOps case and its Salesforce ticket, prevent duplicates, and associate the ticket with the correct customer account?Has anyone implemented a similar workflow? I’d appreciate any practical experience, known limitations, or recommendations.Thanks!</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 17:36:50 +0200</pubDate>
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            <title>Unable to use results of fetched events in SAR playbook downstream</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/unable-to-use-results-of-fetched-events-in-sar-playbook-downstream-8470</link>
            <description>I have a playbook that fetches UDM events using the ‘GoogleChronicle - Execute UDM Query’ action. This action return events in the format below:{    &quot;events&quot;: n        {&quot;foo&quot;: “bar”},    ]} I need to loop over each event in the events list returned, and send an email containing the dict details. I cannot seem to consume this data in any GSO action without throwing the below error:Message: Unable to cast object of type &#039;System.String&#039; to type &#039;Newtonsoft.Json.Linq.JToken&#039;. I can use the base JSONResult from the action, but after parsing it and trying to access the nersted values, i get the above.  Any idea what could be causing this? Thanks</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 17:20:23 +0200</pubDate>
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            <title>Zero-Downtime Custom Certificate Authority Rotation for GKE Managed Workload Identity</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/community-blog-42/zero-downtime-custom-certificate-authority-rotation-for-gke-managed-workload-identity-8466</link>
            <description>Authors:Andy Lu, Strategic Cloud EngineerLiga Viskinte, Security Cloud Consultant  Implementing mutual TLS (mTLS) in Kubernetes historically introduced significant overhead in certificate management and application reload orchestration. Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) Managed Workload Identity (MWLID) simplifies this by automatically issuing short-lived, auto-rotated SPIFFE certificates to GKE pods. Under the hood, MWLID uses Google Cloud Certificate Authority Service (CAS) as its cryptographic anchor. You generally have two paths: use the Google-managed default Certificate Authority (CA) for a fully automated, zero-management experience, or deploy a Custom CA to meet strict compliance requirements and maintain an isolated root of trust. If compliance dictates the Custom CA route, platform teams inherit the responsibility of managing the underlying root and subordinate CA lifecycles. Rotating active CAs carries inherent operational risks:  prematurely deleting an old CA before its issued leaf certificates expire immediately invalidates active mTLS sessions, leading to service disruption.To eliminate these manual risks, we designed an automated, zero-downtime rotation architecture using a &quot;trust, then swap&quot; model. Here is a look at the underlying architecture. Building a Hands-Off CA Lifecycle Manager The automated CA lifecycle management tool is implemented as an event-driven architecture using Google Cloud native services. The core orchestration and rotation logic is handled by an agent written in Go, deployed on Cloud Run, and scheduled via Cloud Scheduler. Long-running state delays are using Cloud Tasks.   Here is how the automated rotation ensures zero downtime for GKE workloads: 1. The Graceful Flip (Cloud Run + Cloud Scheduler)Routine rotations are triggered automatically by Cloud Scheduler. The Go agent spins up, queries the regional CA pool, and executes a delicate &quot;flip&quot; rather than a destructive replacement:	Discovers the current active Root CA and active Subordinated CAs in the pool.			Creates a new Subordinate CA, generates a Certificate Signing Request (CSR), and signs it against the Root CA.			Enables the new CA so it can start issuing new pod certificates.			Disables the old CA. The old CA stops issuing new certificates but crucially remains in the pool&#039;s trust bundle. This allows existing short-lived pod certificates to safely validate until they naturally expire.	 2. The 48-Hour (Configurable) Waiting Room (Cloud Tasks)You cannot delete the old Subordinate CA while pods are still using certificates signed by it. Pausing a Cloud Run Job for two days to wait for expirations is inefficient and costly. To solve this, the Rotator agent generates a delayed webhook payload, drops it into a Cloud Tasks queue to be executed after a configurable delay (48 hours by default), and exits successfully. 3. The Sweeper (Cloud Run)Two days later, Cloud Tasks dispatches the webhook back to a secondary Cloud Run &quot;Sweeper&quot; job. The Sweeper performs the final cleanup by executing the permanent DELETE API call on the old CA, and spins back down, completing the rotation lifecycle. Designing for Resilience Automating cryptographic operations requires accounting for disruptions from API timeouts and partial state failures. To ensure high availability and prevent accidental key destruction, the lifecycle manager incorporates four core resilience patterns:  Dynamic Auto-DiscoveryTo avoid hardcoding CA resource identifiers in Terraform state, the agent queries Google Cloud CA APIs at runtime to discover the active Root and Subordinate CAs. In newly provisioned Google Cloud projects with empty CA pools, the agent automatically bootstraps the foundational Root CA using a predefined baseline configuration.  The &quot;Paused Job&quot; FailsafePermanent deletion of a cryptographic key is irreversible. The Root CA Scheduler is deployed in PAUSED state to provide a human-in-the-loop safety net. The scheduled job will not execute until an operator explicitly triggers the job. This gives teams a chance to verify cluster health before any keys are permanently destroyed. Staggered Regional Rollouts: To limit the blast radius, the system never rotates CAs in all regions simultaneously. When a global Root CA rotation is triggered, the Go agent uses Cloud Tasks to schedule a staggered regional flip. A configurable 1-hour delay is introduced for each region (e.g., US-East at T+3h, Europe-West at T+4h). This ensures that if a trust propagation issue occurs, it is localized to a single region, giving SREs time to pause the execution before the next region begins.   Two-Layer IdempotencyNetwork blips and API rate limits can interrupt execution mid-rotation. The automation enforces idempotency across two layers. If a Cloud Run job crashes mid-rotation, its inner loop simply retries. If the agent wakes up and finds a CA in a half-rotated state, it knows how to read the resource labels, heal the state, and pick up exactly where it left off. For broader outages, Cloud Tasks acts as the outer loop, handling exponential backoffs automatically. Managing the Root of Trust While regional Subordinate CAs rotate on a short-term cadence, rotating the Root CA is a high-risk operational event with a fleet-wide blast radius. To provide a secure transition, this process uses the same Cloud Run and Cloud Tasks architecture to coordinate a multi-day lifecycle. The system divides the rotation into three phases: staging the new Root, enabling it, and executing regional flips. State payloads are passed through delayed Cloud Tasks to complete the global transition without disrupting active workloads.  Real-Time Alerting: Knowing When Things Break To monitor rotation health, the Cloud Run jobs integrate directly with Google Cloud Monitoring. If an API times out, a step fails, or a critical error occurs during the rotation, the system automatically triggers a log-based metric alert and sends out an email notification to the SRE team. While the process remains automated, operators are brought into the loop if an issue arises. Conclusion Automating management of custom CA lifecycles greatly reduces operational risk. Combining the stateless execution of Cloud Run with the delayed scheduling capabilities of Cloud Tasks creates a reliable, automated pipeline that handles rotation seamlessly in the background. Get started today with the complete Go codebase, Terraform models, and setup runbooks available in the Github Repository.</description>
            <category>Community Blog</category>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 19:13:54 +0200</pubDate>
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            <title>Tuesday&#039;s Tip of the Week - Who Watches the Watchmen? Detecting When Your Detections Break</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/tuesday-s-tip-of-the-week-93/tuesday-s-tip-of-the-week-who-watches-the-watchmen-detecting-when-your-detections-break-8463</link>
            <description>October 20, 2026 Audience: Detection engineers, SecOps platform admins, SOC leadsSummary: Detection pipelines fail silently. A rule gets disabled, a log source stops sending, a parser stops filling in fields, or a rule hits a runtime error. None of these raises an alert by default. This briefing covers how to detect each failure, the SecOps feature that catches it, and the rules, alert policies, and dashboard queries to set up.1. Failure modes and what catches them Failure			What you see			Alert			Dashboard		Rule or curated rule set disabled, or alerting turned off			The rule goes quiet			Approach 1 rules			Approach 1 queries		Log source, collection agent, or feed stops sending			Volume drops to zero for a log type or collector			Approach 2: Cloud Monitoring metric absence			Approach 2: last log received		Parser starts failing			Logs fail parsing, UDM events stop arriving			Approach 2: Normalizer alerts, Health Hub			Approach 2: parsing errors		Parser runs but stops filling in a field			Events arrive, but a key field is empty, so rules that need it never match			n/a			Approach 2: field coverage		Rule runtime error (timeout, resource limit)			The rule stops producing detections			n/a			Section 5		Any of the above, by an unknown cause			A rule’s detection count drops			n/a			Section 5		 2. Approach 1: Monitor detection changes using SecOps audit logsSecOps writes Cloud Audit Logs to the Google Cloud project bound to your instance. The service name is chronicle.googleapis.com and the resource type is audited_resource. Write operations, such as creating rules or changing deployments, are Admin Activity logs. These are always on and can’t be disabled.Which audited method does what:Action			Audited method (matched by suffix, because the API version varies, e.g. v1alpha)		Create, edit, or delete rule text			RuleService.CreateRule, RuleService.UpdateRule, RuleService.DeleteRule		Enable, disable, archive, or change alerting for a rule			RuleService.UpdateRuleDeployment		Change several rules in one request			RuleService.ModifyRules		Enable or disable curated rule sets			CuratedRuleService.BatchUpdateCuratedRuleSetDeployments		 How the GCP_CLOUDAUDIT parser maps these events (from Google’s field mapping reference and changelog):protoPayload.methodName → metadata.product_event_type	protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail → principal.user.email_addresses	protoPayload.status.message → metadata.description	Log severity ERROR → security_result.severity = &quot;ERROR&quot;	For UpdateRuleDeployment:	Request: target.resource.attribute.labels keys req_rule_deployment_name and req_rule_deployment_alerting		Response: keys res_enabled, res_archived, and res_execution_state	Before you build anything:Ingest the audit logs. Bring the bound project’s Cloud Audit Logs into SecOps as GCP_CLOUDAUDIT. Admin Activity logs are all you need here. Google warns that Data Access logs can be very high-volume, so filter them out unless you need them.	Run a test change. Disable and then re-enable a test rule. Then confirm in UDM search that the event shows res_enabled and the other labels above.Rule 1: detection rule disabledrule secops_detection_rule_disabled {  meta:    author = &quot;SecOps Team&quot;    description = &quot;A custom detection rule was disabled&quot;    severity = &quot;Medium&quot;  events:    $e.metadata.log_type = &quot;GCP_CLOUDAUDIT&quot;    $e.metadata.product_event_type = /RuleService\.UpdateRuleDeployment$/    $e.target.resource.attribute.labelsr&quot;res_enabled&quot;] != &quot;true&quot;    $e.principal.user.email_addresses = $actor  match:    $actor over 1h  outcome:    $change_count = count_distinct($e.metadata.id)    $rule_deployments = array_distinct($e.target.resource.attribute.labelsr&quot;req_rule_deployment_name&quot;])  condition:    $e}res_enabled is the rule’s state after the change. The rule checks != &quot;true&quot; rather than = &quot;false&quot; because audit logs often leave out fields that are false. If the response doesn’t contain enabled, the rule is disabled. $rule_deployments shows the rule’s resource ID (…/rules/ru_…), not its display name.Rule 2: any change to how detections are deployedrule secops_detection_deployment_changed {  meta:    author = &quot;SecOps Team&quot;    description = &quot;A rule or curated rule set deployment was changed (enabled, disabled, alerting, archive)&quot;    severity = &quot;Low&quot;  events:    $e.metadata.log_type = &quot;GCP_CLOUDAUDIT&quot;    $e.metadata.product_event_type = /(RuleService\.UpdateRuleDeployment|RuleService\.ModifyRules|CuratedRuleService\.BatchUpdateCuratedRuleSetDeployments)$/    $e.principal.user.email_addresses = $actor  match:    $actor over 1h  outcome:    $change_count = count_distinct($e.metadata.id)    $methods = array_distinct($e.metadata.product_event_type)    $rule_deployments = array_distinct($e.target.resource.attribute.labelsr&quot;req_rule_deployment_name&quot;])    $alerting_requested = array_distinct($e.target.resource.attribute.labelsr&quot;req_rule_deployment_alerting&quot;])    $enabled_after = array_distinct($e.target.resource.attribute.labelsr&quot;res_enabled&quot;])  condition:    $e}This rule makes every deployment change visible to the team, including alerting turned off and curated rule sets changed. Those can’t be isolated reliably from the documented fields alone. Deployment changes are rare in most environments, so the volume stays low. Exclude your CI/CD service account and approved admins with a data table, for example not $actor in %approved_rule_admins.email.Dashboard queries (Events data source)Detection changes per day, by method:metadata.log_type = &quot;GCP_CLOUDAUDIT&quot;metadata.product_event_type = /(RuleService\.(CreateRule|UpdateRule|DeleteRule|UpdateRuleDeployment|ModifyRules)|CuratedRuleService\.BatchUpdateCuratedRuleSetDeployments)$/$method = metadata.product_event_type$date = timestamp.get_date(metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)match:  $date, $methodoutcome:  $change_count = count(metadata.id)order:  $date descWho changed which rule deployment:metadata.log_type = &quot;GCP_CLOUDAUDIT&quot;metadata.product_event_type = /RuleService\.UpdateRuleDeployment$/principal.user.email_addresses != &quot;&quot;$actor = principal.user.email_addresses$rule_deployment = target.resource.attribute.labelst&quot;req_rule_deployment_name&quot;]$enabled_after = target.resource.attribute.labelst&quot;res_enabled&quot;]$date = timestamp.get_date(metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)match:  $date, $actor, $rule_deployment, $enabled_afterorder:  $date desc$enabled_after will be empty when the rule was disabled, for the same reason as Rule 1.Failed rule changes, for example syntax errors from CI/CD:metadata.log_type = &quot;GCP_CLOUDAUDIT&quot;metadata.product_event_type = /RuleService\./security_result.severity = &quot;ERROR&quot;$method = metadata.product_event_type$error = metadata.description$date = timestamp.get_date(metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)match:  $date, $method, $erroroutcome:  $failure_count = count(metadata.id)order:  $date descGoogle now puts the rule’s display name at the start of these error messages, for example rule &quot;Suspicious PowerShell Execution&quot;: compiling rule: syntax error….Add an alert that doesn’t depend on SecOps: If SecOps stops ingesting audit logs, both rules and all three charts go quiet with it. Back them up with a log-based alert in Cloud Logging and Cloud Monitoring, which works even when SecOps ingestion doesn’t:protoPayload.serviceName=&quot;chronicle.googleapis.com&quot;protoPayload.methodName=~&quot;.*RuleService.UpdateRuleDeployment.*&quot;Also include GCP_CLOUDAUDIT in the silent-source alerts in Approach 2.3. Approach 2: Ingestion and parsing healthAlerts in Cloud MonitoringSecOps publishes ingestion metrics to Cloud Monitoring under the Chronicle Collector metric category. Despite the name, these metrics cover every ingestion path: collection agents, feeds, and direct API ingestion.Forwarder deprecation: The legacy SecOps forwarder reaches end of life in January 2027, and Bindplane and OpenTelemetry-based collection agents replace it. Build new silent-source monitoring for agents, and retire forwarder-specific alert policies as you migrate.Silent log type or collector:Create a policy on Chronicle Collector → Ingestion → Total ingested log count.	Under Transform data, set the rolling window function to mean and choose how to group. Group by log_type to get one alert per log type, or by collector_id for one per collector. With no grouping, Cloud Monitoring raises a separate alert for every individual source.	Choose Metric absence as the condition. The alert fires after roughly the rolling window plus the trigger absence time. Google’s sample sets these to a combined 60 minutes.	Scope it to critical sources with filters on log_type, collector_id, or ingestion_source.	For high-availability pairs, filter to both members and set Alert trigger to All time series violate. That way it only fires when every member stops sending.Silent collection agent: Google’s sample policy uses Chronicle Collector → Agent → Exporter Accepted Spans Count, grouped by collector_id, with a metric-absence condition.Host-level silence: If you manage agents through Bindplane, Bindplane has its own silent host monitoring. Use it to catch individual hosts that stop sending, which per-log-type metrics can miss when other hosts keep the volume up.Parser failures: Create a threshold policy on Chronicle Collector → Normalizer (Total record count or Total event count). Filter on the state label (failed_parsing, failed_validation, or failed_indexing) and on log_type.Health Hub (built in, nothing to configure): Health Hub uses a 15-day statistical baseline to flag data sources and parsers as Irregular or Failed. For example, it flags a parser when its error share rises by 5 percentage points or more over the previous day. Its Set Up Alerts link opens Cloud Monitoring for that source.Dashboard queries (Ingestion metrics data source)Last log received per log type, stalest first:ingestion.component = &quot;Ingestion API&quot;$Log_Type = ingestion.log_typematch:  $Log_Typeoutcome:  $Recent_Ingestion_Time = timestamp.get_timestamp(max(ingestion.end_time), &quot;%F %T&quot;)  $Total_Log_Volume = math.round(sum(ingestion.log_volume) / (1000 * 1000 * 1000), 2)order:  $Recent_Ingestion_Time ascLast log received per collector and log type (catches a dead agent even when other agents still send the same log type):ingestion.component = &quot;Ingestion API&quot;$Collector = ingestion.collector_id$Log_Type = ingestion.log_typematch:  $Collector, $Log_Typeoutcome:  $Last_Log_Received = timestamp.get_timestamp(max(ingestion.end_time), &quot;%F %T&quot;)order:  $Last_Log_Received ascParsing errors per log type:ingestion.component = &quot;Normalizer&quot;ingestion.state = &quot;failed_parsing&quot;$Log_Type = ingestion.log_typematch:  $Log_Typeoutcome:  $Parsing_Errors = sum(ingestion.log_count)order:  $Parsing_Errors descNotes on the ingestion queries:Missing log types: A log type or collector that sent nothing during the whole time range won’t appear, so compare against your list of expected sources.	Approximate counts: Ingestion metrics are sampled at intervals, so treat the numbers as indicators, not exact counts.	Access: If your data access scope uses a custom label, ingestion metrics show no data at all.Dashboard query: when a parser stops filling in a field (Events data source)This doesn’t show up as a parsing failure, because the event parses fine and the field is simply empty. To catch it, track how often the fields your rules depend on are filled in. For example, for process command lines from EDR:metadata.log_type = &quot;YOUR_EDR_LOG_TYPE&quot;metadata.event_type = &quot;PROCESS_LAUNCH&quot;$date = timestamp.get_date(metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)match:  $dateoutcome:  $total = count(metadata.id)  $missing_cmdline = sum(if(target.process.command_line = &quot;&quot;, 1, 0))order:  $date ascReplace YOUR_EDR_LOG_TYPE with your log type. If $missing_cmdline suddenly rises as a share of $total, every rule that relies on command lines is blind, even though it still runs without error.4. Approach 3: Rule runtime errorsSecOps reports two kinds of rule errors:Compilation errors are found when you save or test a rule, and you can’t save a rule that has one.	Runtime errors only appear when the rule actually runs: during Run test, live execution, or a retrohunt. For a live or retrohunt run, the error appears as a link on that rule’s Detections page. There’s no central list of every rule’s errors, and no dashboard data source for them.Common runtime errors (from Google’s troubleshooting guide):Error			Cause			Fix		Spilled bytes exceed limit / query resource usage is exceeding its allocation			The rule processes too many events			Add filters, for example on metadata.log_type		Not enough memory for aggregation			Too many keys in the match section			Reduce the match keys		Too many OR and AND operations / Query is too long			Nesting or length limits			Simplify the logic or split the rule		Accessing a new field that did not exist for this time range			The rule references a field that’s newer than the time range it’s running over			Handle a missing value, or start the range after the field existed		Error reading files/database, Internal error			Temporary platform problem			Retry. If it persists, contact support.		Covering the gap without a central list:Test before deploying: Run test every rule before deploying it, and again after any parser change to a log type it depends on.	Chart failed rule changes: Use the failed rule changes query in Approach 1.	Spot rules that stop firing: A rule hitting runtime errors usually stops producing detections, so Section 5’s monitoring catches it.5. The silent failure problem: monitor rule detection countsA rule that stops firing means either the threat went away or the detection broke. You can only tell the difference by watching each rule’s detection count over time.Daily detections per rule (Detections data source):$date = timestamp.get_date(detection.created_time.seconds)$rule_name = detection.detection.rule_namematch:  $date, $rule_nameoutcome:  $detection_count = count_distinct(detection.id)order:  $date ascA day with no detections returns no row for that rule, not a zero. A rule that normally fires 10 times a day and then disappears from the results needs investigating.Last detection for each enabled rule (Rules data source):$status = rules.live_status$status = &quot;ENABLED&quot;$rule_name = rules.display_name$last_detection = timestamp.get_timestamp(rules.latest_detection_time.seconds, &quot;%F %T&quot;)match:  $rule_name, $last_detectionorder:  $last_detection ascRules that have been quiet longest sort to the top. A rule that has never fired shows 1970-01-01 00:00:00. Set this chart’s time range to the maximum, because the Rules data source applies the time range to each rule’s creation date.Weekly triage for a rule that went quiet:Was it changed or disabled? Check the Approach 1 rules and the “who changed which rule deployment” chart.	Did its log source stop? Check Health Hub and the “last log received” charts.	Did a field stop being filled in? Run the field coverage query for the fields the rule uses.	Is it hitting runtime errors? Look for the error link on the rule’s Detections page.	Did the threat actually go away? Only conclude this after ruling out 1–4.6. Action itemsIngest SecOps Admin Activity audit logs (GCP_CLOUDAUDIT). Make a test disable and enable, and confirm the labels in UDM search.	Deploy Rule 1 and Rule 2, plus an out-of-band log-based alert in Cloud Logging	Create Cloud Monitoring metric-absence policies for critical log types and collection agents, including GCP_CLOUDAUDIT. Retire forwarder-specific policies as you migrate to Bindplane.	Create Normalizer failed_parsing threshold alerts for critical log types	Build the dashboard: detection changes, failed rule changes, last log received (by log type and by collector), parsing errors, field coverage, detections per rule, and last detection per rule	Review the dashboard weekly, and make Run test a required step for rule changes and after parser changes  </description>
            <category>Tuesday&#039;s Tip of the Week</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 22:43:45 +0200</pubDate>
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            <title>Does a reply to [removed by moderator] reach the compliance case?</title>
            <link>https://security.googlecloudcommunity.com/google-security-operations-2/does-a-reply-to-removed-by-moderator-reach-the-compliance-case-8344</link>
            <description>My customer data is still on Google Cloud, but my entire account has been banned. I only want to restore access as quickly as possible.After I submitted an appeal, I received an email from an address in this format:google-cloud-compliance-reply+{case-tag}@google.comI was not sure whether replying directly to that message would reach the compliance team and be added to my case. I replied to that email one day ago, but I have not received any response yet.I am in a hurry because the Appeals page only allows 500 characters, and I have also read that I should not submit duplicate appeals. Because of that, I cannot tell whether my case is still moving forward.Could someone confirm the correct way to follow up: wait for a reply to that email, or use another channel? I will not post my project ID, case ID, or the full address here.</description>
            <category>Google Security Operations</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 22:03:19 +0200</pubDate>
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