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Security Vulnerability: Inability to disable Push Prompts in favor of TOTP/Authenticator

  • March 14, 2026
  • 1 reply
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dsollNC
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I am requesting the ability to disable "Google Prompts" (Push notifications) without signing out of my mobile devices. Currently, Google defaults to Push even when a more secure TOTP (authenticator) or hardware key is available. This creates a high risk of "Push Fatigue" attacks where a single accidental tap grants unauthorized access. Users should have the option to choose their primary 2FA method for high-security accounts.

 

I believe this lack of control over 2FA increases the success rate of Account Takeover (ATO) attempts, as attackers can exploit Push Fatigue during the credential recovery process.  Unfortunately, my Gmail address has been compromised in a number of third-party breaches, and I am subject to frequent ATO attempts.  Because I use VPN, a push notification alerting me to a login attempt from a remote city is not necessarily a red flag for me.  But the bigger concern I have is the inadvertent tap--my screen wakes up, my left thumb is in the wrong place, and I’ve given the attacker the keys to the kingdom by accidentally granting them access to my Gmail account.

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dsollNC
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  • March 15, 2026

Noob edits:  Following up on my initial post, I’d like to clarify that I am framing this as a security workflow vulnerability rather than a simple feature request.

I believe the current 'forced push' architecture represents a defect in user intent validation. Specifically, by prioritizing a non-deterministic 'one-tap' authorization over manual, high-assurance factors (TOTP/FIDO2), the system creates an unnecessary attack surface for MFA fatigue.

Additionally, there may be a related vulnerability with automated credential management: Password managers that autofill on recognized domains may inadvertently populate TOTP fields during an ATO attempt, effectively neutralizing the 2FA. A truly secure 'Cloud Security Foundation' must allow for a deterministic security posture where the user—not the service—defines the primary gate.